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ABSTRACT 
Many people would like to believe that nationalism is a thing of the past, a 
dinosaur belonging to some bygone, uncivilized era. Such a belief is not borne out 
by recent history, however. Nationalism occupies the political forum with as much 
force as ever. Yet, in many ways, it remains a mystery to us. The purpose of this 
study is to explore individual motivations involved in the rise of nationalism, in 
addition to the role of structural factors. The linkage employed in this exploration 
is the psychosocial phenomenon of self-identity, including emotions and self-esteem. 
We demonstrate how individual, socially-constructed self-identity accounts for why 
some people embrace nationalism while others eschew it. The methodology employed 
was theoretical and historical analyses of secondary sources and indepth interviews 
with subjects who had some connection with former Yugoslavia, the country utilized 
to test the new model. Our analyses yielded the result that current 
conceptualizations of nationalism from an exclusively macro or micro perspective are 
unsatisfactory; we require a more comprehensive approach wherein the two 
perspectives are integrated. Such an integration necessitates a bridge: hence, our 
new model, which rests on the psychosocial premise, offers a more useful conceptual 
tool for the understanding of nationalism. We conclude that nationalism is first and 
foremost a matter relating to individual social self-identity which takes place within 
a particular context where oppositional forces emerge from structural factors and our 
membership in a particular group becomes paramount. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
2 
Just when talk of the "global vUlage" becomes common among people in daily 
conversation, when some say they are "citizens of the world" and when the nations 
comprising what used to be called "Western Europe" decide to merge into something 
ca11edthe "European Community", ethnic vio1enceexplodeson the international scene. 
When first Slovenia and then Croatia announced their secession from the 
federation of Yugoslavia, elevating their status from mere republic to that of nation, 
probab ly few people in liberal democracies believed that what was to follow would be 
such virulent internecine warfare - virtually unknown in the North American and 
European world for over forty years. Many were shocked when Yugoslav Army tanks 
rolled out of the barracks in Croatian and Slovenian cities in an attempt to put 
Humpty back together again. Those acquainted with the sometimes dark power c:A 
nationalism probably were not. Those people might have realized from the beginning 
how forceful are the passionate feelings that can be stirred by nat~1ism .Ad to 
what extremes it can compel behaviour. 
Nationalism in the twentieth century is very often ~ with the t'tlO 
World Wars. In the case of the First World War, or the "Great War", nationalism 
appeared to be a positive force. It was largely responsible for topp'Kng the old 
empires and helping to usher in political modernity wth regard to nation-statas and 
international relations. It was at the end of that particular war that Woodrow Wilson, 
then President of the United States, made his now-famous liberal pitch for national 
self-determination. However, after the Second World War, the reputation of 
nationalism plunged. It took on the overtones of depravity as the civilized world 
contemplated Nazi atrocities against Jews, Slavs and Gypsies. Nationalism became a 
scourge for many, a thoroughly discredited force considered best to be avoided at 
an costs. 
Such an attitude towards nationalism has carried with it a rather .,1gh price 
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for some countries. Witness the effects it has had on Canada, a country that threw 
open its doors to virtually everyone after the Second World War economically, 
politically and culturally, and now faces a kind of assimilative death at worst (thanks 
to the ever-encroaching shadow of the Goliath to the south) and an ongoing identity 
crisis at best. In Yugoslavia, a country determined to rise from the ashes like a 
Phoenix after the devastation of World War II, as Tiro and his fellows publicly 
outlawed any displays of the ethnic force that had caused so much death and 
destruction, nationalism went underground. There, in the nether regions of the 
private soul, it festered, bubbling up from time to time whenever a leader emerged 
to give it momentum only to be forcefully driven back, until it could no longer be 
contained. Some ten years after the death of the man whose personal vision had 
created the modern state of Yugoslavia and who, some say, was the only one who 
could galvanize it, nationalism took hold again and blood began to spill once more. 
Nationalism is a broad term, often used to encompass anything from patriotism 
toethnlc solidarity. For every theorist of this phenomenon, there isa new approach 
to its definition and study. Part of the problem of understanding it stems from the 
difficulty of delineating what is meant by a nation. The very concept of nation is 
troubling because of its vagueness. Funk and Wagnalls Canadian College Dictionary 
offers two pertinent definitions: (1) "A body of persons associated with a particular 
territory. usually organized under a government, and possessing a distinctive 
cultural and social way of life"; and (2) "A body of persons having a common origin 
and language",t From these definition, specifically the second, it is possible to see 
such a conception of nation could ostensibly be applied to virtually any group of 
people. Any number of people who develop a sense, or consciousness, of themselves 
as having something in common could claim status as a nation. Thus, we might 
envision a group of upper middle class, English-speaking accountants born in 
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Toronto and living in Richmond Hi11coming to see themselves as constituting a nation. 
This characterization may seem amusing or ludicrous, but it conforms sufficiently to 
the above-noted definitions to be at least theoretically possible. A Dictionary of 
Political Thought clarifies to some degree our understanding of what a nation might 
be by explaining that Czechoslovakia consisted of two nations within a single state, 
while the Germans were, until recently, one nation divided into two states.! 
Therefore, a nation is not synonymous with a state, although people who consider 
themselves to constitute a nation often wish to have their own state and gain sove-
reignty. 
Rousseau binds the concepts of nation and state together by asserting that the 
nation-state (a nation of people who govern themselves and have political sover-
eignty) is the most legitimate social contract because the will of the people comprising 
the nation will be in harmony and it is not a will imposed on them by an outsider, but 
by themselves.' Hence, we see how the term nation takes on a somewhat circular de 
facto definition wherein a nation is, inter alia, a group of people who govern 
themselves while a group of people who govern themselves is considered a nation. 
It would seem evident that we must arrive at more satisfactory criteria by which to 
describe the "body of persons" who might constitute the members of a nation or we 
may very well have to concede nationhood to the aforementioned accountants. With 
such vagueness associated with the cornerstone of the whole conceptualization of 
nationalism, it is not difficult to understand why there is little consensus on the def-
inition of and approach to the study of the phenomenon. Some have studied 
nationalism as a social movement or ideology; for others, it is a psychological or 
cultural phenomenon. We have the top-down, macro approach and the bottom-up, 
micro one. 
For the purposes of this study, we will view nationalism simply as po7itica77y 
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mobf7izedethnicity 'in pursuit of somadegreeof autoRomy or SDv.,..,dl1nty4. Ethnicty 
~ "'" 
has been conceptualized by some as. way of labelling and/or stigmatizing people in 
order·to exploit and oppress them.. Such a conceptualization fa. to address 
, 
appropr'iately aU dimensions of the phenomenon, however. We must include in any 
definition of ethn'fcity the positive e"ments which people embrace. These elements 
. 
encompass the vast importance of meaning in its myriad forms. Meaning is derived 
from ancestral origins, cultural traditions, language and religion, and a sense of 
belonging to a group of similar others. 5 Meaning is significant for human beings .. 
I 
we are unable to interpret and understand ourselves and our reality without it. 
I 
Ethnioity also consists of boundaries: those from within the group itself, usuaTIy 
accomplished through the process of socialization, and those from without, achieved 
through intergroup relations.' The boundaries established by outsiders relates to 
the above oonoeptualization of labelling and/or stigmatizing. In other words, 
nationalism is an efforton the part of individuals whoshareasoc1al identity of wh'fch 
a part'fcular ethnicity becomes a significant element around wh'fch these individuals 
organize their political activities and goals. Their ethnicity becomes the standard 
that they bear as they enter the political forum and strive for an end in congruence 
with the way they perceive their standard should be actualized. This is not to say 
that every member has the exact same perception of his/her ethnicity or the same 
reasons why he/she joins in a collective effort or even that there is complete 
agreement as to goals and their realization. There is plasticity in these political 
efforts and they are not necessarily monolithic enterprises. We must exercise 
caution, lest we reify the group to which we refer. This is something we should 
always remember as we strive to understand the total picture of nationalism: that 
there are many facets and that they are ever-changing, ongoing processes arising 
out of interaction. The interaction occurs among members of the same ethnic group, 
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among members of different ethnic groups, between individuals and the state, and 
between individuals and structural factors that arise in any given situation. 
Subjective perceptions and interpretations mediate an these interactions as people 
try to make sense of what is happening to them. 
Therefore, individual self-identity is a very important factor when trying to 
understand nationalism, since this psychosocial component provides the framework 
from which perceptions and interpretations emerge. No one of us is a tabula rasa 
when it comes to understanding a particular issue or event; we an have personality 
traits that have undergone the socialization process of a specific context or contexts 
which, in turn, determine to a great extent how we will articulate to ourselves what 
we are experiencing by providing precedents for like situations or issues. 
From the above, we can see how studies of nationalism that omit the personal, 
individual aspect present skewed portrayals of the phenomenon; at the same time, it 
is apparent that a completely subjective interpretation of nationalism that does not 
include external and structural factors is equally inadequate. We must strive to 
integrate the two. For example, studies of nationalism which place it under the rubric 
of social movements and proceed to analyze the dynamics and structures of social 
movements and demonstrate how nationalism fits into these models doan excellent job 
of presenting the external, structural aspect of the phenomenon. These studies show 
how social movements arise, how they organize and attempt to disseminate informa-
tion, how they make efforts to achieve their goals, the composition of their 
membership and the various stages through which the movement itself passes. These 
are all valuable pieces of information, but they fail really to answer the question of 
why people join them in the first place or why some do and others do not. Without 
an explanation of possible human motivations, their complexity, fluidity and myriad 
variety, these studies lack vitality and seem somewhat deterministic. 
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Studies of nationalism that rely upon the notion of national integration as their 
cornerstone are similarly incomplete: national integration is analyzed in terms of its 
components and processes, such as official language policy and universal education, 
and we learn how, if integration breaks down, nationalism may arise, but this does not 
give us an understanding of why people would comply with these processes of 
integration or, in turn, why they might not. Again, we are left with the impression 
of determinism; that the processes and components exert their power over human 
beings who have little or nochoice but to follow along until somehow something spon-
taneouslyoccurs to awaken them from their slumber and cause disintegration to 
occur. Human motivation is inferred in this scenario but there is little attempt to 
understand its more intimate workings. 
Conversely, to explain away nationalism as a purely psychological or cultural 
identity fails to uncover the reasons why some people behave in some ways some 
times while others do not. If nationalism is little more than personal identification 
with a social or ethnic group wherein cohesiveness mayor may not be a significant 
factor, how do similar interpretations and orientations arise at the same time? If 
nationalism is nothing more than individuals identifying inner feelings vis-a-vis 
certain symbols of ethnicity or even with other members of an ethnic group, how do 
these individuals come to behave in similar fashion? And why at a particular time? 
There must be structural aspects that intervene to provide frameworks for these 
individuals' motivations. 
When there are already so many approaches to the study of nationalism, so 
many inherent difficulties with the concept, what more could another study 
contribute? What stone has been left unturned? What will set this particular study 
apart from the rest is the attempt to integrate the macro and micro perspectives 
using the socially constructed self-identity of individuals as the bridge between the 
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two. Because nationalism is a phenomenon that frequently resurfaces in the world 
and has the power to bring so much change and destruction in its wake, it is 
important to continue to study it, to analyze it as thoroughly and creatively as 
possible to attempt to understand it. We need to explore the factors that contribute 
to its emergence as wen as how these factors might influence people and evoke a 
response. In this way, it may be possible to foresee situations in which the potential 
for emergent nationalism resides and deal with it before it explodes into something 
that would threaten the wen-being of others. The predictability of any phenomenon 
is rather limited whenever human beings are involved, since there is always the 
possibility of spontaneity and creativity, but a more thorough understanding of 
nationalism may nevertheless be a worthwhile contribution, if only to lessen its 
power. If we place human motivations into an equation that includes external and 
structural components, we may be able to see the kinds of responses that might 
emerge and discover an answer that gives us a more complete comprehension. To 
explore nationalism at a grassroots level may offer greater insight into how it func-
tions. 
In this study, we assert that structural and external factors constitute a forum 
in which psychosocial forces emerge and cause people to behave in what may be 
described as nationalistic fashion. These factors will be taken as "oppositional" 
ones.' Individuals experience or perceive the influence of these factors and 
interpret them in accordance with their self-identity. How they perceive themselves 
mayor may not tap into primordial sentiment which may then cause them to feel 
ethnic group solidarity. Ethnic group solidarity may then lead people to become 
nationalistic and behave in a manner that is congruent with such a response. 
Individual self-identity will always act as a mediating device; it will shape the way 
that primordial sentiment is experienced; it will help to determine whether or not 
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ethnic group solidarity will occur and how it will be actualized; and it will influence 
what form nationalism willtake. Win nationalism be incarnated as the organization of 
a political party whoseagenda is dominated by the drive for secession, as is the case 
with the Parti Quebecois and the Scottish National Party? Or win it become some form 
of collective behaviour which includes taking up arms and turning against former 
neighbours? The way that individuals perceive themselves - who they are and how 
they will conduct themselves in accordance with that identity - will determine to a 
great extent which course of action they will choose to follow - provided they have 
a choice, of course. 
Theaforementioned "oppositional" model is an elaboration of the one proposed 
by scott.' Scott's model provides for oppositional forces, real or perceived, which 
cause ethnic group solidarity with primordial sentiment as the intervening variable. 
In other words, ethnic groups may experience opposition in some form; primordial 
sentiment is aroused which, in turn, causes the members of these ethnic groups to 
feel solidarity with each other. As far as it goes, scott's model brings together 
external factors with internal mechanisms. However, it appears to be rather 
unsophisticated and calls for leaps in logic. For example, why should primordial 
sentiment necessarl1y intervene when opposition is experienced or perceived? Is it 
always the case that ethnic group solidarity results when primordial sentiment is 
aroused? How would scott account for members of ethnic groups who feel that their 
group is being oppressed and fail to experience a sense of solidarity with their 
fellows? The model does not allow for consideration of such a scenario. Hence, it is 
important to explore the possibility of other intervening variables, something this 
study will attempt to do. 
In addition, we will attempt to examine the internal dynamics of nationalistic 
organizations to determine whether these are single-minded monoliths or many-
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headed hydras; that is, whether these organizations are unified in terms of goals and 
sentiments or whether there is a divergence between leaders and members or even 
amongst the membership itself. We will view this model of nationalism through the 
lens of the former country of Yugoslavia where various strains of nationalism have 
ripped the country apart, turning neighbours against each other. 
Yugoslavia has been chosen as the case study for this exploration of 
nationalism because it was an experiment in nation-building that faced almost 
impossible odds from the beginning and appeared to be reasonably successful for a 
long time. It was a country comprised of a variety of ethnic groups, religions and 
cultural traditions, of which the two largest ethnic groups, the Serbs and Croats, 
have a fairly lengthy history of mutual suspicion and conflict. Many expected that 
the death of the man whose vision had provided the blueprint for post-1945 
Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tita, would precipitate the disintegration of the country, but 
it did not. Indeed, Yugoslavia continued toexist for another ten years before ethnic 
tensions exploded into secession and b1oodshed. Since a number of different 
nationalisms emerged in the country and have been expressed in the most extreme, 
violent manner, it seems that Yugoslavia is a prime candidate for the study of 
nationalism. 
The methodology employed for this study was primarily a reinterpretive 
analysis of secondary sources, both historical and theoretical. It was particularly 
necessary to rely upon secondary sources for the examination of the former country 
of Yugoslavia. However, in order to acquire some more personal, intimate perspec-
tives on the ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia, interviews were conducted with 
individuals who have some connection to the country and who now reside in North 
America. In addition, we used information gathered from lnterviews given to 
newspapers and magazines. The interviews were limited to people who presently 
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reside in North America because it was not possible for the author to travel to the 
war-torn region to conduct interviews with those actually involved in the conflict. 
This method has acknowledged limitations'; however, since the reason for interview-
ing was not so much to draw conclusions from quantitative data but to gain 
qualitative insight into human motivations, it seemed a viable option. 
To summarize, nationalism has been historically a significant phenomenon in 
world politics and has been responsible for a great deal of change. It has been 
studied in great detail by many scholars, employing a variety of different approaches 
and methods, but is worthy of further study. Because previous analyses have tended 
to examine either external, structuralfactors or individual psychological responses, 
it is necessary to attempt to integrate elements of these two perspectives in order to 
provide a more balanced, holistic approach. This study makes an effort to do so, 
using individual, albeit socially constructed, self-identity as the means for 
integrating the two. The former country of Yugoslavia is utilized as a case study 
because its diversity has given rise to several nationalistic factions which have 
turned on each other in the most extreme, hostile fashion. These nationalistic groups 
have shocked and horrified the world with their ferocity, leaving many, especially 
in Western democracies, shaking their heads and wondering how and why such 
barbarous behaviour could take place in this day and age. The goal of this research 
is to try to explain how and why. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
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To appreciate the diversity of views on nationalism, we shall examine some 
previously-undertaken studies. The purpose of this review is to investigate the 
strengths and weaknesses of these theories and models. In this manner, we hope to 
identify the existing lacunae and attempt to close them by proposing an alternative 
model. The studies chosen for review fall into two main categories (although there 
is certainly overlap between them): (1) external/structural explanations and 
examinations; and (2) psychological/cultural approaches. The first category includes 
the study of nationalism as a social movement and as a possible result of the 
breakdown of national integration. The second is comprised of a theory on social 
group identification and the oppositional model, representing two aspects of the micro 
perspective. These studies have been chosen because there is a component of 
collective behaviour involved in nationalism and often members of ethnic groups form 
associations to achieve nationalist goals. National integration would seem to be a 
significant element for the survival of nation-states; therefore, its breakdown could 
contribute to the rise of nationalism (or vice versa). Social group identification and 
primordial sentiment are the experiences of individuals. Since individuals are the 
essential elements of nationalism, we must attempt to understand their motivations. 
A brief discussion on ideology and how this particular concept lends insight 
into the subject of nationalism will be followed by the exploration of some theories 
pertaining to the construction of the psychosocial phenomenon known as se1f-
identity. Self-identity is the linchpin of an alternative model for nationalism that 
brings the macro and the micro perspectives together. 
As has already been discussed in Chapter I, the whole concept of nationalism 
is problematic. This difficulty is partly due to the vagueness surrounding the 
definition of nation. Another source of distress is the possibility that what some 
observers may consider to be nationalist behaviour in reality has other motivations. 
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Hence, it does not seem correct to call such behaviour nationalist. Imposing an 
interpretation on some phenomenon which, in actuality, does not conform to that 
interpretation does not contribute to better comprehension. Finally, an additional 
component of nationalism, namely ethnicity, is a highly contentious issue as well, a 
matter introduced previously. 
Nationalism is viewed by some theorists as a kind of social movement, organized 
and mobilized in some fashion. There is a component of collective action or behaviour 
involved. Therefore, a review of literature concerning social movements and 
collective behaviour is necessary. 
Nationalism as Social Movement 
In the examination of nationalism as a social movement, we must first consider 
the fundamental elements and processes that come to be known as social movements. 
It is necessary to investigate what a social movement is, what kinds of individuals 
become involved in them and what roles they might play within them, what 
circumstances might be responsible for the mobilization of a social movement and what 
dynamic processes might take place within them once they have mobilized. 
Social movements are characterized by Paul Wilkinson as follows: (1) there is 
a collective and deliberate attempt to promote change in a certain way by some 
method; (2) there must be some degree of organization, regardless of how loose or 
informal it is; and (3) the movement must be based on conscious will and a commitment 
to the aims and beliefs of the movement, along with participation by the followers. 
Social movements rarely grow out of one-dimensional efforts. As such, they .. may be 
concerned simultaneously with values, norms, forms of organization and material 
conditions and resources."1 Wilkinson states that the commitment to norms may not 
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be unitary. He employs Max Weber's typology, delineating three major types of 
commitment: (1) value-rational fellowship of believers; (2) emotional-affectual 
following of a charismatic leader; and (3) purposive-rational association for pursuing 
individual interests. These three forms are not necessarily mutually exclusive, he 
contends, for there may be overlap among them. Wilkinson also puts forth the notion 
that there are three types of individuals who become involved in social movements: 
(1) ideologists (those members who greatly influence the generation and articulation 
of the ideals and goals); (2) practitioners (those who carryon the activities); and (3) 
scientists (social scientists and historians who describe, interpretand explain social 
movements). Again, he contends that there may very well be overlap among these 
types.2 
Social movements are linked to culture because they "both initiate and reflect 
changes in the wider society."s Their ideological component is to be found in the 
way social movements attempt to form public opinion so that they can gain mass 
support and participation by turning all those discontented individuals in the 
population to their own purposes.4 They are also very much political in their 
orientation for they usually attempt to affect the distribution and utilization of 
power.s Eyerman and Jamison emphasize that the political aspect may be considered 
to be the core of social movements since the raison d'etre of any social lobbying for 
change is to redefine and renegotiate the political sphere. In doing this, social 
movements form a linkage between past political endeavours and the present as they 
seek to open new spaces and bring new issues into the established political forum.' 
Wilkinson credits Gustav Le Bon, whose theory dealt with crowd and movement 
behaviour based on the notion of psychological attributes of the crowd, for bringing 
the collective action aspect to the study of social movements. Le Bon believed that 
the mentality of a crowd was inferior to that of an individual and that it was 
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irrational passion rather than rational thought that was expressed in the "subco-
nscious herd instinct of the crowd. Crowds are therefore able to carry out acts of 
extreme heroism and extreme bestiality and savagery which no rational individual 
would perform on his own.'" It is possible, based on this reasoning, that the 
supportive atmosphere of the group allows for latent tendencies among individuals 
to emerge because of the sense of anonymity accompanying membership in a crowd. 
Thus, people might be spurred to do things as part of a crowd that they would never 
dream of dOing as an individual. This assumption suggests that a shift in a person's 
self-identity must occur; that is, that the person must de-emphasize the individualist 
component of self-identity which dictates what "r will do and who "r am and place 
greater emphasis on the component which governs the identification with the 
collectivity so that the person then begins to interpret who "we" are and what "we" 
are going to do. 
According to Joseph Gusfield, social movements are "SOCially shared activities 
and beliefs directed toward the demand for change in some aspect of the social 
order."s Samuel D. Clark, J. Paul Grayson and Linda M. Grayson add that social 
movements may also strive to restore old social arrangements as well.' Gusfield 
associates social movements with collective action for two reasons: (1) the term 
"social movement" denotes a kind of looseness similar to "social trends", while the 
term ··collectiveaction" emphasizes the group component and asenseofa structured, 
organized character; and (2) there is a close relationship between episodes of 
collective behaviour and the development of social movements. COllective action 
denotes group activity channelled into actions for change. 10 
The idea of movement suggests efforts toward achieving change. Effort 
consists in activities - demonstrations, meetings, literature, campaigns. 
A movement consists of more than the passive sense of discontent, 
however shared that may be. It also involves beliefs -- perceptions of 
what is wrong with the society, the culture, or the institution, and what 
can and should be done about it. What the participants in a movement 
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share are the activities and beliefs that distinguish it. '1 
From the above, we see the emphasis on not just beliefs, but action. He further 
points out that structure is an element of both social movements an d collective action. 
Presumably, a social movement cannot consist only of either beliefs or action, but 
must incorporate the two. It is interesting to ponder how far this notion applies to 
nationalism; that is, does nationalism have to integrate action and belief to be 
considered nationalism or simply to be considered a social movement? Further 
exploration of this question will be pursued below. 
Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison bring new elements into the discussion when 
they speak of social movements being "'forms of activity by which individuals create 
new kinds of social identities."'12 People participate in social activities through their 
own "'frames of reference"'. Therefore, no action is completely determined or an act 
of sheer individual willpower because the meaning of the action derives from the 
context in which it takes place, as well as the interpretation individuals bring to it 
and/or derive from it. For this phenomenon, Eyerman and Jamison use the term 
"'cognitive praxis"'. Specifically what is meant is "'the creative role of consciousness 
and cognition in all human action, individual and collective."'u In terms of social 
movements, cognitive praxis stands for the ideational or intellectual component of 
movements that give them their identity. This term incorporates worldview 
perceptions as well as the particular beliefs associated with the goals of the 
movement. "Movements are interested in knowledge in a variety of ways, which we 
identify as the different dimensions of their cognitive praxis."'14 
Thus, these theorists bring the study of social movements into the realm of 
conscious individuals, not just committed actors and participants or members of a 
"herd". Eyerman and Jamison attribute the fundamental aspects of social movements 
to the frames of reference, or SOCially constructed self-identity, of persons who are 
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influenced by and, in turn, influence their context. They concentrate on a dialectical 
approach to social movements wherein context and individual identity interact and 
synthesize to produce collective identity and action which can then be termed a social 
movement. Contexts change, self-identity changes and, hence, so do social 
movements. With this insight, we can better understand not only how this 
phenomenon emerges, but also how it grows and evolves and may eventually 
disappear. 
Eyerman and Jamison attempt to make sense of the symbolic significance of 
social movements as they challenge the existing power structure and help to create 
new knowledge or new perspectives of it. Social movements carve out a new social 
space through interactions among various groups and organizations. This process 
enables the formation of the identity of the social movement to take place. ls "It is 
precisely in the creation, articulation, formulation of new thoughts and ideas - new 
knowledge - that a social movement defines itself in society."t6 They believe that 
the cognitive praxis of a social movement is its most important function. 
that 
The historical context is also significant for Eyerman and Jamison, who maintain 
[h]istory is not imposed on movements, but it conditions them, it provi-
des their starting points as well as their range of operation. This means 
that the dimensions of cognitive praxis must be reconstructed in the 
context of their actualization. [Their] retrospective reading focuses on 
the interplay between movement identity formation and long-term social 
processes, that is, between internal knowledge push and external poli-
tical pull.n 
Placing a social movement into its historical context allows for an understanding of 
how it relates to other movements.18 
Eyerman and Jamison identify three areas of knowledge in social movements: 
(1) the cosmological (basic assumptions and beliefs); (2) the technological (specific 
topics and techniques); and (3) the organizational. The cosmological is what provides 
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the movement's worldview and how it "articulates its historical meaning". It also 
serves to provide the "utopian mission" of a movement.!9 The technological aspect 
dictates how the movement will particularly articulate and implement its cosmological 
aspect, while the organizational arises from the ideas generated by the cosmological 
position and directs how the knowledge produced will be made accessible to others. 
"The organizational dimension is thus the way in which movements get their message 
across, and the organizational forms within which their cognitive praxis unfolds. "20 
According to Eyerman and Jamison, everyone who participates in a social 
movement may be termed a "movement intellectual" since they all contribute to the 
movement's collective identity. This, however, does not mean that all movement 
intellectuals are equal. In fact, some become organizers and others become leaders. 
This inequality contributes to the hierarchical appearance of most social movements. 
Furthermore, intellectuals are formed through interactions within a social context. 
A movement intellectual is one who has emerged from the movement itself while an 
established intellectual is one who arose from within established social institutional 
contexts. Intellectuals are important for giving a social movement its ideological 
aspect.21 
One of the most important tasks of an intellectual is the formation of the other, 
the opponent, which helps to articulate the collective identity of the movement.22 
Eyerman and Jamison are quite eloquent on this particular matter, describing how the 
Other is constructed and the way that it influences the social movement. For this 
reason, it is worth quoting them at length: 
This Other is not merely an intellectual construction, but is almost 
always a real social actor, an authority, the government, an institution, 
the state, or a conglomerate of individuals, the "technocrats", with whom 
the movement must strategically interact. In the process of interaction, 
other types of movement intellectuals come into play: those who act as 
intermediaries between the movement and its Other, translating aspects 
of the movement's newly articulated worldview into programs from which 
specific demands can be turned into negotiable items in the arenas of 
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the established political culture. Movement spokespeople and experts 
thus filter out aspects of a rather diffuse wor1dview, which as a source 
of collective identity has served as a framework for mobilizing sup-
porters, into clearly defined items for political negotiation in the 
institutional frameworks of established political culture. This is not an 
unproblematic process, as it involves much internal debateand conflict. 
Never a matter of free choice, the issues and the arenas of confrontation 
are often forced upon movements by their opponents, the situation, or 
by the political culture in which they emerge. This can also lead to 
"diplomatic" negotiators coming to the fore as significant movement 
intellectuals. Much as the media can impose one kind of intellectual type 
on movements, so can the peculiarities of the political cu1ture.23 
Social movements are shaped by political processes, both internally and 
externally. As the consciousness of individuals shifts, resulting from their 
interactions with each other and their opposing counterparts, social movements 
reflect these shifts. Eyerman and Jamison deem this to mean that social movements 
are forms of cognitive praxis: the social construction of problems and concerns 
articulated and responded to by historically-situated individuals. "In other words, 
social movements are the result of an interactional process which centres around the 
articulation of a collective identity and which occurs within the boundaries of a 
particular society. "24 
The political aspect of social movements is fundamental, but it does not 
represent the sum total of the movement's character. Very often, the political agenda 
only serves as a means of gaining other social resources or drawing the attention of 
political leaders to particular problems. There is usually a moral element as well, as 
movement elites attempt to garner support by invoking higher ideals to attribute to 
what may be more prosaic goals. Indeed, the moral element is what distinguishes 
conservatism from utopianism. When a particular social movement becomes imbued 
with a sense of moral outrage, it may gain the kind of momentum that will turn it into 
an antisystemic movement. At this point, it becomes crucial for the moral component 
to be managed properly and responsibly because every member of the movement, not 
just its leaders, is in a position to decide the fate of many people, thanks to the 
22 
natureof mass col1ectiveaction. Here, the self-identity of members must playa very 
strong role as people negotiate moral issues and plan agendas around them. The 
whole process of negotiation and planning takes place within the framework provided 
by that psychosocial construction. 25 
Thus, we see that individuals are as important to social movements as the 
collectivity. Action and beliefs are essential components and there must be some sort 
of organization of actors, however loose, who have made a commitment of sorts to a 
goal of change. Because of their collective element, they may inspire people to 
behave in ways in which these people might never behave as individuals because it 
is contrary to their notion of self-identity. When this occurs, it may be due to a 
reinterpretation of self-identity that places greater emphasis on the person's 
membership in the collectivity than on individualist concerns. Social movements are 
political in nature but not comprised solely of political motivations; they also have 
components that may include morals, values, norms and notions about the way things 
ought to be organized and managed. Since they spring out of the conditions inherent 
in particular societies so that they are all historically and culturally specific, we must 
next examine some of those conditions. 
Wilkinson credits Jean Jacques Rousseau for setting out the principles which 
legitimate the formation of social movements for the attainment of certain goals. 
According to his interpretation, Rousseau stated that everyone has the right to 
organize in his/her own self-interest and to rebel against tyranny. The consent of 
the people is the only legitimate authority. All people are entitled to their fair share 
of the wealth of any given society and the assurance of equality is entrusted to the 
state. 26 Hence, any group which feels it is not sufficiently enjoying the benefits of 
the social contract has the right to take action to remedy the situation; consent is 
withdrawn in this instance, something which is perfectly legitimate since people can 
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only be governed by consent in Rousseau's philosophy. Such a formulation would 
seem to wed social movements with the ideals of democracy as well as particular 
interests. 
In their discussion of how social movements emerge, Clark et a1. propose the 
notion of social segmentation. That is, social cleavages exist in a society, dividing it 
into groups between which there is no communication, few cooperative relationships, 
and sometimes even hostility. These segments often have their own cultural 
characteristics, a kind of "we-group" feeling they call "group consciousness··. 
"People are aware of belonging to a certain group, and they believe that their per-
sonal goals or interests depend on the attainments of that group as a whole."27 
Social segmentation may increase the probability of a high level of discontent and 
inconsistencies in the institutional structure because some groups acquire values and 
norms other groups do not possess. This situation makes it more difficult for 
institutions to operate in a manner that is consistent with everyone's ideas. There 
is also an increased chance of mobilization under these conditions. Discontent may 
be directed against the institutions linked with the opposing segment. Any 
organizations that spring up to deal with the discontent will be composed entirely of 
people from the same segment who potentially share that discontent. The values and 
norms of the organizations can be utilized to construct common definitions of 
institutional deficiency and to formulate new values and norms. Elites will identify 
with their own segment rather than with other elites. Channels for communication 
and networks of cooperative relationships are more available because alternative 
channels and networks are blocked by social cleavages. Thus, an organizational base 
is more readily available to build new institutional guides.28 
Clark et at stress that discontent must reach a high level in order for a social 
movement to emerge. This discontent can be generated by either a relative decline 
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in achievements for members of the discontented segment which then causes them to 
feel relative deprivation, or by status inconsistency wherein achievements are 
actually rising, but expectations are rising even more. Mobilization occurs when 
three elements are present: 
(1) There is an ideology to unite members. A common set of values and norms 
is established to overcome initial confUSion; sometimes components of existing 
ideologies are utilized if they apply to the situation at hand. The most important 
point here is that these ideologies must be indigenous, not foreign imports; being 
indigenous provides for a common perception of the institutional deficiency and also 
a remedy for the deficiency. The presence of an ideology increases members' 
commitment to the movement and thus provides for coordinated action, as well as 
internal norms for interrelationships among members. 
(2) There must be willing and able leadership. This can pose a problem if the 
members lack the skills or education to become leaders or if the structure on which 
leaders base their authority is weak, or ill-defined. Leaders may emerge from an 
already-established base of authority or they may be charismatic, which means that 
they do not depend on institutionalized norms of obedience. Leaders must be able to 
identify with a social group to which they do not necessarily belong, they must have 
special qualities to invoke enthusiasm in their followers, and they must be divorced 
from the institutions enough that they can still challenge them and suggest 
unconventional solutions. 
(3) There must be channels for communication and a network of cooperative 
relationships to permit the dissemination of values and norms. These channels and 
networks facilitate mobilization of a social movement by the very fact that they 
already exist. A cooperative relationship is a normal social relationship and can 
readily induce people to accept norms, values and directives being transmitted to 
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them because they trust each other and can reward or punish one another to enforce 
conformity. 
All of the above-noted things, according to Clark et a1., provide an organiz-
ational base for social movements. The organizational base may take two forms: (1) 
communal, whereby members are bound by traditional ties based on kinship, commun-
ity, ethnic or tribal attachments; or (2) associational, whereby social groups are 
organized for specifically-stated purposes such as occupational, religious, etc. 
Membership in organizational structures can mobilize people or restrain them, when 
the need. arises.29 Eyerman and Jamison emphasize that communications among the 
various groups and organizations comprising a social movement, between the 
collective and the individual, and the movement and the public are vital for the 
survival of the movement itself. It would seem that there cannot be a movement 
without adequate communication amongst individuals. This imperative generates 
difficulties of its own. Because of the importance of the local organizations, there can 
always be tensions between them and the national organization, as well as between 
the local spokespeople or intellectuals and the national, acknowledged ones.ao 
Social movements seldom emerge spontaneously; instead they require 
long periods of preparation both at the individual, group, and societal 
level. No social movement emerges until there is a political opportunity 
available, a context of social problem as well as a context of communica-
tion, opening up the potential for problem articulation and knowledge 
dissemination. Not every social problem, however, generates a social 
movement; only those that strike a fundamental chord, that touch basic 
tensions in a society have the potential for generating a social move-
ment .... A movement conceptualizes fundamental contradictions or 
tensions in society -- what Smelser called structural strains ... Yet not 
even that is enough to determine the emergence of a social movement. 
Not until the theme has been articulated, not until the tensions have 
been formulated in a new conceptual space can a social movement come 
into being, and this is a very uncertain process involving many 
contingencies. a1 
Eyerman and Jamison go on to state that context formation is just one component of 
how a social movement emerges, that individuals must be ready to turn "private 
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troubles into public problems", as C. Wright Mills put it, and to take part in the 
formulation of a collective identity. The role of people is crucial to Eyerman and 
Jamison32 because it is evident that there can be no collective action or movement 
until individual self-identity has receded somewhat to allow the group aspect to 
emerge to the forefront. If such a reorganization does not occur, then discontent, 
tension, perception of institutional deficiency or any other factor that might 
contribute to the context from which a social movement might emerge will not 
necessarily result in any action being taken. They propose that knowledge is "the 
product of a series of social encounters, within movements, between movements, and 
even more importantly perhaps, between movements and their established oppo-
nents"33 and not just of one individual to be passed down to others. 
Another observation on the emergence of social movements made by Clark et 
a1. is that perceived institutional deficiency wherein the objective reality of whether 
or not institutional deficiency exists is not as salient as the perception of it among 
certain persons. The perception determines the level of contentment these people 
may feel with the institutions as they exist. This, however, does not mean that people 
want to abolish existing institutional guides per se. It simply means that they may 
consider them to be inappropriate, upsetting in some ways to their sensibilities, or 
insufficient. These institutional guides may not be providing them with the meaning 
these people require for living the life they desire. 94 Nevertheless, 
[p]erceptions of a deficiency often take the form of opposition to some 
aspect of the existing values, norms, or leaders under which people live. 
For one reason or another, people are unhappy with the way their 
SOCiety is operating and they blame it on the prevailing institutional 
guides or some portion of the prevailing institutional guides. Usually, 
they either disagree with some of the prohibitions stated by con-
ventional rules or they object to some behaviours that conventional 
rules permit. The best-known forms of collective behaviour provoked 
by this sort of perception are groups of people protesting against social 
conditions.35 
Collective behaviour, according to Clark et a1., is not normless; norms emerge 
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from the collective behaviour itself as people interact as a collectivity and make 
efforts to influence others. "New institutional guides emerge as a large number of 
people begin to subscribe to a new set of values, conform to a new set of norms, or 
obey new leaders. "" Thus, it would appear that collective behaviour is not a static 
thing, but is, rather, an evolving phenomenon. This evolutionary pattern seems to 
indicate that the self-identity of members of the collectivity is constantly being 
reinterpreted and may fluctuate between the individualist and collectivist aspects as 
interactions take place. Clark et a1. maintain that social movements tend towards 
institutionalization in the sense that they are "in the process of developing 
consistent and stable institutional guides."s7 Once again, we ponder the question of 
whether this conceptualization of social movements applies strictly to nationalism in 
all cases. It raises the question of whether nationalism has to become institu-
tionalized. 
It is to be noted, according to Wilkinson, that nationalism adds an important 
element of efficacy to an ideological movement or government. The ideological 
underpinnings may be strengthened by the nationalistic component which provides 
an additional source of legitimacy and can be effectively used as an instrument of 
propaganda." Nationalism may provide the moral element to a social movement for 
material resources, according to this logic. The ethnicity of a particular group 
becomes the standard around which members rally (and attract others who may come 
to identify themselves with the standard even though they may not have been 
attracted to the original issues at stake and may continue to find these issues 
unattractive or unimportant); then it takes on new meaning as a moral stance. The 
nationalist component, with its overtones of family membership, common origins and 
historical experiences, brings a dimension of cohesion to a movement that might not 
be available to groups that organize for different issues or based on alternative as-
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sociations. Nationalism may provide the quintessential bridge for linking beliefs and 
actions, and members with disparate motivations with each other; it may be the 
optimal glue for binding a social movement. We will discuss this matter in greater 
detail below. 
People respond to structural conditions, both real and perceived, by 
interpreting them from an idiosyncratic point of view and formulating opinions and 
beliefs which may motivate them to take action. If beliefs and actions come together 
in multiplicity, we have a social movement with its own ideology and agenda. 
However, it is worth examining the inner workings of social movements to avoid the 
tendency to reify them and view them as monolithic enterprises wherein the co11ective 
consciousness is seam1essly unified. In our examination, it is helpful to recall what 
has already been discussed regarding their nature: that social movements are 
comprised of individuals who are constantly involved in interactions which produce 
shifting interpretations of self-identity. Social movements are a series of dialectical 
processes. 
Internal interactions of the social movement are very often prone to 
factionalism since conditions are never ideal and support is rarely homogeneous." 
Clark et a1. suggest that, when a large part of an existing social structure is 
rejected, the situation allows many interpretations to arise. Factionalism sometimes 
results from rivalries among leaders. At times, factions can work together instead 
of merely competing with one another. Clark et a1. point out that some argue that 
factionalism within a social movement can be positive in that fragments can find their 
own niche within the movement, competing factions may be motivated to pursue the 
goals of the movement more energetically, a fragmentary structure makes the 
movement harder to predict and, thus, fight, and the movement can expand through 
the multiplication of factions. However, this may also be a weakness since there may 
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be a lack of unity within the movement and it may generate frustration among the 
members if they feel little progress is being made. As such. state Clark et al., 
factionalism is usually seen asa problem by members and is often responsible for the 
decline of a social movement. Factionalism may also cause the movement to turn 
inward on itself if the factions become overly concerned with internal bickering and 
power struggles. It may be a greater problem for movements based on the more 
rational commitments discussed by Weber in his typology of commitment. Movements 
that centre around a charismatic leader may be less prone to factionalism because of 
the membership's devotion to the leader. 
Social movements may decline for various reasons or become routinized. 4o 
What is often the case with social movements is that they do not last long. The 
decline may beattributab1eto factionalism within the movement itself, disillusionment 
or discouragement on the part of the membership. Often the least committed leave 
first. Being a mass movement also contributes to the instability of a social movement. 
Instead of decline, it may become routinized when it establishes consistent and stable 
institutional guides; values and norms cease to be created, becoming accepted and 
followed. This is the end product of the evolution towards institutionalization 
mentioned above. Routinization may occur when institutionalized guides become part 
of the dominant society or when the existing order is overthrown and the movement 
establishes a new order. Sometimes a part of the movement's institutional guides are 
absorbed by existing institutions, often as legislation. In other cases, the movement 
may set up its own institutions and operate independently of those of the dominant 
society (eg. communes). Clark et a1. state that what usually occurs is that a social 
movement becomes accepted as part of the social order as a specialized association 
w hen some of its goals are adopted into mainstream society. In that case, the original 
ideology ends up being watered down. Most members accept the routinization of the 
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social movement because the guides for behaviour that are provided become more 
acceptable to others as goals deemed unattainable are eliminated. In addition, 
routinization provides members with rewards as the organization becomes a source 
of power, prestige, and sometimes money. Members are always seeking guides for 
behaviour that will be acceptable to others so social movements are almost inevitably 
evolving towards routinization. In fact, it is often difficult to detect when a social 
movement ceases to be such and becomes routinized. When nationalism is the 
standard of the social movement, routinization may result in preferential policies for 
the particular ethnic group in question or in consociational government. 
Unlike Clark at al., Eyerman and Jamison emphasize the rather ephemeral 
nature of social movements. Instead of taking the position that social movements 
inevitably evolve towards institutionalization and routinization, they posit that a 
social movement tends to disintegrate as its cognitive praxis becomes fragmented and 
those fragments are either adopted or rejected by the host society. What these 
theorists emphasize is the notion that a social movement creates "a public space that 
did not previously exist" and that the organizations that are produced are only the 
tools for transmission of the movement's cognitive praxis. The organizations and the 
movement itself are two different things, according to Eyerman and Jamison, and it 
is a mistake to reduce the movement's meaning to its medium. Evidently they do not 
agree with Marshall McLuhan's famous stance that "the medium is the message." For 
Eyerman and Jamison, "[t]he meaning, or core identity, is rather the cognitive space 
that the movement creates, a space for new kinds of ideas and relationships to deve-
lop."41 They also suggest that the space created by a social movement is always 
being invaded by other "social actors",42 
Giovanni Arrighi, Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein draw on Max 
Weber once again for a two-pronged distribution of power in political communities: 
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(1) class-structured, where it is linked to the market and distribution of property; 
and (2) status-group-structured, wherein goods and services are tied to prestige 
and "the distribution of life chances among the members of the political community 
(and others) is determined by their membership ('status situation') in the organizing 
complex of honorifically ranked communal groups, the basic categories of which are 
'positively esteemed' and 'negatively esteemed'."o Because of distinction by rank, 
people are categorized and esteemed at different levels which may contribute to their 
ability to relate toone another and find enough common ground to experience a sense 
of solidarity. Arrighiet a1. hasten to add that the distribution of power by class and 
status-group are often fused rather than being separate. They point out as well that 
there is a great tendency to reify groups partly due to the fact that self-conscious 
groups often legitimate themselves by claiming some kind of preeminence and 
sometimes their "temporal priority" in terms of other groups. To outsiders, self-
conscious groups often appear monolithic in their solidarity and cohesion. This is not 
entirely true, according to Arrighi et at, since the monolithic appearance is actually 
the product of the group's relations with others. Groups are actually always 
changing their characteristics in terms of their interrelations.u 
[They] are contending that there is a sense in which all these groups 
are in fact constantly being recreated such that over time we have 
genuinely new wine in old bottles, and that the emphasis on the 
continuity and primordiality of the group's existence, though it may be 
of considerable ideological value to its members as such is of very little 
analytical value to us as observers.45 
Besides internal interactions that help to shape social movements, external 
interactions playa significant role in their evolution. 
External interactions consist of responses to social movements by the rest of 
society.41o There may be panic on such a large scale that people may migrate to get 
away from a social movement. A crowd may form and attack the members of a 
movement. Publics may form wherein issues will be debated and opinions formulated. 
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Sometimes a derived movement will emerge either as a sympathy-movement or a 
counter-movement. Sympathy-movements will form positive interpretations of the 
original movement and try to assist the movement in achieving its goals. A counter-
movement, on the other hand, will promote negative interpretations of the original 
movement and attempt to interfere with its goals. Eyerman and Jamison state that at 
times when society is rife with social movements, some feed off and produce others, 
especially their ow n opposition. 47 
The response of the government is often not institutionalized since it is usually 
ill-equipped to deal with social movements. It takes time to develop institutionalized 
responses. The government may simply respond to a social movement with indiffer-
ence, not seeing it as a threat to the existing order. In this case, the government 
may ignore it, label it deviant and attempt to discredit it. On the other hand, the 
government may try to accommodate a social movement and be willing to negotiate 
with it, believing that some of its demands are valid and of no threat to the status 
quo. This may happen if the movement has enough support that ignoring its demands 
may cause it to become a threat to the existing order. This is often the case of 
protest movements. Finally, the government may make an effort to obstruct a social 
movement if it thinks that the movement is a real threat to the status quo, especially 
if the short-term goals appear to be reasonable but the long-term goals are threa-
tening. Clark et a1. pOint out that these governmental responses are not mutually 
exclusive; in fact, they are often combined." 
The responses of the government have ramifications for the social movement.49 
In the face of governmental indifference, the movement may disappear entirely or 
become a deviant subculture. OtherWise, it may mobilize greater support and make 
higher demands or pose a bigger threat. Governmental accommodation may raise the 
prestige of the social movement and it might achieve some of its goals. The movement 
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may attract more supporters, but it may lose some because some goals have been 
achieved or abandoned. The movement may have to formulate new demands. The 
attempts by a government to obstruct a social movement may cause it to lose support 
when potential and existing members come to believe that the personal costs of 
participating in such a movement are simply too high. On the other hand, members 
may completely reject the existing order and find even more to oppose than before. 
To summarize briefly, the literature illuminates several major considerations 
when analyzing social movements. There must be some level of organization, an 
ideology must be present, change or its prevention must be the goal, and social 
movements arise from a specific historical and cultural milieu. People become 
committed to social movements for various reasons and attempt to carve out new 
social identities within them, even while they contribute to the effort by the social 
movement itself to establish a new social space and to disseminate new knowledge 
throughout society. Social movements are more coherent than simple collective 
behaviour and they are rarely unidimensional; that is, they not only have a political 
agenda, they usually also have a moral character, as well as a value-laden vision of 
what their society should be like. Factionalism is often a characteristic of social 
movements, a situation that is not necessarily negative (though frequently viewed as 
such). Communication is essential to social movements to disseminate information to 
members as well as those outside the movement itself, in an effort to gain support. 
The formation of the opponent, or the Other, is crucial since it contributes to the 
articulation of the movement's collective identity; it should be stressed that this is 
not just an abstract entity, but a real social actor of some kind, whether the 
government or another collectivity. Intellectuals playa key role in any social 
movement due to their responsibility in forming the opposition and the ideological 
stance. 
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With all this said, we must step back from this rather clinical dissection of 
social movements and question whether reality is ever so distinct and recognizably 
classifiable, How much of this analysis is due to the interpretations of social 
scientists who then impose these models onto their observations? The first problem 
is in the definition of terminology: for example, how much organization is required 
to turn collective behaviour into a social movement? How coherent do the ideas or 
demands of protestors have to be before they constitute a "movement ideology"? 
Aside from these basic difficulties, which are, admittedly, endemic to virtually 
any social scientific study, one wonders whether social movements are really as 
coherent as the literature implies, Taking the feminist movement as an illustration, 
weoan readily note that there are many components of this "social movement", There 
are academics who write about a myriad of issues, most often with very little 
agreement amongst them, There are grassroots organizations with no connections 
between them and littleor no tie to the national organizations in existence. There are 
ind;vidualfeminists with no formalties to any organization at all who are doing their 
utmost to contribute to the reform of society in whatever way they can. In addition, 
there are Advisory Councils at the federal and provincial levels of government that 
mayor may not be considered part of this social movement. In short, is the feminist 
movement an example of factionalism within a social movement or is it many social 
movements that have been labelled according to a common denominator? 
The same questions could be asked about "nationalist movements". For 
example, what constitutes a nationalist movement? Is a nationalist movement 
comprised only of organizations with an avowed goal of outright independence? Or 
those expressing the desire for greater autonomy? Or perhaps organizations 
promoting elements of cultural nationalism? We could continue, but the point is that 
it is extremely difficult to establish the boundaries of what constitutes a "social 
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movement" and who should be included as participants. 
Another nagging question is the whole concept of the organization or 
institutionalization of social movements. One gets the idea that there is some central 
planning committee with an agenda, sending out directives to various subordinate 
agencies; in short, there is the imp lication of some sort of orchestration involved. It 
is not difficult to envision an octopus-like creature with tentacles reaching out, 
moving forward on some inexorable pathway. The element of time is also suggested: 
that there must be some planning involved to organize and mobilize people, as well 
as to give them an ideological explanation for their actions. To put it another way. 
it appears that the analysis of social movements is undertaken by social scientists 
after the fact -- or, at least, once they have become established enough to study --
at which point it is possible to survey the phenomenon and attribute characteristics 
and categories that may not, in fact, have much to do with the reality of it. As such, 
the literature on social movements may be somewhat misleading. 
This criticism may be even more pertinent to the study of nationalism as a 
social movement. In fact, Anthony Smith makes it in reference to Neil Smelser's work. 
Heaccuses Smelser of "retrospective determinism" because he believes that Smelser 
argues from an a priori point in history and takes it to the "inevitable" result of an 
ideological or social movement without considering how individuals or groups might 
have actively modified or redefined the situations.so Smith levels the further charge 
against Smelser that Smelser cannot account for those groups or "anomalies" that fail 
to initiate nationalist movements. 
From a brief sampling of some of the studies and theories of nationalism, it 
would appear that scholars readily classify nationalist mobilization as a "movement" 
without establishing in sufficiently sociological terms that such mobilization is, 
indeed, a social movement. Anthony D. Smith's Theories of Nationalism will be utilized 
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as an illustration of such scholarly works since it is considered by many to be one 
of the seminal works in the field. We will also examine Anthony H. Birch's approach 
in Nationalism and National IntegrationS1 because of his reliance on the concept of 
national integration and what role it plays in the emergence of nationalism. 
In his introduction, Smith states that nationalist movements are the basis of 
his study. He writes, "Nationalism is treated asa distinct ideological variety of social 
and political movement, with a definite 'directional tendency', a recognisable profile 
and thrust." He asks, "What is the character of nationalism, as a movement?"S2 
Furthermore, he discusses the "heuristic utility" of analyzing the features of 
nationalist movements. Yet, nowhere in his book does he take the trouble to establish 
that nationalism is, in fact, a social and/or political movement. 
In his critiqueofElie Kedourie's work, Smith does to some degree elucidate his 
own approach to nationalist movements (and, thus, hints at the reason he believes 
nationalism to be a movement) which is that there is a core doctrine in nationalism 
that is used as a starting point by nationalistic groups from which they build their 
own particular theories. Hence, Smith states that there is an ideological component 
involved in nationalism. He also alludes to the historical context from which nation-
alist movements emerge. Later, there is some discussion of the possible social 
composition of nationalist movements wherein Smith states that certain movements at 
certain stages are comprised of elites whereas others are mostly middle-class 
phenomena. The intelligentsia always provides a disproportionate number of its 
members.53 These points relate back to the sociological analyses of social movements 
and provide a basis for the belief that nationalism is a movement. However, Smith 
only hints at these linkages and never actually attempts to establish them. 
Smith stresses that the core doctrine of nationalism does not provide a 
thoroughgoing theory for social and political change, but that it illuminates the inner 
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lifeof groups of people and offers a programme for action. Such a conceptualization 
would suggest rather strongly that Smith conceives of nationalism very much as an 
ideology. Nationalism rejuvenates people as they revert psychologically to a Golden 
Age and look to a similar future; it confers identities on people, identities imbedded 
in the history, ethos, culture and institutions of the group.54 Smith goes on to write 
that the "enemy" is conceived of as everything extrinsic to the group itself and that 
the future sought by this group will not duplicate the Golden Age, but will "recapture 
its spirit" and allow people to actualize themselves. Both freedom and redemption are 
inherent in this conceptualization. Smith also posits that there are three ideals that 
are "fused" by nationalism: (1) collective self-determination; (2) "the expression of 
national character and individuality"; and (3) division of the world into unique 
nations, each with something to contribute to the international scheme. 55 As we can 
see, Smith believes in the presence of the individual within the scope of what he calls 
nationalist movements; nevertheless, his individualsare quite unidimensional because 
their psyches can only flourish in the context of the nation's Golden Age. Smith's 
individual cannot find fulfilment in any other milieux and his/her entire psychosocial 
development revolves around the ethnic identity. This seems to be highly simplistic 
and deterministic; the individual has little free will and his/her social self-identity 
derives from only one group. The portrayal of self-identity here is very static, for 
it allows no growth or expansion beyond the ethnic group. The impression given is 
that, if a nationalist movement is successful. self-determination for individuals is at 
an end and individual identity ossifies. 
Employing what he calls "sociological taxonomies" in the study of nationalism, 
Smith explains that these entail the examination of nationalism as movements rather 
than as purely ideological phenomena categorized by historical epoch. Hefavours his 
method because he feels that some nationalisms (such as Syrian Ba'athism) have been 
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characterized by multiple ideologies, thus making classification problematic.s6 Smith 
goes to great lengths to outline new ways to classify nationalist movements in 
sociological terms, dividing them initially into formal (external factors involved) and 
substantive (internal factors) and subdividing these two categories until he has 
refined the classification of these movements down to the subtlest aspects of their 
ideological characters. However, he does not stop to explain why he considers 
nationalism to be a movement, nor even what he specifically means by the term 
"movement". Instead, he relies on some a priori assumptions and/or criteria and goes 
on from there. This is a serious flaw in his analysis, one that cannot be overlooked, 
especially in light of the fact that Smith has earlier levelled criticisms at other 
sociologists for their imprecision and expounds on the virtues of his own taxonomies 
by stating they are constant in their use of referents and are capable of being used 
for subsequent research. How can such sociological studies be carried out, based on 
his work, when he does not operationalize what he means when he uses the term 
"nationalist movement", nor does he authenticate his use of the term? 
Anthony H. Birch is another theorist who writes about nationalism in terms of 
"movements" but does not establish why he believes them to be movements or what 
he means by the term. The crux of his argument rests on his construction of national 
integration. In this way, Birch establishes his support of majority or state 
nationalism as opposed to that of any minority. 
In discussing national integration, Birch states that most modern states are 
political amalgamations of previously-separate historical communities that have been 
brought together for a variety of reasons. He calls this political integration. At the 
level of the nation, political integration becomes national integration. Politi-
cal/national integration is essential in modern times because of the transformed role 
of the state wherein citizens are now called upon to endurea great deal of interven-
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tion into their lives. This kind of endurance requires loyalty: "They must feel that 
it is their government whom they are obeying, their country for which they are 
making sacrifices. They are unlikely to feel this kind of loyalty except in a society 
that both governs itself and has experienced a process of national integration."s7 
The state attempts to create nationalism by replacing minority ethnic culture with its 
own construction of national culture. Ethnic cultural minorities which refuse to be 
integrated or assimilated pose a threat to national integration. 
According to Birch, nationalist theories are founded upon the belief that human 
beings are inherently social and that they are formed by their cultural contexts. 
Furthermore, government is only good when it represents these cultural contexts. 
He believes that national integration is the "central dilemma of nationalism as an 
ideology. "58 In producing unifying national culture and superseding minority ethnic 
culture, governments attempt to instill pride and patriotism in populations, a sense 
of "one for all and all for one", as it were. People must learn to identify with national 
institutions and policies to the point where they feel that they are best represented 
by them and no others. Pluralism may be employed to promote national integra-
tion.s, Birch states that it is used when governments come to the realization that 
ethnic cultures simply will not die out. Presumably, it is considered better to allow 
them to operate instead of taking a chance on suppressing them and having them 
flourish underground until they gain enough strength to threaten the national 
government. While the government should promote tolerance of minority cultures, as 
long as they do not threaten the majority or official state policies, Birch contends 
that minorities have no right to such tolerance. 
The question of secession is a very sensitive one for national governments 
since no national government will be disposed to the disintegration of its domain. 
Secessionist movements often include what Birch refers to as "romantic nationalists". 
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These people do not pursue rational, self-interested ends; they are motivated by 
their emotional commitment to their community. "[The romantic nationalist] is a 
communitarian, not an individualist. He thinks in terms of the spirit and culture of 
his people, not in terms of bargains and calculations. He will fight for his case 
despite any number of rational arguments showing it to be unjustified. "60 Nonethe-
less, these romantics are not enough to fuel an entire movement; they require the 
support of the masses and, for that, they must appeal to the material concerns of the 
other members of the minority. According to Birch, an explanation of this condition 
must be based on "one constant factor and two groups of historical (as distinct from 
structural) variables."101 The constant factor is that romantic nationalists are deter-
mined to gain autonomy to ensure the maintenance of ethnic cultural identity. The 
first group of historical factors includes: the impact of television whereby ethnic 
cultures may be eroded by the constant exposure of children to the majority culture; 
"political impatience" or the unwillingness of people to hope that things will improve 
for their descendants; the greater security of small states in the international system 
and the existence of supranational organizations, such as the European Community, 
with which small states may deal in their own right. Birch's second group of histori-
cal factors is entirely local and particular to the ethnic group's circumstances.62 He 
states, 
It is impossible to generalize about factors of this kind. It is vital to 
realize that nationalist movements need an eruptive factor if they are to 
capture mass support, but it is difficult in advance of its occurrence to 
predict what this factor may be or when it may develop. It may be a 
social or economic factor, like foreign immigration or the discovery of 
new natural resources. It may be a purely political factor, like the 
brutal treatment of a minority, the sudden suppression of activities that 
had previously been tolerated, or an election result that seems to 
threaten the interest of a particular ethnic group.6S 
In his conclusion, Birch asserts that minority nationalist movements have little 
chance of success in the face of the rather impressive arsenal of weapons at the 
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disposal of national governments. One of the most significant of these weapons is 
control of the police and armed forces. Control of these coercive agencies is surely 
a strong deterrent for the masses usually involved in nationalist movements, if not 
for the romantic nationalists. He states, "At times of crisis the police constitute the 
sharp end of the state. "64 We may extend this metaphor to the armed forces and add 
that, at times of crisis, the army may constitute the lethal end of the state for 
minority nationalist movements.'s 
Birch makes national integration sound rather effortless, thus portraying those 
recalcitrant ethnic cultural minorities to which he refers as being nothing short of 
intransigent children. This approach tends to belittle the very real problem of 
securing a "nationa'" identity for heterogeneous or multicultural societies. He even 
states that ethnic cultural minor'ities have no right to tolerance by the majority; by 
stating that this right is absent, Birch imp lies that these groups have little more than 
gaster baiter status in a nation, that they are not entitled to the same governmental 
representation and protection as the majority because they do not really belong to 
the nation. Such an illiberal stance seems rather harsh. Assimilation and pluralism 
are proposed by Birch as two ways to "reduce" ethnic cleavages. These proposals 
condone either the total destruction of ethnic minority cultures or their (limited) 
tolerance; neither one, as offered py Birch, pays a great deal of respect to the 
position of these ethnic minorities in the host society. To put it another way. Birch's 
solutions infer that the status of these minorities is not on equal footing with that of 
the majority. An attitude such as this held by a government would seem to provide 
an exceptional breeding ground for the fomentation of social and political unrest 
among ethnic minorities. 
The conclusion at which Birch arrives is that governments have such an 
impressive arsenal, both literally and figuratively, with which to fight off secession 
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by a minority nationalist movement that this kind of movement has very little chance 
of success appears to be far more equivocal in reality than he would have us think. 
If we use the former country of Yugoslavia as a case in point (which we certainly will 
later), we can see that, under certain circumstances, nationalist secessionist. 
movements can gain the support of the international political community against their 
former government and attain a great deal of success. Furthermore, the impression 
given by Birch is that majority nationalism, in its guise as national integration, is the 
supreme goal that should be achieved and maintained, while minority nationalism is 
intrinsically negative and to be avoided. In other words, ideological/conservative 
nationalism is desirable, whereas utopian nationalism is damnable. Hence, we have a 
hierarchy of nationalism in terms of preferential value that does not take into con-
sideration the lives of the people involved and barely seems to even notice that there 
are people involved. Lastly, Birch never clarifies his terminology or gives any 
justification for its use. 
From the above-noted detailed examinations of the treatment of nationalism as 
a social movement, we are able to see some of the difficulties involved in such an 
approach. The first problem is that theorists seem to work from an a priori 
assumption that nationalism is a movement without bothering to authenticate such a 
position. ("If it looks like a movement and acts like a movement, then it must be a 
movement.") Another problem is the use of social movement criteria itself. This is 
a two-pronged matter: (1) there is reason to question the extent to which the 
analysis of the phenomena known as social movements can be usefully emp loyed in the 
study of nationalism; and (2) the literature on social movements;s rife with its own 
conceptual and taxonomic difficulties. Part of the reason for the dilemma is the 
essential circularity of the argument: we know that society is undergoing strain 
because of the rise of social movements and we also know that social movements arise 
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out of times of social strain; similarly. Birch tells us that nationalism arises from the 
breakdown of national integration and that the breakdown of national integration is 
observed when nationalist movements arise. This is not to say that there is nothing 
whatsoever that the literature on social movements can tell us about nationalism. To 
dismiss the entire analytical field would be frivolous and akin to throwing out the 
baby with the bathwater. The point being made here is that we should make every 
effort to avoid the intellectual Black Hole of automatically assuming that mobilization 
by ethnic/nationalist groups qualifies the phenomenon to be categorized as a social 
movement and treated as such; this type of approach omits the subtler, more 
individualistic and psychological elements of nationalism. 
Many theorists who talk about nationalism in terms of "movements" also treat 
it as an ideology. Apart from analytical confusion, these theorists offer some 
worthwhile insights into the role of ideology in the study of nationalism and thus 
bring another element into the discussion: the power of ideas. 
Nationalism as Ideology 
There seems to bea case for the position that nationalism as a social movement 
leaves something to be desired in terms of the study of nationalism itself. Historical 
and contextual trends may give rise to feelings of discontent and social tension and, 
under the influence of those conditions, people may begin to look around for others 
of like mind and organize themselves for change. Once they make this commitment 
and mobilize, we have a social movement. yet, the scent of determinism lingers in the 
air. What makes people reinterpret themselves and their contexts? If they begin to 
waver, do they necessarily drop out? What makes people stay committed to a 
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situation even when they feel discontent and tension? Does everyone automatically 
act or react in a nationalistic manner when they experience the influence of outer 
pressures? 
The literature on ideology and the concomitant conceptualization of nationalism 
assn ideology can shed some lighton these questions. "Ideology" isa term buffeted 
about between the left and the right ends of the political spectrum without much 
definition or precision. It can mean something negative, something positive or 
something neutral. It can be a credo, simply a coherently-organized set of ideas, or 
a way to obfuscate reality and oppress people. Everybody knows what ideology is, 
yet nobody really seems to know. In short, as Anthony Giddens so aptly puts it: 
"Nobody can even decide how to pronounce it! "'6 Nevertheless, despite its 
imprecision and lack of definition, ideology can be very powerful and can have trem-
endous ramifications. For this reason, if no other, it is imperative to examine the 
phenomenon of ideology and explore its possible relationship with nationalism. 
Terry Eagleton and Raymond Gauss delve into the topic of ideology in order to 
bring it more conceptual clarity and thereby demonstrate how complex a phenomenon 
it really is. Gauss' approach is concerned with the classification of ideology for 
study." Eagleton employs a theoretical, historical analysis of the subject.u 
Ideology and power are connected at the outset in Eagleton's discussion, 
although he rejects the idea of broadening the definition of ideology to include 
everything that would fall under the "intersection between belief systems and 
political power" because he believes that this would cause the term to lose all 
meaning. In rejecting such a broad definition and for the same reason, he also 
rejects Michel Foucault's view that power is everywhere. As Eagleton states, "The 
force of the term ideology lies in its capacity to discriminate between those power 
struggles which are somehow central to a whole form of social life, and those which 
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are not. "0' If power is absolutely everywhere at all times, according to Eagleton, 
then there is nothing left to fight against since there is no Other. Some leftist 
intellectuals may be uncomfortable with this rejection of all-pervasive power because 
it suggest..~ a hierarchy of struggle, but Eagleton favours this approach since it 
allows for the distinction of which struggles involve ideology and which do not. Not 
everything is ideological.HI 
In addition, Eagleton disagrees with the definition of ideology as .. discourse 
bound up with specific social interests" because all discourses fit this description; 
that is, they are all interest-bound. Thus, once again, ideology loses all meaning. 
Eagleton argues that the whole notion of interests involves two levels: those at the 
"deep" level of the body (i.e., nourishment, communication, etc.), which are not 
ideological; and interests we might call political, which are ideological. His criterion 
for distinguishing some interests from others is their centrality to the entire social 
order. By making this distinction (and the one regarding power). Eagleton tries to 
ensure that ideology retains meaning in order for it to be utilized as an analytical 
tootH 
Geuss divides ideology into three main areas: (1) the descriptive sense; (2) 
the pejorative sense; and (3) the positive sense. Eagleton's discussion revolves 
around six definitions of ideology ranging from very broad and general to sharply 
focussed and specific. These definitions can be grouped in similar fashion to Geuss' 
categories. 
At one end of the continuum, we have the descriptive aspect of ideology. For 
Gauss, this isan anthropological approach to the concept whereby ideology forms one 
part of the study of any group of people. Ideology in this sense includes the ideas, 
beliefs, attitudes, psychological characteristics, etc., that are held by the group 
under study. These facets may be grouped by common denominators and subdivided 
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into more specific ideologies. Thus, there may be multiple ideologies present within 
groups, some pertaining to religion, others to economic matters, and so on. Eagleton 
states that this type of definition of ideology makes it closely related to the concept 
of culture. Not only does ideology in this usage pertain to "the whole complex of 
signifying practices and symbolic processes"72 of a group, but it also refers to the 
way members live their social practices. A more specific definition of ideology 
considers it to be "ideas and beliefs (whether true or false) which symbolize the 
conditions and life-experiences of a specific, socially significant group or class. "79 
Now we are nearing the kind of conceptualization Marx and Mannheim attribute to 
ideology which will be discussed in greater detail below. The notion of power is also 
creeping into the definition, as evidenced by the phrase "socially significant group 
or class". Eagleton continues along this axis of power in his third definition wherein 
ideology becomes a way of promoting and legitimating the interests of "socially 
significant" groups to opposing interests. The political enters the forum here as the 
"interests" referred to must be relevant to sustaining or challenging the status quo. 
Thus, "interest" may be translated to "self-interest", tainting the concept of ideology 
with the overtones of rhetoric and deception. 
Eagleton's fourth definition coincides with Gauss' "ideology in the pejorative 
sense" because he writes that promotion and legitimation of particular interests now 
relates to a dominant social power. Gauss himself describes this category of ideology 
as stemming from the position that it is delusional or false consciousness. He 
proceeds to discuss the falseness of ideology from the epistemic, functional and 
genetic aspects, but his discussion goes beyond the scope of this treatment of 
ideology. The Marxian attitude towards ideology is highlighted in this classification 
as ideology is viewed as being patently false; ideology cannot contain any veracity. 
In this sense, it is little more than a weapon to be employed by the powerful against 
47 
the weak. Eagleton presents an effective critique of such a simplistic stance on 
ideology when he points out that many people are often willing to die for their beliefs 
and that these beliefs have an enduring quality; it is degrading to humanity to 
dismiss such beliefs as empty and intellectually shallow when they are evidently so 
meaningful to so many persons. Another point raised by Eagleton is that the efficacy 
of ideology must derive from its grounding -- at least to some degree -- in the lived 
experiences, or social reality, of individuals who adhere to it. Ideology may be able 
to shape needs and desires, but it must also speak to people at some level to persuade 
them to embrace it. Eagleton concedes that there are falsehoods inherent in ideology, 
but there are also truths. 
The fifth definition of ideology proposed by Eagleton entails the use of 
ideology to legitimate the interests of a group in power through .. distortion and 
dissimulation. "74 It should be noted that he does not go as far in this characteriz-
ation as does Geuss in that Eagleton states that ideology is not a tissue of lies, even 
though it may be taking liberties with the truth. Such a definition may appear to be 
intellectual hairsplitting, but considering his stance on ideology being made up of 
both truths and falsehoods on different levels and in different cases, the distinction 
is a valid one. Eagleton's sixth definition goes one step further and posits that 
ideology may consist of "false or deceptive beliefs", but that said beliefs derive from 
the structure of the society, not from a particular sector of the population. 
"Ideology in the positive sense" is proposed by Geuss as being vital for human 
beings because we need to believe in something and to find meaning in our lives and 
our selves. He characterizes this kind of ideology as more of a "desideratum", 
something to be created at a future time. This is not to say, however, that this form 
of ideology does nothing but speak to our needs and desires; rather, "positive 
ideology", as Geuss refers to it, helps to shape those needs and desires in that it 
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places restrictions on what kinds we are allowed to have. The salient point in this 
discussion of ideology in a positive sense is that needs, desires, etc., are not usually 
static, but highly variable, making it difficult to construct an ideology. Eagleton only 
hints at positive ideology when he makes passing references to ideologies employed 
by oppressed groups when they attempt to formulate opposition. 
John Plamenatz credits Marx and Engels as the first theorists to employ the 
term "ideology" when discussing ideas and attitudes specific toa group or community 
and in expressing their notion of the connection between beliefs and attitudes and 
human activities.?S Karl Mannheim took up this theme in Ideology and Utopia." He 
writes that the production of knowledge is not something in which everyone 
participates; rather, only certain individuals from particular groups have developed 
ways of thinking based on a certain style. These ways of thinking characterize their 
own positions. Most other individuals simply further the thinking that has already 
been given.?? The definition of a situation is paramount for Mannheim, who states 
that a situation is only "constituted as such when it is defined in the same way for 
the members of the group. "18 People belong to groups not just because they are 
born into them, or consider themselves to be members, or are considered to be 
members by others, but when they use the group's definitions of the world as their 
own. "In every concept, in every concrete meaning, there is contained a crystal-
lization of the experiences of a certain group. "1' Thus, ideology can only emerge 
from a specific group and it influences the way that people behave. This may seem 
likea rather obvious conclusion, but it is an important one in that it clears away the 
notion of "universal" truths and "natural" or instinctual behaviour in human beings. 
Truth, or knowledge, whether or not it exists on some abstract metaphysical plane, 
is always mediated by the material social position occupied by the people who 
articulate it; those who articulate truth or knowledge in similar fashion belong to a 
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group. In addition, ideology not only provides the content of our thoughts, but it 
also provides the form for the way we think." It offers a framework for the 
formation of future thoughts. Hence, we have a spiralling effect where the material 
social position of people influences ideology which, in turn, influences the material 
social position of these people. Even if they occupy different statuses in society, 
Plamenatz suggests that they will still subscribe to the same social ideology in terms 
of their worldview and that there are certain ideas that they share with all others in 
society, despite their differing points of view. Plamenatz states, 
Just as observers in the physical world could not be aware that they all 
belonged to one world in which their pOints of view differ and change 
unless they shared ideas about that world, unless they understood it in 
the same way no matter what their points of view, so too the members of 
a society could not be aware that they belonged to it, and could not 
sustain their roles inside it, unless they shared ideas about it,unless 
their understanding of their own and other people's places in society 
were not relative to their own places. Understanding necessarily re-
quires that ideas not be relative to points of view, whether the 'points 
of view' are ph ysica 1 or socia 1. 11 
"Shared ideas", as he has employed the term in this case, is quite suggestive of a 
kind of hegemonic ideology, a matter which will be discussed in greater detail below. 
Furthermore, Plamenatz brings up a very significant point when he states that 
people belong to a number of groups in society, each of which has its own ideology; 
hence, we all subscribe to a number of ideologies which we share with different 
people.1Z The reason for the significance of this point is that it illustrates the 
multifaceted nature of both individuals and ideologies, something which is often 
ignored or overlooked, especially by Marxist scholars, in the discussion of ideology. 
We are often given to believe that ideology is a monolithic structure that occupies a 
central, overriding position in society and allows little or no room for any alterna-
tives; that when an alternative arises, it is always accompanied by a situation of 
threat and conflict. We are not encouraged to entertain the belief that many 
ideologies exist at any given time due to the presence of diverse social groups and 
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that these various ideo1ogies are not necessarily always in conflict. 
Utopian thinking has the opposite effect from that of ideo1ogy: oppressed 
peoples are so convinced that the only way to remedy their situation is to completely 
destroy the existing situation that they are incapab le of seeing any positive elements 
therein. Mannheim stresses that these people are not concerned with the actual 
reality of the situation, only in their ow n perceptions. For this reason, utopian thin-
king is a call to action. With this kind of mentality, people are capable of turning 
their backs on anything that does not fit in with their perception of the situation and 
carrying out whatever action they deem necessary as a remedy.89 "A state of mind 
is utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality within which it occurs. "84 
Mannheim believes that ideologies often begin from good and noble intentions 
and transcend the actual situation; unfortunately, they rarely translate in their 
realization, falling short of the original intentions because whenever people attempt 
to interpret them into action, they become distorted.8s The same may be said for 
utopias. Utopianism would appear to be one extreme of the continuum of ideology 
with its attendant perception that the existing order must be abolished in order to 
realize perfection; at the other end of the continuum is conservatism, the belief that 
the existing order is perfect and that nothing should be changed. 
Utopias can never ultimately be attributed to the vision of one individual, 
according to Mannheim. One individual is incapable of bringing down the existing 
order single-handedly. The vision of the individual must strike chords already 
present in society and be able to articulate them. Once a collectivity adopts the 
utopian vision and instigates action based upon it, then the challenge to the status 
quo materializes. "In other words, the key to the intelligibility of utopias is the 
structural situation of that social stratum which at any given time espouses 
them."86 Individual experiences are framed by the utopian vision, Mannheim 
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suggests.S? 
Utop ias are to be understood in terms of the social structure of the collectivity 
initiating or embracing them; the utopian vision then frames the experiences of the 
individuals, according to Mannheim. Once again, we observe the spiral effect, 
mentioned above by Eagleton, whereby the ideological structure is determined by 
those who construct and espouse it, while the ideology then, in turn, structures the 
material reality of those individuals, and so on. Most importantly, we note the fluidity 
of the situation w herein neither the ideology nor individual experiences remain static. 
The above-noted characterizations of ideology and utopia may be applied to 
nationalism. Nationalism may start off as a good and noble intention, transcendent 
of the situation at hand; however, in its translation to action and reality, it can very 
well go astray and become extremely distorted. Nationalism can be either conserva-
tive or utopian: some nationalistic groups may want to change the existing order 
while others may wish to retain the status quo in the face of change. 
At this point, we may pause to take note of the different characterizations of 
nationalism. Nationalism as conservatism (i.e., conservative ideology) is that of the 
State or the dominant group. In other words, if the government of a country 
promotes nationalism and patriotism, it may be said to be embracing conservative 
nationalism. There is no interest in changing the existing order. Status quo 
conditions are salutary for this type of nationalism. On the other hand, nationalism 
as utopia is the kind of nationalism characteristic of minority groups, especially those 
that are secessionist or irredentist. In these cases, the minority group mobilizes 
because it believes that it cannot realize its aims within the existing structure; only 
by destroying that structure can it accomplish its goals. There is a hint of 
messianism in this type of nationalism which gives it its extreme nature; this is the 
typeof nationalism that may go toany lengths to accomplish its mission. Its ideolog-
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ical character does not allow for compromise or concession; whatever it takes must 
be done. It turns its back on the old order and, in order to do so with irrevocable 
finality, it must demonize the old order in the eyes of its followers. Followers of this 
type of nationalism must be truly convinced that there can be no possibility of 
achieving their goals under the existing regime and must look upon it with fear and 
hatred; they must be willing to risk the loss of everything in order to gain 
everything. When nationalism has a utopian character, we can be prepared to witness 
untold destruction and brutality. 
Another feature of utopian nationalism is its "fairy tale" overtones. Like the 
slumbering beauty who is so romantically awakened by her prince, who then takes 
her off into the sunset wherethey live happily ever after, utopian nationalism offers 
the promise that, if only the nation would be awakened to its bright future and attain 
statehood, it, too, would live happily ever after, all its problems solved. Such naivete 
can have disastrous consequences for the followers of this nationalism. Despite 
claims to the contrary, small, fledgling nations may find themselves possessing little 
more than formal political sovereignty while, in reality, they are at the mercy of the 
giants of the world system and may even face greater oppression and exploitation 
than when they were part of their former country. 
Mannheim raises the point that political conflict has generated ideology 
because it was discovered that groups in power could become so entrenched in their 
interest-bound thinking that they either wilfully ignored or unintentionally 
overlooked any point of view that might possibly pose a threat to their status. 
"There is implicit in the word 'ideology' the insight that in certain situations the 
collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of society both 
to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it."ss In other words, when someone 
notices that the way things are being portrayed by those in power has little to do 
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with the way things actually stand, the notion of "ideology", or justifications 
produced by those in power, becomes evident. If those in power refuse to recognize 
the alternative point of view, they may be accused of attempting to exercise 
hegemony over all of society in an effort to oppress everyone other than themselves. 
Thus, ideology takes on the overtones attributed to it by Marx, among others, that 
it is a tool employed by the powerful to obfuscate the reality of the powerless and 
maintain the status quo. 
Perhaps this would be an opportune moment to ponder the difference between 
ideology and hegemony. If we take hegemony to mean the moral and intellectual 
leadership of one group over another, a definition which would include ideology 
under its rubric, we can then concede that there may be a class (perhaps not 
necessarily a ruling class) or group in any given society whose beliefs, norms, 
values, mores, ideas, etc, override all others, are espoused in some form by the 
majority of members of that society, and permeate, in some fashion, virtually every 
facet of social life. Ideology, on the other hand, is a more modest phenomenon, 
representing beliefs, attitudes and action in more specific, less generalized areas of 
social life. By making such a distinction, we can then see how there can be a social 
group whose ideology is hegemonic and exclusionary and which may eventually lead 
to the complete denial of the real conditions in society. In such a situation, it is 
possible for other ideologies to vie for a superior place in the social sphere and 
perhaps even replace the former hegemonic worldview. 
The question that arises from the above discussion is whether ideology and/or 
hegemony always have political ramifications. There are several ways to approach 
an answer to this query. First, if an ideology becomes so intensely interest-bound 
that it acts as an opaque screen to any alternative, the possible result from those 
who do espouse an alternative will be political mobilization of some sort, ranging any-
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where from lobbying as an interest group to a full-scale social movement or even to 
rioting and violence. Second, if a group is hegemonic but other ideologies exist, a 
challenge to the status quo may arise; the challenge would have to be couched in 
political terms since power struggles are intrinsic to politics. Lastly, if ideology is 
the union of beliefs and attitudes and action, then it is inherently political for, once 
people begin to act in concert with their beliefs and attitudes, there will always be 
political overtones. This, of course, would not apply to a belief such as that the 
world is round. It would apply to a belief such as' that each individual has certain 
civil rights. When one begins to act on such a belief, or assert those rights, there 
will be political consequences for one has to act within a space where others may hold 
the same belief and also act upon it. Therefore, the notion of ideology and/or 
hegemony tends to suggest that political ramifications are intrinsic. 
In summary, we have learned from the above discussion of ideology that it 
encompasses not only ideas, but action, and that the actions and ideas form a dynamic 
interplay. Ideology emerges from historical contexts and not everyone plays a part 
in its production; in fact, most people do little more than simply perpetuate it and 
pass it along to others. It gives us the content of our thoughts and, more important-
ly, the form. We know that we belong to a certain social group, not just because we 
believe that we do, or others believe that we do, but when we use that group's 
definitions of the world. However, we all belong to many groups throughout our 
lives, so we embrace multiple ideologies. There are even multiple subdivisions of 
ideology in society and, even though we may occupy different positions in our social 
system and change those positions from time to time, we all still more or less espouse 
the same ideology -- the one that dominates in our society. The reason for that is 
because those of us who belong to a certain society must havea common understand-
ing of itand the world in order to make sense of our own and others' positions within 
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it. Ideologies or points of view may vary, but the shared ideas -- or hegemony --
must be the same. 
Ideology occupies a continuum from conservative to utopian. From the 
conservative point of view, the system is fine the way it is and we can realize our 
goals within it; utopian thinkers, on the other hand, come to believe that theonly way 
to achieve their aims is to completely' change the system or destroy it. In both cases, 
groups who hold these ideologies can become so intensely interest-bound that they 
fail to see any other point of view except their own and refuse to acknowledge that 
an alternative could have any merit. Utopian thinking particularly requires those 
who espouse it to take action. Ideology, whether conservative, utopian or something 
in between, must address the needs and desires of people in order for them to 
embrace it; it must tap into people's lived experience. Power is intrinsic to ideology, 
whether it is the power a social group must have in order to have its ideological 
position dominate in SOCiety or the power that comes from being an adherent of the 
dominant ideology. 
There are some criticisms of the theories of ideology set out above. The main 
one is that, despite repeated efforts and a great deal of attention to detail, it is still 
unclear as to whether ideology is the all-encompassing, umbrella-like phenomenon 
that dominates the intellectual landscape of society and gives form and content to 
everything or whether it is the more specific, focused definition that pertains to a 
certain group or facet of social life. Can it be both at the same time, as some 
theorists suggest, or does this cause it to lose its analytical precision? If it is one 
and the other, how do we distinguish between them? An attempt has been made here 
to address this problem, but much more analysis is required before the dilemma can 
be settled. 
Another problem is that posed by the discussion of ideology as becoming overly 
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interest-bound and not allowing for alternative visions of reality while, at the same 
time. it is suggested that ideology must address people's lived experience and answer 
their needs and wants in order to be truly meaningful. An interesting conundrum 
emerges here. If ideology is meaningful to individuals, how can they help but become 
interest-bound and not allow alternative visions of reality? How can one 
wholeheartedly embrace one vision and yet give equal credence to another. possibly 
opposing, one? The suggestion here is that no one should passionately believe 
anything in order to be tolerant or that tolerance breeds a certain amount of 
indifference in terms of what people believe. Perhaps this kind of ideological shifting 
not only can, but does. take place in any given society, but then the question arises 
as to what happens to identity when shifting of this nature occurs. 
The whole concept of ideology as presented in the literature gives the 
impression of a coherent, managed, carefully planned schema. One can hardly help 
but imagine a number of individuals sitting in an office in front of a drawing board, 
discussing and laying out the components of a given ideology. There is the 
suggestion of time as well, for such carefully orchestrated things take time to plan 
and map out. To say that this imageappears somewhat artificial is to understate the 
case. Obviously this is not a realistic picture. Therefore, we must assume that 
ideology emerges piecemeal from the actions and thoughts of individuals and groups, 
is constantly being renegotiated, and requires a fairly lengthy process to become 
coherent in any context. 
That nationalism is a form of ideology is a common position taken by theorists 
of the phenomenon. As has already been noted above, even those that discuss it in 
terms of "movements" refer to a "doctrine" or ideological component. On the 
superficial level at least -- and in spite of some questionable analytical points -- it 
does make sense to think about nationalism in terms of ideology because we tend to 
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assume that people have reasons for the things they do. Few of us would argue that 
'individuals are devoid of beliefs and attitudes; or that there is a bifurcation of some 
sort between the beliefs and attitudes they hold and the behaviour they manifest. 
Thus, common sense tells us that the concept of ideology has significance where 
nationalism is concerned. 
Arrighi et al. state that what we call "nations" are really just political claims 
made by ethnic groups that they should have states which represent them and their 
territory. Such political claims can be utilized by both secessionists and irredentists. 
They further write, 
In point of fact, if we were to use a strict definition of the concept 
"nation", we should be hard-pressed to find even one "nation-state" in 
the entire world system. This indicates that "nation" is more the 
description of an aspiration, or of a tendency, than of an existing 
phenomenon.89 
Thus, the only real difference between an "ethnic group" and a "nation" is 
sovereignty; ethnic groups do not have or claim their own states while nations do. 
Ethnic groups depend on the creation of nation-states for their structures because 
nation-states have been the significant political units of the international market 
system. These political units are dependent for their definition and circumstances 
on their location in that system.90 To put it another way, the nation-state is the only 
real game in town for anyone who wants to bea player. Hence, any ethnic group must 
make a claim to nationhood, and thus to nation-statehood, if it truly seeks self-
determination. These are the only conditions available under which the aforesaid 
ethnic group can truly aspire to any kind of self-governance or to determine its own 
destiny. Without the political clout of nation-statehood, it cannot enter the interna-
tional economic forum, participate in international relations, or negotiate its standing 
in the international system. It must be a nation in the truest sense. That is why, as 
Arrighi et al. assert, "[olne of the fundamental ideological themes of all modern 
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nationalism has been the struggle for equality -- both the hypothetical equality of 
all members of the 'nation' and the demand for equality with 'outside' 
oppressor states/groups."'! If the ethnic group does not have "equality" with 
other groups or states, then it cannot participate fully. The attainment of equality 
with others must be one of the foremost ideological goals because it bestows not only 
personal dignity upon people, but also the dignity and position due to full citizens 
of the world community who are represented by their own government in their own 
state. 
other theorists equate nationalism exclusively with the nation-state as well, as 
if the attainment of political sovereignty were the only dimension. Tonu Parming and 
Mea-Yan Cheung simply state, ..... political nationalism as an ideology essentially 
insists that the highest expression of a people's collective identity is statehood, and 
that the population of a given state should have but a single sense of peoplehood. "92 
Jayant Lele discusses nationalism as an ideo1ogy in its "umbrella-like" incarnation, 
or as a meta-ideo1ogy. It is behind all ideo1ogies and constitutes the "utopian" core 
ofideo1ogy because of its expression as the "essential sociability" of human beings.,g 
Lele writes, "Nationalism continues to remain potent, drives people to suffer 
repression and inflict it on others only because it is rooted in the social basis of their 
existence. "'4 This social basis is the community, the site of oppression and 
exploitation which is projected onto those outside the community. As such, Lele 
suggests that nationalism is the "hegemonic face" of the indigenous dominant class 
which proposes its own sectoral interests as those of the nation. Unfortunately, Lele 
fails to point out that the community can also be the site of sharing, generosity, 
support, tolerance, and a host of other positive phenomena. He offers no insights 
into why these aspects are overlooked while more negative ones are imposed on 
others. Nor does heexplain why people would allow themselves to be so duped by the 
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indigenous dominant class that they would adopt and fight for sectoral interests that 
do not offer anything meaningful for them. 
Wilkinson attributes the creed and doctrine for nationalism's ideological 
component to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. That is, the nation-state is the most 
appropriate basis for the establishment of the ideal political association (i.e., the 
social contract). "Universal civilized society" and the general will are harmonized 
in a republican nation-state because the nation is legitimated by the people. 9S 
Wilkinson further credits Rousseau and the Jacobins with giving the modern 
doctrines of nationalism their underpinnings: "[p]rinciples of national solidarity. 
universal citizenship, equal rights to civic participation and equal treatment under 
the law. ".6 Echoing the position taken by Arrighi et a1. with regard to the intimate 
connection between nationalism and political sovereignty, Wilkinson asserts, "Once 
defined in terms of the entire population within a given territory, or a whole ethnic 
or linguistic group, nationalism asserts that the nation should become the fundamen-
tal and universal unit of political organization. Human SOCiety becomes a world of 
nation-states. "" He a 1so points out that this doctrine of nationa 11sm has been 
attacked on three fronts: (1) there is no agreement on what constitutes a nation and 
there is often much cross-cutting when nations are established; (2) nationalism is 
often mistaken for the desire for constitutional democracy by Westerners; and (3) 
nationalism has exacerbated inter national conflict and has often been the justification 
for revolution and war." 
Anthony H. Birch states that nationalism is a political doctrine that is 
concerned with the "organization of political authority. ,," He equates the problem 
of understanding nationalism with thecoterminal problem of defining what is a nation. 
If one claims that every people or society has this right [to govern 
itself], one is immediately in trouble. How many peoples or societies are 
there in the world? How are their boundaries to be defined and 
charted? If one says that only a national society has this right, how is 
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one to define a national society without falling into the circular 
argument that it is a society that governs itself? How, in fact, can one 
define a nation?100 
He maintains that national identity has both subjective and objective aspects. It is 
not camp lete ly subjective because the situation and observers play an important part 
in establishing group/national identity as well. Birch believes that "[a] nation is best 
defined as a society which either governs itself today, or has done so in the past, or 
has a credible claim to do so in the not-too-distant future. "II)! He admits that there 
is some circularity in this definition but insists that it is inescapable because of 
historical reality. For him, nationalism is "a doctrine about the proper relationship 
between society and the political regime ... "102 
Ernest Gellner calls nationalism a "principle" and argues that it is political and 
that its claim is tocangruence between the political and the national unit. Nationalism 
defines both the sentiment and the movement concerned with it: "Nationalist 
sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the 
feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment. A nationalist movement is one 
actuated by a sentiment of this kind. "103 Gellner delineates the ways in which 
nationalist sentiment can be violated and sums up this brief discussion by stating 
that "nationalism is a theory of political1egitimacy" and that this legitimacy is based 
on ethnic boundaries coinciding with political ones and not acting as a divisive tool 
between the powerful and those without power. I04 He also argues that the 
nationalist principle may be couched in universalistic terms whereby the abstract 
concept of nationalism is supported, regardless of its specificity, a la Woodrow 
Wilson's generalized stance of "national self-determination". However, the universa-
listie is not usually the case for nationalism; indeed, what tends to fuel nationalism 
is extreme particularism or ethnocentrism -- "forsaking all others", so to speak, in 
favour of one's own. Such particularism also generally leads to extremism in the form 
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of "passions running high" as opposed to "sweet reason". 
Gellner's definition as stated above is highly circular and requires the 
acceptance of certain assumptions and leaps in logic to be adopted. We know there 
is such a thing as nationalist sentiment because nationalist movements arise from the 
stimulation of the said sentiment. We must assume that the sentiment has been there 
all along, mysteriously latent until some stimulus has aroused it, but we are given no 
insight as to where such sentiment originates and why it is particularly oriented to 
the "nation". There is, similarly, no explanation why the label "nationalist" is given 
to the movement which arises from such sentiment. We are expected to simply accept 
this notion, suggesting that national sentiment is inherent to human beings. But the 
question remains: why should such a label necessarily be attached to either? And 
is the stimulation of sentiment sufficient to constitute a movement - or is something 
else necessary to facilitate acting in concert? There is also the problem of presenting 
an individualistic concept such as the stimulation of a sentiment with a collective 
result (i.e., nationalist movement) without adequately accounting for the linkage 
between the two or the processes that lead from the individual sentiment to the 
collective action. To be sure, Gellner is hinting at something which we would argue 
has a great deal of validity; however, the criticism remains that he has not taken 
enough care to explain and analyze the relationship and progression between the two 
phenomena. 
As we can see, the approach of nationalism as an ideology offers some excellent 
analytical insights. Specifically, we are a.bleto see that nationalist ideology accords 
a particular kind of identity to individuals as individuals and as members of ethnic 
groups. The whole notion of "self-determination" bestows a new way of perceiving 
ourselves: it empowers us, makes us believe that we can cast off oppressive shackles 
and rise above our mundane existence, and it gives us a great deal of hope for the 
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future. In addition, ideology affords moral justification, grants us the opportunity 
to feel that we are doing something not just for ourselves, but for the sake of others, 
especially future generations. As David Apter states, "The vaguest of ideologies can 
be made to shine in the reflected glow of moral indignation. "105 When ideology also 
taps into our ethnic identity, it can move us to become aotive political beings, making 
some of us willing to saorifice everything to achieve our goals. 
Nationalism may be a particularly powerful ideology for this reason: because 
it has the properties that are afforded by the ideological component in addition to its 
affinity with a deep aspect of our personal identity, it can marshall an enormous 
amount of power and passion for a goal that is highly abstraot in many ways. To have 
a state that represents one's own nation is not something most people dream about. 
Few people in the course of their day-to-day lives probably care very muoh whether 
their ethnic group is in a position to enter the international economic forum, 
participate in international relations, or negotiate its standing in the international 
system, even though these political situations may have great indirect importance for 
them. Even fewer people give muoh of their attention to whether their state is the 
most appropriate or legitimate basis for the social contract or whether the general 
will is harmonized with universal civilized society. Yet, these same people may be 
motivated to lay down their lives for suoh abstract goals. Hence, nationalism as an 
ideology engenders something in human beings that cannot be discounted or 
dismissed. 
Nevertheless, we must not forget that the ideological component without the 
emotional and psyohological commitment is like one-handed clapping. Ideology 
derives its power from its praxis. This requires commitment, something which is 
emotional and psyohological by nature. We cannot fully understand the influence of 
ideology in nationalism until we try to grasp the mechanics of the emotional and 
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psychological factors at work. Some theorists have attempted to account for 
nationalism asa psychological manifestation enuring in individuals or in members of 
social groups. These studies lend further insights into our discussion of nationalism 
and require some investigation. 
Nationalism as Psychological Manifestation 
Now we come to the other side of the one-handed clapping: the psychologi-
cal/emotional side of the equation of nationalism. The literature dealing with the 
ideological component has pointed us in this direction with its references to the ways 
in which ideology arises from personal experiences, how it must have meaning for 
those who embrace it, and how it then influences the thoughts and experiences of its 
adherents. We see the connection between the personal and the political, especially 
when wetakeintoconsidera.tion the fact that ideology goes hand-in-hand with action. 
But what is that crucial personal element? We must assume that human beings 
are not born with a.llegiance toward any given nation; they must acquire it during 
their lifetimes. How do they acquire it and why does it sometimes have such power 
over them? Is it ever-present or does it take on salience at some point? If so, why? 
Once it has been aroused, are we then held in its thrall for all time? These questions 
and many others will be explored in this next section as we review the literature on 
the formation of social self-identity, including ethnic identity, how people come to 
identify themselves as part of a particular social group, and how their primordial 
sentiment can 'lead them to embrace the actions we have come to describe as 
nationalist. 
Theorists of self-identity stress that the self is not a product but a process. 
Weigert at al posit that identity is what makes us human beings. Identities are 
64 
formed through interactions with others and interpretations by ourselves; that is, 
our identity is not simply what others impose on us - we must reject or adopt 
others' perceptions of who we are and discard or integrate them accordingly. 
Identities are comprised of roles we play in society and social/cultural definitions 
restrict what identities are available to us. Thus, presumably, it is not possible to 
be a rocket scientist in a primitive tribal society because its culture and social 
structure do not allow for such a role. Identities are constantly being incorporated 
into the self as people take on new roles in society. However, the identity must be 
validated by others for it to be fully incorporated into self-identity. Self and 
identity are not one and the same, stress Weigart at at, although self is not possible 
without identity and identity is not possible without self. This is because there is 
no "disembodied thinker" who can escape cultural meanings. People strive to 
maintain their identity through time and space; that is. they need a sense of 
continuity with the past and with their place}·' 
For George Herbert Mead, the self is formed through the interaction between 
the "r which is comparable to Freud's concept of the "id", that untamed, unpredict-
able aspect with which we are all born, and the "Me", the socialized aspect}01 
Language is extremely important for Mead because it is the instrument through which 
we interpret our context and the world around us. Indeed, without the organization 
of symbols that we can 'language, human beings would not be able to think at an. 
Hencet the language we use to express ourselves is crucial in the formation of self-
identity. 
Douglas, an existential sociologist, contends that such a conceptualization of 
the self is incomplete. He concedes that most ".ne" and "adult" (i.e. I socially 
competent) people recognize that they are both individuals and socially defined 
beings. In other words, we know that we are separate and different from others 
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while, at the same time, we are also similar to, interdependent with, and often "fused 
by love" with other people's selves .... "The part of us that is different from the 
others is the 'subjective r, the wming, intending person. The part of us that is 
socially defined, that anchors us to the social world, that embeds our beings in the 
way significant others react to us, is the 'social me', what others see in the 'r. "109 
It is apparent that to this extent, he is in agreement with Mead's conceptualization 
of the soc1alself. However, Douglasaugments thistheory of the self by rejecting the 
notion that it is composed of little more than "a composite of social reflections"m 
and insisting that there is an inner self that integrates the mind and lends order to 
its complex subsystems, orienting our actions as we face the external stimuli of the 
world in which we live.ll1 We need that sense of inner self to act as a framework 
for, or give a general gestalt to, our lives. Without it, we would feel threatened by 
external stimuli because we would feel formless, lost, confused, and so on, resulting 
in lives filled with anxiety and panic. When we are secure at the very core of our 
selves, we can feel challenged to grow and expand. According to Douglas, 
[o]ur need for a sense of inner self seems to spring directly from our 
sense of time, from our immense memories, from the vast complexity and 
pluralism of our human mind (with its immensely complex interrelations 
among subsystems), from our awareness of the many potentially conflic-
ting basic emotions and values that might push us in different direc-
tions in life at any given time, and from the necessity we face of 
choosing plans of action to satisfy (optimally) these conflicting emotions 
and values over relatively long periods of time.m 
Douglas further holds that values and emotions are crucial to the self. "Our 
basic values guide us in choosing the social form of actions that fulfil and enhance 
our basic emotions, but it is our basic emotions that orient or guide our will in 
choosing to act at all and then in choosing what kinds of actions to perform."m 
Basic, positive emotions are what human beings consider to be the most vital 
component of the self and, when aroused, they orient our actions so that our selves 
will be fulfilled and enhanced. "The more powerful the emotion, the more the self is 
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oriented, until, at the extreme, the entire sense of self is pervaded by, overridden 
by, completely in the grip of, the emotion. "114 
Existential sociology, of which Douglas isa practitioner, is the perspective by 
which human experience in the world in all forms is studied. "A central orientation 
of this perspective is the fusion of rational thought, action, and feeling. "115 Its 
intellectual forebears come from existential philosophy. As such, its main premise is 
"that the world and our selves are essentially meaningless" but existential sociology 
does not adhere to the belief that such meaninglessness results in negative 
consequences like alienation, fear, and so on. Instead, its practitioners concentrate 
on the optimistic observation that human beings constantly seek "to discover viable 
meaning in order to make life work:· t16 The self is believed to be encased in the 
anatomical structure of the human being and appears to be singular. However, this 
singularity is to be found within a collectivity or collectivities. "Typically, we see 
ourselves as members of historically and socially constituted sodalities. The pronomi-
nal '1' defines itself as a member of a plural 'we' :'117 That is, we require a reference 
group ("sodality") to understand the self. "'I am l' is not an answer that any-
one ... will respect. Thus we all disembody and socialize the self in the very act of 
claiming its singular embodiment and individuality. An individual becomes a person, 
and a person exhibits his or her personification of the social self-referencing 
group."118 Furthermore, not only is the self connected with others in its present 
time and space, it is also linked to previous others historically. Nonetheless, the "1" 
of self must always struggle against the "we" which gives it its individual identity 
in order not to be completely submerged in the "we" .II' 
In other words, existential sociology posits a strong relationship between our 
rational selves and emotion. In short, our emotions inform every thought and 
experience we have throughout our lives. We can no more divorce our rationality 
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from our emotions than we can split our minds from our bodies. Emotions form the 
basis for our rationality. As such, our emotions are absolutely fundamental in the 
formation of our social self-identity. It makes sense to assume that, aberrations not-
withstanding, human beings attempt to maximize p leasurab le experiences and minimize 
negative ones. Pleasurable experiences arise from some of the roles we play in 
society and roles are the building blocks of social self-identity; therefore, social se1f-
identity can be viewed as a collection of roles that produce pleasurable experiences 
or are in reaction to negative experiences for most human beings. 
In this context, the concept of self-esteem would appear to be an essential 
element of social self-identity. The definition of self-esteem set forth by Baumeister 
and Tice120 rests upon the notion of a dichotomy between positive and negative 
qualities. In other words, they state that high self-esteem involves emphasizing 
abilities, strengths and good qualities, while, on the other hand, low self-esteem 
involves an emphasis upon deficiencies, weaknesses and bad qualities. As far as it 
goes, this definition seems adequate, but it does not go far enough. 
Taking the Baumeister and Tice definition as a point of departure, we can 
expand upon the concept of self-esteem as follows. Pleasurable experiences act as 
a barometer of self-esteem in that the amount of pleasure or "positive strokes" a 
person receives will probably serve to raise his/her level of self-esteem or lower it 
accordingly. Furthermore, the number of sources of "positive strokes" will determine 
to some extent whether self-esteem will be specific or diffuse. In other words, if the 
ethniccommunity, for example, affords the greatest amount and highest consistency 
of pleasure for an individual, he/she may likely experience his/her self-esteem as 
being highest within, and specific to, the ethnic community. On the other hand, if an 
individual derives pleasure from his/her experiences not only within the ethnic 
community, but also at work, during leisure-time activities, through religious 
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affiliation, and so on, it is probable that self-esteem will be high and diffuse for that 
individual, with the ethnic community being only one of many sources of "positive 
strokes". Hence, not only the level of self-esteem of an individual, but the number 
of sources of self-esteem, will have significance for social self-identity. Of course, 
if the ethnic community is the backdrop for all the sources of self-esteem, its 
significance will be paramount. 121 
Baumeister and Tice propose that there are two systems of control employed 
by human beings when they confront the world. Primary control is instrumental 
while secondary control is passive and interpretive. Primary control involves 
attempts to change the world to suit the individual's needs. Secondary control 
involves submission to what is perceived as the immutability of the world and the 
situations confronting the individual. Essentially, "[p]rimary control aims to fulfil 
one's goals, whereas secondary control aims to avoid disappointment. "122 According 
to Baumeister and Tice, regardless of whether individuals have high or low self-
esteem, they will employ both primary and secondary control; however, the pattern 
and goal of their employment will differ in relation to the level of self-esteem. 
Whenever a situation arises to confront an individual and the result is failure, 
if the failure can be attributed to external factors, the individual will pursue this 
course. Such is true for those with high or low self-esteem. Primary control 
mechanisms will not play a role because of the attribution to external factors: if 
instrumental behaviour were to be pursued by the individual who has experienced 
initial failure and externalized it, continued attempts resulting in failures might 
result in the internalization of the failure, with the possible consequence being a 
drop in self-esteem. The attribution to external factors is itself a secondary control 
mechanism, according to Baumeister and Tice.1Z3 This suggests that, even when 
people can save face by blaming external factors for a failure, given a choice, they 
69 
probably will not continue the behaviour that resulted in the failure, lest it become 
apparent that the failure was due to their own deficiency rather than any external 
factor. Therefore, to overcome this tendency, it might be possible to give new labels 
or interpretations to similar situations that have previously resulted in failure. Such 
reinterpretation might allow for renewed actions without a loss of self-esteem. 
Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that people with high self-esteem will 
experience more dissonance when they face a situation which conflicts with their 
views of self. The reason for this heightened dissonance is due to the fact that those 
with high self-esteem make positive evaluations of themselves, whereas people with 
low self-esteem tend not to have such self-evaluations. What this characterization 
tends to suggest is that individuals with high self-esteem who experience cognitive 
dissonance will embark upon a course of action intended to remedy the disso-
nance.124 Hence, we are given some insight into why someone might choose to "exit" 
from a situation. 
Ronald Rogowski presents nationalism as a "rational" phenomenon. Although 
he sets out three parts to his definition, we will only deal with the following: (1) 
"the product of value-maximizing (but not merely greedy) behaviour; (2) based almost 
always on an accurate appraisal of self-interest and social reality (that is, rarely a 
consequence of hysteria or delusion)".125 He uses the term "rational" in the sense 
of maximizing personal benefits after a cost/benefit analysis" w here both benefit and 
cost are evaluated idiosyncratically but consistently "126; that is, he defines 
"rationality" in its economic manifestation. Thus, nationalism arises out of personal 
choice after a careful calculation of costs and benefits. Nevertheless, it is not a 
purely individual matter; such an orientation towards rational choice applies to 
groups as well. 
Rogowski posits that individuals/groups make calculations on the bases that 
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they will be in a position to supply personal Skl1ls for which there will be demand in 
the anticipated state and that such a state will also provide a corresponding 
supply/demand equation for other "socially important skills" belonging to the 
individuals/group.l27 Based on these premises, Rogowski describes various forms 
of nationalism and their related hypotheses. Without going into excessive detail, he 
links social mobility, changes in the mode of production, cultural integration, and 
changes in the terms of trade between cultures both in societies that are character-
ized by clearly dominant and subordinate groups and those that involve multiple 
cultural groups that are relatively equal in terms of socioeconomic status. 
Despite the fact that there is little emotion expressed in Rogowski's character-
ization of a kind of nationalism that is based on purely "rational", cost/benefit 
analyses, we may infer from the literature dealing with the self that emotion is the 
basis for all rationality and, thus, even the most calculated cost/benefit analysis 
arises from the desire to maximize personal pleasure or "positive strokes". 
Nationalism may provide an excellent rallying tactic for individuals who seek to raise 
their self-esteem and view an elevated level of status for their ethnic group as a way 
of achieving such an end. After all, an individual has little hope of overturning a 
social order by him/herself such that, if he/she believes that his/her lack of 
socioeconomic status is due to his/her membership in a certain group (and we are 
always members of groups), he/she will likely attempt to rally others in the same 
group around the same cause: elevation of group self-esteem through elevation of 
group socioeconomic status. Such an end may only be achieved in certain situations 
by espousal of nationalism. 
We may ask why such individuals would necessarily choose the ethnic group 
as the interest group to be employed for such social change? The answer lies in the 
suggestion that the ethnic group may represent a specific enough group to allow for 
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both profound identification (i.e., because ethnicity can be viewed as transcending 
and cutting across all other statuses, in addition to the fact that ethnicity has 
symbols and markers around which to rally) and strategic political organization. To 
illustrate, organizing all women in an attempt to precipitate political change is an 
extremely difficult task since, although gender can be seen as transcending and 
cutting across all other statuses, there are few symbols and markers to denote a 
specifically female culture with which all women can identify; furthermore, a political 
organization consisting of the entire adult fema'iepopulation in any given society (or, 
indeed, the world) would tend to be exceedingly unwieldy. 
Although Rogowski claims that the orientation towards rational choice is not 
exclusively confined to individuals, his characterization of the rise of nationalist 
movements nevertheless emphasizes individual choice rather than the group 
dimension. He does notexplain adequately how the orientation might take on a group 
character. In fact, many theorists of a psychological approach to nationalism seem 
to have a difficult time demonstrating how their rather solipsistic models make the 
transition to group form. For an explanation of how an individual becomes at least 
psychologically attached to a group. we will 100k at the following model set forth by 
John C. Turner. 
Members of a social group are usually characterized, according to Turner, as 
those who identify themselves as having interests in common with certain others. 
"This definition stresses that members of a social group seem often to share no more 
than a collective perception of their own social unity and yet this seems to be 
sufficient for them to act as a group. "123 He rejects the "socia] cohesion" model as 
it pertains to social groups since he does not feel that it is borne out in empirical 
study. The social cohesion model suggests that the element of affectivity must be 
present in social groups, that members of social groups are bound together by their 
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cohesiveness. It "rejects the members' attraction to each other, to the groups as a 
whole and to group activities. "ut For Turner, the "aoc1al identification" model is 
a better explanation for social groups because it is based on the assumption of 
cognition. That is, members identify themselves and others through the use of 
abstract social categories which then become part of their self-concept through the 
process of internalization. Group behaviour, then, is the product of the interaction 
between self-cognition and soc1a1-cognition. In other words, one identifies a group, 
one identifies oneself as belonging to that group, then one interacts with others of 
the group accordingly. Turner asserts that the primary question determining group 
membership is "Who am n·': hence, "what matters is how we perceive and define 
ourselves and not how we feel about others:'J" Social cohesion, he states, is not 
a necessary or sufficient oondition for group formation while social identification may 
be both. In addition, social identification can better explain inter- and intragroup 
relations as itean account for the manner in which individual needs for positive self-
esteem motivate people to assign positive values to the characteristics of the group 
to which they bebng and to distinguish their own group from others. 
Distinction is made by Turner between social identity and personal identity. 
Social identity is the collection of categorizations of self and others, while the 
personal identity relates to personal tastes, intellect and psychobgical characteris-
tics. He hypothesizes that there may be times when personal identity and social 
identity conflict, when self-image is exclusively based on group membership. Social 
identity does not operate at all times. It needs a trigger in order to be awakened. 
Here, Turner seems to echo what Douglas has already argued: that there is a core 
self which organizes the complex subsystems of the mind, of which social self-identity 
would be a part. Certain situations will arise in an individual's life which will cause 
some facet of social identity to come forward and gain salience. Ethnic identity is an 
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example of such a facet of social identity. In such a case, salience need not be 
permanent (and probably is not) nor does the salient feature of social identity cancel 
out the other components. 
Turner pOints out that, once individuals identify themselves as belonging to 
a particular group, there is a strong tendency to attach positive characteristics to 
that group in spite of negative labels that might be generated by outsiders. Members 
of groups also continue to identify themselves and others according to group 
attributes once they have made their social identification. It is argued that 
subjective status and prestige derive from positive comparisons of the ingroup to 
outgroups. When comparisons are negative, subjective status and prestige are low. 
Thus, the need for positive social identity motivates a search for, and 
thecreation and enhancement of, positive distinctiveness for one's own 
group in comparison with other groups. Where the ingroup lacks 
positive distinctiveness, members will be motivated either to leave that 
group physically or dissociate themselves from it psychologically and 
aspire to membership of a higher status group or to adopt creative 
and/or competitive strategies to restore its positive distinctiveness. 191 
Turner concludes that the need for positive self-esteem is the significant contribut-
ing factor in inter- and intragroup behaviour.m Thus, he has explained not only 
why members would desire to be part of a group and remain members, as well as why 
they might choose to disengage from their particular group. Social self-identity and 
self-esteem are important variables in these dynamics. 
As was stated above, ethnic identity is a facet of social self-identity. It is a 
term that is often discussed in the literature but is sometimes confusing; hence, we 
need some sort of definition of it. 
Frances Aboud construes ethnic identity to be made up of self-identity and 
ethnicity.i33 "Ethnic self-identity, therefore, means knowing that oneself is defined 
in part by attributes which are in turn used to define an ethnicity."u4 Aboud 
states that self-identity is based on the ability to distinguish oneself as different 
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from others and, hence, be "identifiable in a social context." Furthermore, being 
different from others serves an informational function, allowing us to describe 
ourselves by means of contrast. "Thus distinctive attributes contribute to self-
identity simply by enhancing the availability of information about oneself."m 
Ethnicity enhances the contrast of self-other through ethnic differences; therefore, 
it enhances self-identity. Ethnic identity is, in turn, "strengthened through 
contrasts with members of other ethnic and national groups. "116 
Edward H. Spicer argues that both group cohesion and personal identity may 
be strengthened by the existence of "opposition". Spicer discusses "persistent 
cultural systems"; that is, identity systems that adapt to changing environments 
rather than disappearing. He defines identity systems in the following terms: "The 
essential feature of any identity system is an individual's belief in his personal 
affiliation with certain symbols, or, more accurately, with what certain symbols stand 
for.nu? Identity systems are not only individual, but collective as well. The main 
feature of collective identity is "[aJ relationship between human individuals and 
selected cultural elements - the symbols .. :'198 The symbols are what give meaning 
to the collective identity. There is an historical dimension in the notion of 
persistence; that is, culture is cumulative and it is important for people to have a 
sense that what they experience personally has been experienced by previous 
generations as well. The symbols and historical dimension provide individual 
motivation to continue the historical process and fulfil the group destiny. It should 
be noted that the history in question need not be based on fact; rather, it is the 
perception of the members of the collectivity that is paramount, that the history have 
meaning for them. Of significance is that these identity systems persist in other 
cultural contexts. l39 
Opposition is part of the process of persistence in these identity systems as 
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groups struggle to resist being incorporated into other cultures or organizations. 
The groups develop clear-cut symbols to distinguish their own culture from that of 
the host society especially and those of other groups within their milieu as well. 
Resistance is probably strongest against the cultural group in control- because it 
is in control and has the power to assimilate the minority. Continued opposition is 
instrumental in the formulation of persistence, not only because the minority group 
struggles against the dominant one, but because the dominant group is affected by 
the oppositional process as well. What is interesting to nctais that state power often 
acts to dissipate the identity system of the group which possesses it, presumably 
because that group feels so secure in its position that it is not required to struggle 
to maintain its culture. Unfortunately, in order to assimilate other cultural groups, 
and because governance involves compromise to accommodate the various elements 
to be found in any society. the group possessing state power may have cultural 
hegemony, but that culture may become diluted.uo 
Symbols are usually associated with land and language, according to Spicer. 
If the land is lost, the identity system can actually be reinforced - provided that 
certain structural conditions are maintained by the group. Although Spicer does not 
elaborate on this point, it can be assumed that he is referring to such structural 
conditions as religious customs or cultural organizations. The loss of language is 
similar to the loss of land: like the myth of "our land", certain words and/or phrases 
can become sacred in the religious or ritual life of the group.141 
Spicer states that the identity system actually develops independently of 
cultural maintenance. Onceagain, this isa function of the process of opposition. The 
identity system develops out of the meanings that members of the group attribute to 
certain symbols and have significance for them. "The meanings amount to a self-
definition and an image of themselves as they have performed in the course of their 
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history. The selection of cultural elements for symbolic references goes on in terms 
of the character of this image; the frequent shifts in emphasis are part of the process 
of maintenance in response to alterations in the environment. "142 
Three spheres of participation are delineated by Spicer: (1) communication 
through a shared language; (2) moral values held in common; and, (3) "political 
organization for achieving the objectives of group policy".w It is not possible to 
maintain an identity system without the participation of members in all three of these 
spheres; however, participation fluctuates. Spicer explains that language is a 
fundamental sphere of participation because it assists in the maintenance of internal 
solidarity even while it establishes boundaries between the group and others. 
Common moral values help to guide groups through the oppositional process by 
informing them of the ideal behaviour to pursue in their own course and assisting 
them in making judgments about the behaviour of the others. The greatest 
fluctuation occurs in political participation because organization is necessary for 
such participation. There may be periods wherein the group is organizationally weak 
for various reasons. This low point of participation does not mean that the identity 
system has disappeared; it may be maintained by language and morals even while 
political participation is at an ebb.144 Nevertheless, we may suggest (from the 
discussions of social movements above) that organization and political participation 
are fundamental prerequisites of nationalist mobilizations. 
Anya Peterson Royce attempts to employ Spicer's oppositional model in her 
study of the Zapotec Indians of Mexico.145 She reinforces the notion that ethnic 
identity is only one of many identities from which people may choose. Furthermore, 
it is not just primordial sentiment but, rather, a resource that can be manipulated or 
ignored in accordance with whatever situation faces the individual. Whether it is 
salutary to employ an ethnic identity will determine its utilization. It must be 
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beneficial to the individual to have an ethnic identity in a particular situation. 
Power, perception and purpose are three dimensions that Royce states are present 
in any consideration of ethnic identity. 
Power is usually in the hands of the dominant group which is in a position to 
determine who is an "ethnic". Subordinate groups tend to have more information 
about the dominant group than vice versa. There is some indication here that there 
will be jockeying for power as the dominant group attempts to keep the subordinate 
groups in an inferior position while subordinate groups vie with each other and the 
dominant group for more power, prestige and status. Groups perceive themselves 
and others, and thus create symbols and stereotypes. "Symbol construction and 
stereotype building are not unidirectional processes, nor do they occur in isolation. 
L ike everything else having to do with ethnic identity, the presence of tothers' 
stimulates, molds, inspires. "146 Symbol construction plays a significant role in the 
persistence of identity since symbols help to maintain boundaries between the group 
and outsiders and, in addition, assist members of the ingroup to differentiate between 
themselves. The flexibility of content of symbols is important for the survival of 
ethnic groups; since the more flexibility, presumably the more chance of group 
viability in any given situation and time period. "The ability of an ethnic group to 
maintain boundaries, hence survive as a distinct identity, may depend on its ability 
to marshall an impressive array of symbols. Conversely, a symbol system without 
boundaries cannot continue to exist."w Purpose is another important facet be-
cause, according to Royce, everyone has the desire to improve their own situation at 
some point, even if their purpose is not conscious. Interaction or opposition is 
implied because there must be some contact with other groups in order to instill the 
notion of "improvement" of one's situation. Thus, there must be some intergroup 
vying for scarce resources. 
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Royce's pOint regarding the "situational use" of ethnicity has merit in terms 
of the whole notion of multiple identities and deriving "positive strokes" from ethnic 
identity. She suggests that the situational use of ethnicity imp lies: 
(1) that individuals can choose, within certain constraints, between a 
variety of identities; 
(2) that individuals will maximize the options available to them and will 
use ethnic identity if they perceive an advantage in so doing; 
(3) that individuals have to contend, in this process. with other 
individuals engaged in the same process whose interests and percep-
tions may be quite different.ICe 
Thisconceptualization proposes that ethnic identity, whether it stems from primordial 
sentiment or not, involves personal choice and interactional situations with others. 
Hence, the idea of "exit" as an option emerges; that is, one of the choices available to 
people who employ an ethnic identity or whose ethnic identity becomes the "master 
status" in a given situation is that of opting out of such master status or employment 
of ethnic identity. The implication here is that there is intra- psychic conflict among 
identities with the result that another identity emerges with some salience. In 
addition, external stimuli or oppositional factors do not determine the outcome of any 
interaction; there is always idiosyncratic agency involved. 
Using Spicer's model. George M. Scott, Jr. has derived a proposition which 
binds primordial sentiments to the oppositional circumstances which stimulate them. 
With this relational approach, ethnic group solidarity becomes a psychosocial 
manifestation. He also relies on the work of Edward Spicer as the basis for his 
oppositionalapproach. According to his interpretation of Sp1cer's model, "the degree 
of an ethnic group's identity win vary in direct proportion to the amount of 
opposition encountered by the group"l49 and primordialism (i.e., "a psychogioal 
explanation for the behavioral phenomenon of ethnic solidarity"150) is an interven-
ing variable, also directly related to the amount of opposition. "Opposition, then, 
does not lead directly to ethnic solidarity, but operates indirectly through the 
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psychological mechanism of primordial sentiments. "m When and if ethnic groups 
perceive opposition, members will100k back toa "gbriouspast" or "golden age" and 
cleave to whatever symbols are deemed salient, thus strengthening ethnic identity 
and ties with other members. It is important to note that opposition can take almost 
any form and the term "perception" is definitive; that lS, opposition can be a wheny 
subjective matter. 
Some of the external factors that might come into play when we examine how 
nationalism among subnational groups emerges are: oppression of the ethnic group 
by the host society, attempts at assimilation of the ethnic group. a policy of 
multiculturalism where cultural pluralism is tolerated and perhaps even encouraged, 
displacement of the ethnic group by the host society or another group or groups, 
forced migration by the host society. and even non-action by the host society 
wherein it does nothing to assist in the survival of the ethnic group. These factors 
may be real or simply perceived by the ethnic group. 
Part of non-action of governments involves the "ethnic trap". This situation 
may evolve where ethnic minorities insist on preserving their traditional culture and 
language, to which insistence governments acquiesce. Unfortunately. what may 
happen, as in Quebec up to the time of the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s. is that the 
ethnic minority then is left behind economically. socially and politicany. Its members 
are not able to compete with members of the majority culture for economic and/or 
political opportunities because they do not possess the skills and education or their 
lifestyle has not prepared them for successful competition. Thus, when the 
government takes the non-action stance in such a case, it is indirectly. and perhaps 
even inadvertently. playing a significant role in maintaining ethnic inequality and 
oppression ,1$2 
A multicultural policy wherein all ethnic groups are granted equality and 
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legitimacy in the eyes of the state may act as an oppositional factor in terms of ethnic 
group solidarity or as a stimulus to nationalism. For example, the multicultural policy 
introduced by Prime Minister Trudeau in the face of nascent m11itant Quebec 
nationalism was a measure argued by many purely to defuse said nationalism. The 
policy essentially tried to reduce the Quebecois to just another ethnic group in 
Canadian society and thereby undermine their claims to nationhood. In the case of 
Yugoslavia, Tito declared the Muslims to bea nationality under the 1974 Constitution, 
giving them collective rights and legitimacy. This action reduced the traditionally 
competing Serbian and Croatian claims to Bosnia-Hercegovina by making the Serbs 
and Croats into nothing more than two large ethnic groups in an essentially Muslim 
republic. In such cases, a multicultural policy can pose a threat to ethnic nationalism 
as an undermining device. Nationalists can either be assimilated into the pluralistic 
environment or they can become even more militant. 
The final point that Scott discusses in terms of his proposition is that the 
direction of causation is essentially circular, which accounts for the fact that ethnic 
conflict can escalate so precipitously. Expression of ethnic group solidarity can lead 
to greater opposition, which may then result in increased ethnic group solidarity, and 
soon. 
Another author who has taken a specifically psychological approach to the 
study of nationalism and self-identity is leonard Doob, who unites patriotism and 
nationalism by stating that the former is a feeling while the latter consists of 
demands which stem from the feeling. Doob asserts that it is not possible to have 
"zero" patriotism, that there are only positive or negative degrees. Furthermore, 
while patriotism is personal, nationalism is always social. Thus, we seethe orientation 
towards bringing the personal commitment of individuals into the social, collective 
realm of demands and presumably actions. He does not, however, leave the matter of 
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what patriotism is at the simple assertion that it is a feeling. Rather, Doab goes on 
welaborate that the referents of patriotism are emotional attachments to land, other 
people and culture. He states that these are also the basic components of national 
consciousness. In addition, there is what he calls a "reciprocity of influence";iSS 
that is, the land, people and culture influence individuals who, in turn, influence 
these entities and so on, creating a spiral that can go on indefinitely.1S4 
Doab explains that patriotism entails a continuity with, and a link to, the future 
as well as the past. As human beings come to realize that others before them have 
lived and died and that they, too, will die, they gain comfort from the knowledge that 
they are part of an endless chain which flows inw the future. People need a rich 
heritage in order to feel pride, an important component of patriotism and nationalism. 
Sacred symbols are also required to provide a reference point for feelings. People 
can invest their emotions in objects which represent their heritage, which objects, 
in turn, will evoke patriotism and national pride.155 
There are two interacting factors which mediate the way people understand 
their world, according to Doab: (1) "the stimulus pattern evoking the experience", 
and (2) "the person's own predispositions".m He utilizes the spiral which results 
from the passage of time to rescue from circularity his argument about personal 
predispositions being explained by patriotic ones: "The time factor ... permits a 
graceful exit from the circle into the usual Spiral. Over the years nationals acquire 
a set of tendencies, the patriotic predispositions. Perception is affected by these 
predispositions and, as a result, patriotism grows stronger or weaker after each 
experience. "157 
According to Doob, distinctiveness is essential to all organisms for they must 
perceive that they are different from others. He suggests that peap 1e come to see 
what they consider "their own" in terms of land, other people and culture as being 
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distinctive and, when they compare "their own" to those things associated with 
another group, they come to elevate their distinctiveness toa virtue. This argument 
presupposes that people have distinguished their distinctiveness in terms 01' a cer-
tain group and have identified themselves as part of said group, as well as having 
had contact with at least one other. Such identification is acquired through 
socialization; that is, people are _ socialized to be patriotic. lS8 Doob states that the 
perceived distinctiveness does not have to be scientifically proven; in fact, it is the 
emotional investment of the people that lends the quality of distinctiveness and, 
indeed. similarities must be ignored. People value their own integrity, an important 
element of self-identity. Thus, when they consider significant others, they endow 
their own distinctiveness on them; this endowment makes people feel outstanding, 
bringing them prestige and status higher than those belonging to the outgroup. The 
judgment of superiority usually accompanies the sense of being distinctive and 
nationalists can invoke reasons to justify their own belief in such distinctiveness. 
Doob asserts that the level of patriotism depends on the strength or weak ness of 
value judgments made about the ingroup and outgroups,m 
A list of evaluations, both egocentric and ethnocentric, is elaborated by Doob, 
but it is not necessary to go into a detailed discussion of these at the present 
time.uo What is most significant from these evaluations is the point he makes that 
"apparently people feel more comfortable or relaxed in front of those who are similar 
to themselves",l61 largely because there is a sense of predictability in a situation, 
or during an interaction, involving homogeneous others. He even goes so far as to 
suggest, at one point, that people will seek to surround themselves with homogeneous 
others when dissimilar others seem to be threatening. Here he is hinting at the logic 
behind "ethnic cleansing". 
The discussion of the transition from the passivity and individualism of 
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patriotism to the collective action of nationalism is grounded by Ooob in his statement 
that preservation and/or expansion are necessary under patriotism162: hence, 
every society has a network of media which constantly reinforces the link between 
personal welfare and that of the nation (although he never elaborates on why the 
media would be so inclined). "Ultimately, therefore, all citizens and especially the 
patriotic ones continually see a connection between their important values, their way 
of living, and their surroundings. The surroundings are their country and they 
have come to possess an impressive arsenal of words, symbols, and objects which 
frequently remind them of that link. "lU The nation represents the kind of group 
affiliation that pervades every aspect of people's lives - or, at least, can be made 
toappear so. Since it is so pervasive,a threat from another "national" group can be 
perceived as being "life-threatening". Here Doob echoes the importance of 
"oppositional" factors emphasized by Spicer above. Thus, people will take steps to 
preserve or change their way of life. Ooob asserts that the initial action taken may 
be defensive and may draw from the traditional means of preservation that have been 
employed by that group up to that time. 164 However, if the group becomes so 
discontented with its way of life or the alterations it believes are taking place, 
members may "deliberately, unblushingly seek the action they believe will change or 
preserve what they had - or what they think they once had."us This is the 
moment when "national" or ethnic groups become nationalist: they make demands for 
action that may be anywhere from nonovert to overt behaviour. Nevertheless, it 
should be borne in mind, and Doob explicitly brings up this matter, that national 
demands, like all human demands, are not necessarily "pure" in nature. There may 
be hidden agendas that express the motives of leaders, communicators or followers 
who are simply taking advantage of a given state of affairs.all Hence, we must bear 
in mind that "nationalist" mobilizations not be pure - that is, they may be 
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adulterated by those whose behaviour conforms with that expected from nationalists, 
but their actual motivations may have nothing to do with nationalist sentiment. This 
observation does not have to involve a negative judgment; the motivations of these 
people may be just as, or more, altruistic than those of nationalists. For example, 
they may be fighting for their homes or families, not for any ideal of national self-
determination. 
Doob makes the connection between personal behaviour and the collective 
behaviour of nations when he states that the latter can be conceptualized as the 
former writ large. Frustrations can be dealt with in a myriad of ways ranging from 
aggression to submission.m As such, there is no formal agenda that nationalist 
groups must follow, even though statehood seems to be the goal most often attributed 
to such mobilizations. Doob elucidates the justifications that may be employed by 
these groups, all of which are beyond the scope of this discussion, and even sets out 
the aims involved in war and peace strategies. m 
Nationalism is facilitated, according to Doob, by a number of personal 
phenomena and experiences. a, These include the fact of sharing numerous cultural 
traits, not biological ones; interaction among people facilitated by the occupation of 
the same land, region or territory; geographical or cultural isolation from other 
groups, a matter which may be voluntary on the part of the particular group; 
economic self-sufficiency; shared language; an understanding of their own culture; 
temporal factors involving the evolution of traditions arising from generations of 
people living together and sharing a history; and leaders who hold meaning for the 
members of the group and who are intelligible to them. The presence of the enemy 
is also significant for nationalism.11O This may seem rather obvious, but it is worth 
noting that having an "enemy" is very important in terms of engendering loyalty in 
the members of a group. Hostility can be directed at that enemy, creating a safety 
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valve within the group. and a scapegoat is born whereby all troubles are attributed 
to the enemy.li1 This may serve an important function for national self-esteem 
because individuals can excuse any deficiency they suffer as individuals and as 
members of the group by deflecting the blame to an externalfactor - the enemy. In 
this way, nations and their members can still maintain their positive evaluations of 
themselves and continue to derive pleasure from their experiences as members. 
Doob provides an excellent analYSis of the personal processes involved in 
nationalism and goes far in establishing the connections between individual 
perceptions and experiences and col1ectiveaction. However, the question remains as 
to why people would invest emotional attachments in land, people and culture, or, in 
the case of minority nationalism, why human beings bestow emotional attachments on 
the subgroup and not the host. Furthermore, why is it that not every member of the 
ethnic group will endow such emotional attachment to the subgroup? These questions 
need to be answered for a more satisfactory understanding of the psychological 
aspect of nationalism. 
A salient point is raised by William Bloom who states, "Insomuch as every 
identification is made with an external social actor, identification is, of course, a 
social act as much as a privata psychological one. "rn He adds that there are always 
at least two parties involved in any identification: the identifier and the ident-
ified.113 This is significant from the point of view that we often believe that, when 
we identify with someone or something, the experience is purely personal and 
individuated; Bloom demonstrates that it is inherently social since there is always 
another party of some kind involved in such identification. He draws on the writings 
of Freud, Mead, Erikson, Parsons and Haber-mas to construct his version of 
identification theory. A lthough it is beyond the scope of this work to outline his 
construction in detail, it would be helpful to bring out. some of the more noteworthy 
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matters cited by Bloom. He quotes Freud as linking emotion with identification; that 
is, identification is made through an "emotional tie with an object". Furthermore, 
Freud notes that not only do infants internalize the attitudes or social identities of 
significant others, but so do adults. Identification is made with specific individuals 
and "diffuse groupings". Thus, it must be understood that the forging of emotional 
bonds by adults as well as children forms the basis for identification with other 
significant individuals and groups, causing identification to be an ongoing process 
that takes place throughout our lives. In addition, the success of an identification 
rests on its gratification of primary needs for survival of the individual and its 
assurance of the acceptance of the individual by his/her social environment. Erikson 
drew the conclusion that the individual has a secure sense of identity, something 
which is absolutely crucial to the psychological well-being of any human being, when 
a "feeling of oontentment" is experienced.l7f Once again, it is clear that there is an 
association between emotions and self-identity. 
Bloom states that Erikson made ideology into a psychological phenomenon. 
Ideology is the social institution which "guards" identity. The psyche must 
appropriate ideology, which is oomposed of identifications already made in history 
and culture, and synthesize an identity based on partial knowledge (called 
"totalism "). Any threat to ideology or culture is, as such, a threat to personal 
identity and requires defence. Further, a change in historical circumstances 
threatening to a generalized identification (i.e., group identification) win also 
threaten individual identification within the group. The result of such a threat will 
be either individual resynthesis or bolstering of the old identification, or a concerted 
effort on the part of the members of the group to resynthesize or bolster the old 
identification.J15 Bloom explains how the group ·win undertake such a response as 
follows: 
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The degree to which the group will respond as a whole will depend upon 
certain historical and existential bonds within the group: geographical 
propinquity, length of timepaseed together, class, ethnicity f religion, 
ritual and the degree to which that particular identification is crucial 
to the general identity. The form that the group reaction to a shared 
identity threat takes will be determined by a configuration of shared 
perceptions and common 1y accepted communications about the nature of 
the crisis. Both the perceptions and the communications are, of course, 
vulnerable to manipulation - particularly so since individuals, and 
individuals as a group with a shared identification, may seek together 
to enhance their sense of identity}" 
A possible political consequence of such group response to a threat is 
mobilization on a grand scale. According to Bloom, "(m]ass mobilization is possible 
when the individuals in the mass share the same identification."m However, Bloom 
does not appear to take into consideration that members of any group will also be 
members of other groups and, as such, have multiple identifications. Nor does he 
note that identifications are always being added as new circumstances arise and 
increasing or decreasing in their salience as people find themselves in changing 
situations. This is a basic flaw in his theory regarding personal identity and national 
identity: he does not make strong enough linkages between individual identities and 
group activities. 
Bloom avers that identification can only be triggered by .. meaningful and real" 
experience. It must be positive and "psychologically beneficial" for the individual 
to make such an identification. He reminds us that symbols and ideologies per sa are 
incapable of evoking identification. "For an identification to be made, the symbols 
have to be appropriate as a mode of behaviour and attitude for a particular and real 
experience. "118 This statement is as true for nationalist ideo1ogies as any other I ac-
cording to Bloom. What is problematic about such a position is the definition of 
"meaningful and real experience". Such a phrase can be taken as broadly or as 
narrowly as the reader chooses and this fact weakens Bloom's statement for it can be 
said to explain everything and, hence, nothing. 
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Equally problematic is Bloom's definition of national identity as being ..... that 
condition in which a mass of people have made the same identification with national 
symbols- have internalized the symbols of the nation - so that they may act as one 
psychological group when there is a threat to, or the possibility of enhancement of, 
these symbols of national identity. "179 The notion of "same identification" is a 
fallacy because individual interpretations based on purely personal traits are not 
considered. Even if people do make the same identification in a particular instance. 
there is no concession to the other identifications these people might have made in 
other instances. No two people can share all the same identifications. even if they 
originate from the same family. let alone the same social group. Similar criticism can 
be made for B1oom's reference to "one psychological group". Implicitly he suggests 
that a collective consciousness is able to arise from this mythical group and, once 
again, erroneously attributes identical interpretations to all its members. Bloom's 
argument emerges as being simplistic and static, ignoring the fact that experience 
is ever-changing and always open to reinterpretation; in fact. his individuals seem 
to be quite incapable of independent thought once they have made an identification 
with a group. Furthermore, Bloom never seems to consider the ramifications of 
outside labelling --that some individuals may be forced to makean identification with 
a group because others have deemed that they. in fact, belong to that group. A more 
appropriate analogy is that individuals are like multi-faceted diamonds revolving in 
an atmosphere full of elements which may influence them from time to time in varying 
degrees. 
Bloom goes on to define what he calls the "national identity dynamic" as being 
"the potential for action which resides in a mass which shares the same national 
identification"}80 He states that the mass may act as "one unit" when a situation 
affects the group identity. Thus, according to Bloom, individual interpretations and 
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"meaningfuland rear experiences somehow disappear, leaving only a monolithic mass. 
However, he fails to explain how a collection of individuals manages to translate what 
is essentially an intrapsychic experience (i.e. , national identity) into co l1ective action. 
Hence, Bloom's identification theory, stated as being highly dynamic, becomes static 
and unidimensional when it translates into action. And the problem still remains: 
why do some people with thesame identification fail to act in concert with the others? 
Why do some people drop out? In addition, if it is true that people desire to protect 
previous identifications (as Bloom suggests), which are very complex and multifa-
ceted, how do they decide which facet to protect? What happens if they cannot 
protect all the facets at once? Bloom provides no satisfactory answers to such 
questions. 
Individuals can make other identifications and these can be one-to-one with 
other persons or with all of humanity. When other identifications result in divided 
loyalties, Bloom states that, because everyone is unique and has a unique history, 
many personality factors as well as external factors must be considered; behaviour 
will depend on the psychology of the individual and "environmental input". He claims 
that his imprecision is due to the fact that some people have the personality to ignore 
external factors while others do not.l:U Hence, Bloom has created for himself an 
escape hatch but without any logical basis for doing so. 
Bloom points out that successful nation-building requires nation-destroying. 
Although Bloom is referring here to the need for the state in a multinational society 
to destroy minority nationalisms in pursuit of "national" integration, the point may 
also be applied to the emergence of minority nationalism - identification with the 
overarching "nation" must be destroyed if minority nationalism is to flourish. 
Without going into the details of successful nation-building, let it suffice to say that, 
according to Bloom, success is achieved in this realm when national loyalty 
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transcends all others and when the state can rely on its citizens' support when 
competing internationally with others. Nationalism would appear to be a corollary of 
successful nation-building. Once again, Bloom makes it clear that, in order for 
individual identification with the nation to take place, that identification must 
correlate with the actual experiences of human beings and" directly touch" them, and 
must be personally beneficial from the point of view that it provides psychological 
stability. "Thus the propagandist or prophet might incessantly sell the nationalist 
notion -- i.e. that there exists this nation and this nation should have an independent 
state of its own - but the sale will not be made unless the purchaser experiences a 
direct psychological benefit from the transaction."132 Bloom's statement makes good 
sense if we harken back to the literature on self-identity which demonstrates that 
self-esteem is an essential contributory factor in the formation and content of se1f-
identity. 
There is also a structural component involved in nation-bul1ding. Bloom states 
that, where the process has been successful, there must have been some historical 
circumstances that would have acted as stimuli to identification with the nation-state: 
the state would have moved to act as either the people's benefactor or saviour in 
response to these stimuli. Nation-building is never comp lete, notes Bloom. since there 
are always individuals or groups present which have not made identification with the 
nation and because historical circumstances are ever-changing, producing 
possibilities of alienation of groups and/or individuals.lu When nation-building is 
not successful, or takes place at a very low level, there is a greater possibility that 
other identifications will be salient. However, since the state has the power of 
coercion, usually controls the media and "owns an ideology" that is legitimate, it has 
the luxury of an esteemed position in any nation and will be that much more likely to 
attract identification. Because the international system essentially pits nations 
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against one another, the "us/them", "ingroup/outgroup" ethos is perpetuated to the 
point that it is virtually impossible to think in any other terms. l84 Such pervasive 
competition sets the psychological stage for thinking that is exclusive and 
segregationist, for better or worse. 
Bloom discusses mass mobilization in terms of national reaction to international 
threat. According to him, an international threat to what is perceived as national 
interest may trigger the national identity dynamic, which may then mobilize the mass. 
National prestige is described by Bloom as being "the influence that can be exercised 
or the impression produced by virtue of events and images that devalue or enhance 
national identity."ISS Prestige increases by virtue of anything that acts to enhance 
national identity. Despite the fact that Bloom's dynamic is circular in the extreme, it 
contains some valuable insights into the psychological processes involved. He 
suggests that outside influences act upon the collective and individual psyches of 
people within a group and that it is the psychological motivations of those people, as 
much as any external or structural factors, that plays a significant role in what 
action the group will take. Even though Bloom himself speaks of nations within the 
international system, the same dynamic would operate just as well on the sub national 
level. However, we must bear in mind that, regardless of the certainty Bloom displays 
that those with a shared identification will act in concert and be of the same mind, 
individuals bring unique elements and interpretations into any situation so that there 
would be a great deal of flexibility and variability in the form and content of any sort 
of response to a situation. Nevertheless, identification itself can provide the "fuel 
for mobilization", even though there are degrees of attachment, whether sentimental 
or instrumental, in any identification.186 
A 11 of the theorists above provide cogent arguments on the importance of a 
psychological element in nationalism. They illuminate how individuals and their 
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private orientations matter very much to any collective nationalist action. The 
significance of these individuals and their orientations lies in the fact that, without 
personal commitment, no group can function to fulfil its agenda. Therefore, 
nationalisms, whether they be social movements and highly organized, or ideologies 
with well-planned strategies and inte11ectua1/moralentrepreneurs, require followers 
- people who view nationalist goals as personal goals, intimately involved in their 
own hopes and aspirations. Since human beings are neither automatons nor mere 
dupes, these people must derive something from nationalism that speaks to them 
personally, whether that ~'something" be material gain or psychological benefit. 
Rogowski believes that individuals make rational choices to become involved 
in nationalist causes, weighing costs and benefits, supply and demand. Spicer 
suggests that there is a more nostalgic, sentimental character to nationalism when he 
argues that identity involves a sense of continuity with past generations in terms of 
personal experience and shared culture. For him, opposition from outgroups acts as 
an important catalyst in the process of maintaining an identity system. The group, 
usually in a subordinate position, struggles against assimilation; its culture and 
identity become more salient to members. Royce uses Spicer's oppositional model for 
her work and stresses that what Spicer calls "primordial sentiment" is also a 
resource, a tool to be used for personal gain or satisfaction. If the individual finds 
ethnic identity to be beneficial, he/she will employ ethnic culture in an attempt to 
increase power, status or prestige. Royce also elucidates the fact that ethnic identity 
is just one of many identitiesan individual may have. Scott has constructed a model 
derived from Spicer's that utilizes primordial sentiment as an intervening variable 
between opposition and ethnic group solidarity. Scott is clearly attempting to bridge 
the gap between opposition and action, as well as that between individual psychic 
orientation and group identity. leonard Ooob concentrates on a somewhat 
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psychosocial vision of patriotism and how it may become the social manifestation of 
nationalism. Patriotism is Eli feeling, while nationalism arises out of demands made on 
the grounds of that feeling. Doob stresses the importance of distinctiveness, or 
being different from others. This phenomenon is important because it helps people 
to understand who they are, the group to which they belong, and the group in terms 
of other groups. He sets out a number of ways in which people evaluate their own 
and other groups, suggesting that a sense of superiority of one·s own group is in 
operation when making these evaluations. Another point raised by Doob is that 
preservation and/or expansion are necessary for any group, something which can 
very often lead to nationalist mobilization. Bloom"s contribution to the psychological 
approach to nationalism is his concept of identification. Identification is made by 
adults as well as children, so such a process can occur at any point in life. It can be 
made with individuals or with groups, even those that are diffuse and somewhat 
abstract; as long as the individual making the identification feels an emotional tie 
with the identified, the identified presumably can be anything. Identification is 
successful when it gratifies primary needs for survival. survival being employed in 
loose terms, when it assures that the identifier will be accepted in his/her social 
environment. According to Bloom, when identity is threatened, people will move to 
protect it; this can explain mass mobilization of any kind and, in particular, 
nationalist mobilization. In other words, when many individuals make identification 
with an ethnic group or "nation", and this co11ective identity is threatened, these 
peep le wi11 be motivated to take action to remedy the threatening conditions. 
Thus, coming full circle, we can reiterate that all these theorists have made 
significant contributions to the understanding of nationalism as a psychological 
manifestation. However, they have all failed to incorporate one highly salient point: 
why do individuals make such identifications, feel patriotism, experience primordial 
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sentiment and so on? What motivates a human being to involve specifically ethnic 
identity in his/her own co11ection of social identities? By the same token. why do 
others. ostensibly ascriptive members of an ethnic group, reject such an identity or. 
at least, accord it no salience? From the above discussions. we can see many reasons 
and occasions for action based on ethnic identity, but we can only infer why people 
would embrace an ethnic identity in the first place. Hence, a model incorporating 
such a motivation is essential for a thorough and complete comprehension of 
nationa 11sm. 
Towards a New Model of Nationalism 
In order to flesh out a more all-enoompassing model of nationalism. it is 
necessary to incorporate the msero,er structural, approaches. the nationalism-as-
social-movement and nationalism-as-ideology perspectives, with the micro, or 
psychological. one, and then add the all-important missing component of individual 
motivation. To do this, we will start from individual orientation and move outward. 
Each individual comes into this world with a unique configuration of 
personality traits that have been inherited from previous generations. We have 
emotions and needs which must be met. It could even be said that. in the early days 
of life. human beings are little more than emotions and needs. As we grow, we come 
to identify ourselves with significant others, especially with those who become linked 
with our emotions. When we get positive feedback from these significant others and 
our interactions with them, our self-esteem begins to build and we tend to associate 
our self-esteem with these others and these interactions. We "learn language, initially 
from our caregivers and eventually in other interactions, including institutionalized 
ones, such as school; sometimes we acquire more than one language in this way. 
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Language gives us a set of symbols with which we can think about ourselves and the 
experiences we have. Every 'language, because it is embedded in culture, contains 
limitations such that the language will frame our interpretations; it will provide a 
framework for our thoughts as weH as the content. As such, acquiring more than one 
languagecan mean multiple frameworks for our thoughts, something which can very 
well affect our self-esteem and our self-identity if there are conflicts involved. 
Conflicts may arise from the values that are transmitted to us through the very 
'language we use, since culture is conveyed through language. For example, our 
'language may allow us to interpret a situation or ourselves in a certain way, while 
another language may produce another interpretation that may be quite different. 
We may come from a family that has high status in Portugal and our ethnic language 
would provide us with a particular view of ourselves; in the meantime, that same 
family may be working class in Canada where the English language may cause us to 
view ourselves very differently and, in fact, negatively if our English reflects our 
class position in this country. Of course, it is important to bear in mind that 
language is a purely social phenomenon so that such a conflict would not be 
occurring on a completely psychological level, but on a social one as well 
We also acquire roles as we grow and these roles, for better or worse, become 
incorporated into our self-identity. If the roles cause us to feel negatively about 
ourselves, we will probably seek to minimize them in our lives as much as possible in 
order to decrease the damage to our self-esteem. We may seek out other roles which 
act to increase our level of self-esteem. The roles available to us are limited by 
culture and require validation from others. The roles we assume and the frequency 
with which we assume them are probably dictated to a large extent by the kinds of 
emotions they engender within us. Thus, if we hate playing the role of disciplinarian, 
for example, we may try to avoid playing it as much as possible, or play it only half-
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heartedly when forced to do so. In short. the amount of commitment we feel to that 
particular role will be significant. 
Just as our roles and language derive from interactions with others, so do our 
identifications. None of us is a completely unique entity, totally divorced from 
association with others; we all belong to groups, ascriptively if not in any achieved 
fashion. Identifying the groups to which we belong is an important and necessary 
function for self-identification. We need others by which to compare and measure 
ourselves. We are always in the process of distinguishing ourselves and the groups 
to which we belong. Such a process is mandatory for coming to some understanding 
of distinctiveness as individuals and as members of a particular group or groups. 
But ascription is not enough for identification. We must also achieve some sort of 
status in a group if we want to be a fully-accepted member; other members of the 
group require some sort of achievement. We might have been born into an 
aristocratic English family, but the mere fact of our birth into such a group is not 
enough; we must also work to acquire the social and cultural markers of it or we will 
likely suffer alienation or ostracism. In short, we will not be a member of the group 
if we do not make some sort of commitment to it. even at the most superficial level. 
Obviously, we can assume that self-esteem and emotional attachment play a role here. 
If our self-esteem suffers from being part of a particular group and we do not 
actually like that group, we may opt out of working to achieve membership in it. 
Socialization plays a very important part in our identification process. We are 
socialized by others to fit into society and certain groups; we also socialize ourselves 
in the same manner. Self-socialization is largely the result of desiring to belong to 
a specific group and choosing to do so. If we are born into a Danish family in Canada, 
they will likely socialize us to some degree to be Danish, to fit into the ethnic group 
and the kind of society from which they came. At the same time, we will likely be 
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socialized by our family and definitely by others to fit into Canadian society. As we 
get older, we may choose to socialize ourselves into Greek culture if we marry 
someone belonging to that ethnic group with a strong ethnic identity. On the other 
hand. we may choose to reject some of those socializations and concentrate on only 
one. Those socializations, like language and roles, may never be completely expunged 
from our self-identity, but they are not necessarily salient; we can work to keep them 
buried within our repertoire. Our inner self, the emotional and personality core with 
which we came into the world, win act to frame these desires we have and choices we 
make. It will organize our repertoire according to what is meaningful and Significant 
to us and us alone. Granted, there may betimes in our life when we win not be given 
the luxury of choosing. when external or structural factors may work to deny us any 
choice, but we may espouse a certain identity only for expediency or survival while 
not having a real commitment to it. At these times, we will likely seek an exit from 
this coercive situation. 
Alternatively, we may seek to escape from a situation into which we entered 
voluntarily if elements begin to emerge which cause a conflict among our social 
identities. For example, we may go to war on behalf of our country because we 
identify ourselves as a Canadian and that particular component of our social identity 
feels threatened, thus becoming salient (i.e., our master status at that time); however, 
if, once we are in the battle theatre and we see our fellow Canadian soldiers 
committing atrocities or we are called upon to commit such acts, our humanitarian 
element of self-identity may bearoused, creating a serious conflict among our values 
and beliefs. Should the conflict become psychically unbearab1eandour humanitarian 
identity win out over our ethnic/nationalist identity. we may very well seek to exit 
from the situation in whatever way might be open to us, including minimizing our 
actions to the point where they fit somewhat with our values and beliefs. 
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From such a scenario, it is easy to discern the role our emotions play in our 
rational choice; it may not be quite so clear what role our self-esteem takes. Our 
sense of self-esteem may be diffuse or specific. If it is specific and it hinges on our 
social identity as a "good" Canadian citizen, then our level of self-esteem related to 
actions directly associated with our concept of being a "good" Canadian citizen, such 
as fighting for our country, may be high. Therefore, abandoning a course of action 
that affects our level of self-esteem so much may be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible. As such, we would be less likely to allow our humanitarian identity to 
override our Canadian identity and seek exit from the latter. Instead, we may engage 
in rationalization in an attempt to reconcile our actions with our values, beliefs, and 
self-concept. However, if our sense of self-esteem is diffuse and our Canadian 
identity is just one of many social identities which give us a high level of self-esteem, 
the possibility of exiting from a situation which causes conflict among our values and 
social identities is greater. Any particular situation which affects our self-esteem 
in a negative fashion has a good chance of being discarded in order to replace it with 
one which enhances our sense of self-esteem. Such a case makes sense in terms of 
cognitive dissonance theory wherein a person with high self-esteem is more likely to 
take measures to remedy situations of inequity or injustice because he/she has a 
high level of self-esteem and the situation does not jibe with his/her sense of who 
he/she is.lS? 
It is almost a truism to state that we are committed to the configuration of 
identities that makes up our self-identity. This commitment is both rational and 
emotional, for it makes sense to have a stable identity. Hence, we will work very hard 
to ensure that our identity remains stable. If something comes along to threaten it, 
we raTIy whatever resources might be at our disposal to eradicate or minimize the 
threat. If the threat can be seen as relating to our membership in a group, group 
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support and/or mobilization may be one of these resources. Therefore, if we 
experience a threat to our ethnic identity, we may turn to the ethnic group for 
support. If similar threat is perceived by others in the group, we may be able to 
mobilize them to challenge and deal with it. Such mobilization is especially possible 
if we can tie the threat to ethnicity using ideology. 
Since ideology stems from people's experiences, an ideology that provides both 
exp lanation and remedy for a particular situation might be highly accessib le to those 
whose identity is being threatened. Of course, some people may experience 
discontent and feel a vague sense of inequity or injustice without being able to put 
a finger on the exact cause. For these people, an articulated ideology, especially one 
which lays blame at the door of outside groups or factors, thus alleviating the belief 
in personal shortcomings, could prove very attractive. Given a label and definition 
of the situation, masses of people could be fairly easily convinced that this is the 
answer to their problems. But until people feel an emotional commitment, ideology 
remains just an abstract argument with unrealized potential for action. When 
ideology takes on real power is when people can tie their own experiences and those 
of significant others to whom they are bound by emotion to what is being articulated; 
that is, when the threat is perceived as real and affecting oneself and one's loved 
ones. As C. Wright Mills suggested, tying personal troubles to public issues can be 
the catalytic moment when people are willing to stop just talking and start taking 
action -- drastic action, if need be.188 Hence, ideology can appeal to both the 
converted and also to those without an inkling that they need converting. 
Ideology may also appeal to those individuals whose self-esteem is low. These 
people may not have a general sense of self-satisfaction or feel that they are failures 
because their lives are not going the way they had hoped. Ideology that preaches 
that their lack of self-satisfaction or sense of failure is not due to their own 
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shortcomings, but is the result of oppression by a dominant group and, at the same 
time, builds up the ethnic identity of such people is likely to raise their self-esteem. 
The net result would probably be the enhancement of the self-esteem of the whole 
ethnic group. Individuals and groups with heightened self-esteem have more of a 
tendency to employ primary control; that is, they are willing to take steps to remedy 
whatever problems they believe are facing them. 
If the support of the majority of the members of the ethnic group is deemed 
to be present, and if structural conditions are conducive, ethnic ideologues may put 
forth a nationalist platform that goes so far as to include secession. Structural 
conditions playa very important role in the kinds of demands ethnic ideologues will 
formulate. Secession or irredentism are rather impractical if the ethnic group is not 
territoriaTIy concentrated, for instance. If the state is highly oppressive and 
~ressive, a nationalist ideology might go two ways: it might attempt to achieve 
limited political recognition with the hope of building upon it in the future, or it 
might try to expand to create an aTIiance with other groups by broadening 
specificaTIy ethnic demands to more generalized ones. In either case, it is likely to 
attempt to garner general support from the rest of society (and the world, if 
possible), at least on a nominal level. 
In a federal state, nationalist demands may be more along the lines of some sort 
of consociational arrangement, especially if the group is territoriaTIy concentrated 
such that political representation would be faCilitated. The same arrangement might 
be possible in a unitary state, but the autonomy of the group could be severely 
limited. The strength of opposition by the state or other powerful groups in the 
society will havea great effect on the ideological stance of the group since it is likely 
to influence how radical and militant the group becomes. A great deal of opposition 
may force the group to go underground or begin to employ terrorist tactics. At the 
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same time, it would tend to make members of the group cleave together to a greater 
extent. enhancing group solidarity. Opposition, especially repression. may bring 
other members of the group to whom ideology had not appealed sufficiently into the 
circle such that the group would become larger as well as more cohesive. Through 
cohesion, ethnic identity would become better-defined and take on greater salience. 
Ideologues are likely to cash in on this golden opportunity by creating a more 
pervasive argument based on myths and symbols, past history, and so on. Members 
of the ethnic group would likely find themselves steeped in ethnic ideology to the 
point where virtually every facet of their lives and experiences could be viewed 
through the lens of ethnicity - and opposition. People who come to believe 
passionately that they are being treated unjustly simply because of their accidental 
ascriptive inclusion in a group make good candidates for social movements. If they 
are pushed up against a wall and feel that they must fight for their survival, they 
may go to any length to alleviate the threat, casting their opposition into the role of 
deadly enemy_ Once the combat mentality of enemy versus ally, or "them" against 
"us", sets in, the threatened identity can take on a salience hitherto thought 
impossible and allow people to engage in activities of which they might otherwise 
have believed themselves incapable. The role of ideology in such a c.ase is to keep 
people believing they are facing a mortal enemy and that they are being persecuted 
because they happen to be a member of a certain group. Constantly articulating and 
interpreting events is the indispensable contribution of ideology. 
Communication and organization are essential for a group seeking political 
redress for its perceived problems and past grievances. Ideology is intrinsicto both 
but the importance of leadership cannot be underestimated. leaders may be 
ideologues or leadership may fall to those whose strength lies in organization; 
occasionally a charismatic leader comes along who is able to gain support based solely 
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on personal qualities. In any case, effective leadership is usually organic; that is, 
it arises from the ranks of the ethnic group itself. Such leaders might have already 
enjoyed prestige and status within the group as community or religious leaders. 
Organization is easier if institutional structures were already in existence, such as 
church groups or social clubs. The nationalist movement that arises under these 
circumstances is an ongoing, spiralling or cumulative process: ideologues interpret 
and articulate events and group identity, leaders pass on ideology to followers and 
outsiders and organize them. followers interpret ideology and make it personally 
meaningful, while playing their roles within the movement and providing their own 
feedback to leaders; leaders then integrate this feedback into their organization and 
communications and pass along messages to ideologues, who then take this 
information and incorporate it into the ideology. and so on. The spiral continues in 
this manner. At the same time, opposition acts as an independent variable to 
influence the movement and the process. 
Ro1esare fluid within the movement, especially due to external influences, but 
also because of internal dynamics, so that they are constantly being reinterpreted. 
Unlike Le Bon's notion of the herd, we would argue that individual identities and 
realities are enormously influential for group consciousness which, although it has 
serious import in itself in terms of individual meaning, interpretation and behaviour, 
is always being recreated as varying factors come into play_ Certainly the fact that 
there is some anonymity within a group allows for individual behaviours that might 
not be pursued under other circumstances; and there is peer pressure among the 
members to conform to group identity and behaviour. Nevertheless, it is arguable 
whether anyone ever completely loses personal identity and becomes just a mindless 
follower. Such a characterization is attractive to structuralists, but it seems 
unlikely, at least for any length of time. People may very wen become caught up in 
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the heat of the moment or behave in what might be considered an uncharacteristic 
fashion for a short time, but this may, in fact, be a facet of identity that has not 
enjoyed prominence at any previous time due to socialization. In addition, people can 
always get to a point where the group or movement comes into conflict with their 
other social identities such that they exit. Indeed, members dropping out is a 
problem for social movements. At any rate, we prefer not to reify group conscious-
ness but, rather, posit that it is an ongoing spiralling, or cumulative, process. 
As has already been suggested, opposition plays a vital role in the processes 
outlined above. The response to group demands will help in the group's formulation 
of its next move. The level of organization and coherence of ideology will correlate 
with the strength of opposition. Whether the movement takes on a utopian character 
will also depend on the response of the "Other", or the perceived enemy. If group 
demands are sufficiently thwarted, the moral aspect of ideology will probably come 
into play with a vengeance. With demands thwarted, institutional deficiency is likely 
to be perceived to the point where the group believes that existing institutional 
guides must be replaced with their own. At this time, the movement becomes 
antisystemic and utopian. This is also the catalytic moment when the movement will 
espouse any action necessary to achieve its goals. 
We have seen from the above-noted discussion how important the psychosocial 
component of individual social identity is to a model of nationalism. (See Figure 1) 
Although such a model could be applied to any group mobilization, we believe that it 
is particularly a propos to the study of nationalism. The social movement and 
ideological approaches have been the dominant ones regarding nationalism in the 
past, despite the fact that there have been some significant attempts at employing a 
more psychological orientation. However, these previous studies have all tended to 
ignore their alternatives: structural approaches have omitted the psychological 
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element w hila psychological ones have paid insufficient attention to the structural 
aspects. There appears to have been little attempt to make meaningful bridges 
between the two. That has been the goal of this particular model: to integrate the 
macroand micro paradigms. The all-important core and linkage have been provided 
by our conceptualization of social self-identity. Such a conceptualization is clearly 
not a psychological one as much as a social one, for formation of individual se1f-
identity always arises from interaction with at least one other actor, be it an 
individual, a group, or an abstraction. Social self-identity is the key to understand-
ing the dynamics of nationalism for it addresses a vital issue that has been missing 
in all previous models: why people become nationalists. Without this key, we cannot 
hopeto understand why some people find nationalist social movements and ideologies 
appealing and others do not. While the models of nationalism-as-a-social-movement 
and nationalism-as-an-ideology havetended to be somew hat deterministic, suggesting 
that all those whoascriptively fall into a certain category will be affected identically 
and espouse such nationalisms, social self-identity opens up a space for individual 
motivation and agency. It can explain both why some people embrace nationalism and 
why others do not. It can suggest why nationalism might be present in some 
situations while it is absent in others. To that end, we will analyze the case of the 
former country of YugoslaVia in an attempt to discover the insights our new model 
can offer. But, first, we will discuss the methodology to be employed in undertaking 
a preliminary test of our revised model. 
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Methodology plays a very important role in any research since it acts as a 
framework for the data collected. In other words, the type of methodology utilized 
will determine toa great extent what kind of data can be gathered and how it will be 
interpreted. Quantitative methods have certain requirements, specifically that 
variables be operationalized in strict terms, such that these requirements limit the 
kind of results we can hope to obtain. On the other hand, qualitative methods are 
limited to some extent by their very nature: for example, it is difficult to combine 
in depth interviewing with the principles of random sampling. Certain studies lend 
themselves better to one method or the other, as do the goals of the research 
themselves. 
For this particular study, the methodology employed was largely historical and 
theoretical, drawn from secondary sources, combined with some intensive interviews. 
Since our goal was to locate lacunae in the existing studies of nationalism and 
construct a new model, it was necessary to analyze critically the theoretical models 
that had already been constructed. In order to test the new model, historical and 
current literature on the political situation in the former country of Yugoslavia had 
to be utilized to determine its applicability. Due to the fact that events were 
unfolding in that region on a day-to-day basis while this study was being conducted, 
it was very difficu"lt to obtain current information, Furthermore, since much of the 
media reporting seemed to contain certain biases, the task of gathering data was 
greatly complicated, Construction of the new model required research into 
theoretical matters such as the formation of social self-identity and the nature of 
ethnic identity, as well as the role of self-esteem in identity, All of these theoretical 
works, which were often unrelated, had to be brought together and reinterpreted to 
demonstrate their significance to the new model. 
Thevalueof incorporating historical analysis in any social scientific endeavour 
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is to be found in its ability to illuminate evolutionary trends. We have the 
opportunity to observe how past events shaped current phenomena. As Williamson 
et a1 state, "biography", or life history, is intrinsic to every social form from the 
individual to an organization. Furthermore, since "social life is constantly in a state 
of transformation, "I it is imperative that we look back in time to survey the process 
of transformation that has already occurred. Put in a different way, Williamson et al. 
argue that, without historical analysis, social scientists cannot address themselves 
to the fundamental questions of how and why social and political forms came to 
assume their present shape and how they will appear in the future. 
As with any other methodology employed, historical analysis involves some 
limitations. Accuracy is a problem which may affect fundamentally the validity of the 
data. Even primary sources may not be accurate since every person who records an 
event does so from a particular point of view. There is no way to screen out personal 
interpretations, regardless of how objective the recorder purports to be. Secondary 
sources, of course, may be even more biased because of the additional element of 
interpretation. Generalizability is a further difficulty arising from historical analysis 
due to the specificity of contexts and their social antecedents, according to Williamson 
et a1 However, we must bear in mind that accuracy and validity are difficulties 
encountered in any social science research because every human being brings 
his/her own personal bias to any interpretation of events or situations. Historical 
figures are no more guilty of this than are present ones. The same is true for 
generalizability: any time we study a particular phenomenon, it is entirely possible 
that we are studying something which cannot be generalized to any other context. 
By surveying history, we are in a better position to see how current social life 
came to be organized as it is. The fact that adaptation and transformation have 
occurred in human history to produce such organization is amply displayed through 
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historical analysis. We are not able to comprehend behaviour without reference to 
its context, or culture. To fully understand culture, we must view it through the lens 
of history because culture is cumulative; the values, aspirations, achievements and 
dreams of its practitioners are to be found within it. 
Therefore, \tJe come to the conclusion that historical analysis is an indispens-
able tool whenever we approach the study of any sociopolitical phenomenon. We are 
not arguing for historical determinism, however. The point is that we should attempt 
to situate a phenomenon within its historical context in order to better understand 
where it stands in relation to certain factors, if at all Another major contribution 
of historical analysis is that it provides the testing ground for social scientific 
theory.2 
Theoretical methodology may come under attack from some sectors of the social 
science community for its essentially intangible, unmeasurable nature. It is not 
verifiable by means of what has come to be considered the "usua1", or "accepted", 
ways of testing data for significance and margins of error and so on. Such 
methodology requires a great deal of subjective interpretation and abstraction. As 
such, it may be considered imprecise and speculative, more in the realm of philosophy 
than social science. Moreover, some may argue that theory and methodology are 
distinct; they are two separate entities an d should not be mixed together. We conten d 
that this is an erroneous approach, that, as Bruce L. Berg states, "Data gathering is 
not distinct from theoretical orientations. Rather, data are intricately associated with 
the motivation for choosing a given subject, the conduct of the study, and ultimately 
the analysis, "3 As a form of qualitative methodology, theorizing attempts to probe 
the nature or essence of things.4 Its concern is not to measure things that have 
been conceptualized according to certain criteria and then operationalized in such 
a way as to give shape to those conceptualizations; its concern is, rather, to approach 
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certain phenomena in their natural, essential form and create conceptualizations from 
that. As such, it is inductive logic rather than deductive. 
In assessing his own methodology, William Bloom makes several very good 
points in defence of theoretical methodology. One of the first and most significant 
is that, although the discussion of covert attitudes and psychosocial processes is 
somewhat abstract, these attitudes and processes manifest themselves in overt, 
observable actions and behaviours. In short, we can see the results; our task is to 
theorize the possible causes underlying them.s Few people would argue that human 
beings are devoid of psyches. Bloom points out that the two major streams of 
thought regarding psychological processes, the behaviourist and psychoanalytic, 
both agree that "[t]here is a bio-psychological drive to internalize the behaviour of 
significant others in order to create identity. Furthermore, this is an ongoing 
adaptive process throughout life, concerned with fundamental aspects of psychologi-
cal well-being. "0 In this study we characterize the product of this dynamic not as 
a psychological one, but as asocial or psychosocial one, since there is ample evidence 
to show that the dynamic is always social and, thus, involves interaction. If we agree 
that human beings have psyches, then we must concede that these psyches play some 
sort of role in their behaviour. Hence, it is logical to observe behaviour and attempt 
to theorize about its underlying motivations, despite the fact that we cannot prove 
our theorizing using "hard" scientific methods. We must rely on common sense to test 
our theoriZing. 
Bloom argues that a psychosocial trait that has appeared to manifest itself 
throughout various societies at various times in history merits a theoretical 
explanation. It is not reductionism, he suggests, if there are no other reasonable 
explanations that can be generalized.1 Indeed, any attempt to theorize or explain 
involves ruling out alternative explanations. Bloom's position makes a good deal of 
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sense from the point of view that any phenomenon that seems to be evident in ancient 
history as well as recent, in tribal societies as well as industrialized ones, is a 
phenomenon which could be classified as being universal to humanity. As such, it 
deserves some kind of accounting, necessarily a theoretical one. 
L ike philosophy. social and political theory need not be testable to be valuable, 
according to Bloom. Their virtue lies in providing coherent ways to discuss social 
and political phenomena by proposing insights and possibilities,S The true test for 
such theorizing is "intellectual rigour in terms of the internal consistency of its 
logic. "9 Falsifiability derives from its ability or inability to stand up to evidence, as 
in the case of our present model of social self-identity: by testing it through the 
de v ic.;eor employing a case study, we can demonstrate whether it is falsifiable or not. 
In summary, we can see from the above discussion that theorizing is an 
important component of qualitative methodology, Its validity lies in its ability to 
stand true in the face of evidence and logic. The virtue of theorizing in social 
science is similar to that of philosophy: it furnishes a kind of guide for interpreting 
infcr'mation. The guide provides us with insights into our subject matter. 
Many of these arguments can be used to defend the qualitative device of 
intensive interviewing. Interviews were undertaken in addition to theoretical and 
historical methods in an effort to remain true to the spirit of triangulation, which is 
using multiple approaches to data-gathering. Berg advocates this strategy because 
every method provides a different way of viewing data. Hence, using multiple points 
of view helps to enrich the picture that emerges and serves as a check on the 
possibility that faulty methodology may distort findings if only a single method is 
used. 10 Such an approach was particular'ly a propos for this study since its very 
nature calls for talking to people in order to attempt to discover their personal 
motivations concerning nationalism. It is difficult to try to discern how social self-
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identity plays a role in an individual's orientation to nationalism without actually 
talking to people. However, because of the actual conditions in former Yugoslavia, 
to say nothing of financial constraints, it was not possible for us to travel there to 
speak to individuals. For that reason, our methodology had to consist in large part 
of analysis of secondary sources. Because we did not believe this to be sufficient, 
we decided to conduct some interviews with people who had some connection to 
former Yugoslavia to enhance our understanding of individual motivations. 
It must be recognized at this point that there are some limitations involved 
with interviewing people who currently reside in Canada and have not experienced 
the conflict in former Yugoslavia on a first-hand basis. Regardless of whether they 
have friends or relatives in the war-torn regions, these individuals have no 
knowledge of what it is like to actually be in former Yugoslavia under the current 
conditions. Indeed, some of these emigres may have left Yugoslavia because they had 
realized that war might be imminent and, for whatever reason, did not want to become 
embroiled in the struggle. Therefore, their reflections must be considered in light 
of their presence outside the country. 
The philosophical stance we took in conducting these interviews was derived 
from feminist methodology. Even though, in this case, the interviewees were not 
women, we believed that it was still important to apply the same philosophy to the 
interviewing process. Ann Oakley suggests that the interview relationship should 
be non-hierarchical and imbued with the interviewer's identity as well as that of the 
interviewee. In this way, she believes that the interviewee's voice will be better 
heard. 1l Dorothy Smith stresses that interviewees should not be turned into the 
objects of the study, rather they should be the subjects "as knowers and actors."u 
In this study, six indepth interviews were conducted. The interviewees were 
all males, their ages ranging from their late 20s to their early 50s; some of them were 
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recent immigrants, others had been here most of their lives; between them, they 
represent many of the protagonist groups (Serbs, Bosnian Serbs, Croats) embroiled 
in the present conflict. The age, sex and ethnic composition of the interviewees was 
entirely random in the sense that interviews were conducted with whatever subjects 
could be found and induced to consent to an interview; there was no preference for 
interviewees of any particular ethnic group, although attempts were made to seek out 
members of all the largest ethnic groups of the former country of Yugoslavia. These 
people were assured total confidentiality and asked to give oral consent to being 
interviewed prior to each interview. We informed them of the nature of the study and 
that their participation was completely voluntary; they could decline to answer any 
question and stop the interview atany time. No demographic information was sought; 
in reporting our findings, their names have been changed and their identities 
carefully concealed. The tapes of the interviews have been put away for safekeeping. 
Attempts were made to have members of ethnic organizations fill out 
questionnaires with respect to the subject matter of this study in order to achieve 
a wider sampling. These attempts, unfortunately, were completely unsuccessful. In 
some cases, we wrote to organizations asking for permission to send them question-
naires for their members to fill out and return by mail, ensuring total confidentiality, 
and received no response whatsoever. In other cases, there was initial agreement, 
the questionnaires were mailed off, but, despite follow-up letters, no response 
ensued. We can only speculate as to why there was a failure to respond in the above-
noted cases. Some of the organizations conSisting of non-Serb ethnic members might 
have been unwilling to participate in any research on nationalism conducted by a 
researcher with a Serbian last name. On the other hand, perhaps they did not want 
to risk identification of their activities to anyone outside the group. Those or-
ganizations that initially agreed to partiCipate and then failed to respond to follow-
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ups or return the questionnaires might have reconsidered their original asserit upon 
seeing the questions. Perhaps the questionnaires were distributed to member~ who 
then failed to fill them in or return them, despite prompting, r"iost people lead busy 
lives and might have little incentive to fill out a questionnaire that requires a fair 
amount of time and thought to adequately answer. Perhaps the answer to why some 
people will fill in questionnaires while others will not is to be found in this very 
study! 
At any rate, the six interviews were intensive enough to provide fascinating 
insights into the matter of social self-identity and nationalism. There were two 
instruments used to carry out the interviews. They are appended to the thesis as 
Appendices A and B. Appendix A was reserved for those interviewees who were not 
formal members of ethnic organizations which might be construed as nationalistic. 
These people were what could be termed "free agents". Hence, the questions 
pertained to them as individuals in an effort to solicit purely personal interpreta-
tions, Appendix B was only used in one case where we had prior knowledge of the 
interviewee's involvement with an organization. The questions contained in this 
instrument approached the matter in such a way as to seek the interviewee's 
interpretations both as an individual and as a member of an organization. 
The questions were always open-ended, regardless of whether we used 
Appendix A or B. In this way, we believed we could create a dialogue rather than just 
a straight interview where people answered questions and nothing more. We hoped 
that, by making the interview informal and conversational, the interviewee would 
relax enough to offer more information, which, indeed, was the case. In fact, the 
interviewees usually volunteered far more once the questions were finished and we 
asked them if they had anything else they wanted to discuss. At that time, they 
would reveal their own agendas at great length, raising no objection to the fact that 
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the tape recorder was still running. It was through these ad hoc discussions that 
a great deal of insight into the interviewees' attitudes and interpretations was 
gained, adding immeasurably to our understanding. 
The successful use of the technique of developing a conversation from an 
interview highlights two points that Berg raises. The first is that the interview itself 
is a rather unnatural interaction between two peop 1e because one of them has a script 
to fonow.is The very "unnaturalness" of the interview might serve to discourage 
open communication because the interviewee may feel tense, guarded, vulnerable; 
he/she may feel1ike a suspect being interrogated by the authorities. Such tension 
might lead to the giving of responses that are only superficial or what the inter-
viewee believes the interviewer wants to hear. This would be an unfortunate result, 
especially when we are trying to delve into the interviewee's personal world. In this 
case, we would have obtained something diametrically opposed to what we were 
seeking when undertaking qualitat;veanalysis. The second, and related, point is the 
importance of establishing rapport between the interviewee and the interviewer. 
Although Berg emphasizes how rapport is established using a variety of 
dramaturgical techniques, the implication of his discussion is that, without sufficient 
rapport between the participants of the interview, there is likely to be a high level 
of mistrust on the part of the interviewee, who will then tend to employ a series of 
avoidance techniques when answering questions. As mentioned above, such 
avoidance will result in misleading data and the negation of the whole purpose of 
using the interviews. Instead of getting into the interviewee's reality, the inter-
viewer may be left with nothing more than a false reality presented by the 
interviewee as a defence mechanism. 14 
Most of the interviews were conducted either in the interviewees' homes or 
their places of business to ensure their maximum comfort. What made them highly 
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challenging was the fact that most of them had to be conducted in a mixture of 
English and Serbocroatian. The questions were translated into Ser-boor-eatian pr10r 
to the interview. This was not a problem because we used a diotionary to supplement 
our own knowledge of the language. However, when it eame time to make impromptu 
probes during the process of the interview, it became more diffioultsinee Serboor-oa-
tian is not the language in which we were educated and, thus, we did not know at 
times how to express in exact terms what we were attempting to probe. At that time, 
the salience of language to identity became very clear to us; that is, when we have 
to switch from a language in which we are educated and are thoroughly familiar with 
the concepts to a language which we learned on an informal basis, our identities 
change from that of intellectual graduate student to that of inarticulate child. 
Fortunately, the interviewees were eager enough to pursuethe discussion that they 
made every effort to assist us. We are convinced that nothing vital was lost due to 
language problems. 
Findings were analyzed by grouping responses into various categories that 
corresponded to the themes comprising the integrated model of nationalism. Separate 
chapters were given to the historical data on Yugoslavia and the findings from the 
interviews while the section on discussion was used to incorporate insights gained 
from the two. 
Clearly, our methodology has been oriented towards gaining insight into the 
essence and nature of nationalism. We were attempting to establish a linkage between 
social self-identity and collective behaviour in the context of external and structural 
factors. For such a study. we needed to use qualitative, rather than quantitative, 
methodology. We could not have undertaken our study in this form if we had had to 
rely on the rigours of measurement, operational;zation, statistical significance, and 
so on. We needed to use methods that allowed for the employment of theoretical and 
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historical works, as wen as interviewing people. As such, this study highlights the 
salience of methodology. Because our work did not lend itself to quantitative 
methods, the data yielded are of a very different character from those that surveys 
or content analysis might have done. Our conclusions would probably also have had 
a different nature. We employed two forms of qualitative methodology in order to 
give our analysis more scope, attempting to remain loyal to the logic of triangulation. 
The next step is to demonstrate how our evidence fits with our methodology. 
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It is our contention that an adequate comprehension of the present is not 
possible without looking into the past in an effort to observe the trajectory of 
events. For nationalism especially we must try to understand how history might 
influence the current dynamics tak ing place, since nationalism rests to a great extent 
on conceptions of the past. Ethnic identity combines notions of a shared history, 
myths about the past, and a sense of continuity in experiences between previous 
generations and those of the present. The past is also pertinent to the present in 
that it has helped to shape the present by putting into place certain institutions and 
structures whose effects are felt today. In this chapter, we will review the history 
of the former country of Yugoslavia and its peoples in an attempt to understand the 
various factors which contributed to the virulent explosions of nationalisms that took 
place in the early 1990s. 
To summarize briefly the early history of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, 
let it suffice to say that in approximately the sixth century the South Slavs, "an 
extremely primitive people with no connections with ancient civilizations" ,1 migrated 
from southwestern Russia in tribes and clans and settled in the region now known as 
the Balkans. The geography of the area helped to scatter and isolate them from each 
other. The Serbs populated the present-day territories of Serbia, Bosnia, Her-
cegovina and Montenegro, with some pockets of Serbs located in Macedonia and 
Dalmatia. Due to the Ottoman conquest in the Middle Ages, some Serbs later migrated 
voluntarily and with the encouragement of the Habsburgs into territories comprising 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, specifically Hungary. The modern-day Krajina region 
was known as Vojna Krajina, or the Military Frontier, because of its origin as a 
military stronghold created by the Habsburgs in an effort to block the advancement 
of the Ottoman Turks into Europe. The Croats, mean while, took up residence in areas 
now known as Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia. The Slovenes settled in the Julian Alps, 
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later to be incorporated into a duchy called Carantania in 952 A.D. by Emperor Otto 
I. Later, Carantania was split into Carinthia, Carniola and Styria.2 Bosnia and 
Hercegovina were settled by Serbs and Croats but, by the late fifteenth century, had 
been conquered by the Turks. Many Christians left the area, while the ones who 
remained were subordinated to Slavic nobles who had converted to Islam to retain 
their feudal status.s What are now known as Macedonians are essentially descend-
ants of people who were the product of Serb absorption of the Bulgars who in habited 
the region. The Bulgars became Slavicized, abandoning their Turkic origins. 
Thereafter, the Serbs, Bulgars and Greeks, who had been in control of the 
Macedonian Church for a time while the area was under Ottoman rule, competed for 
control over these people and their region. 4 
Although most of these peoples derive from the same ethnic roots, their 
histories are quite different. Croatia was once an independent kingdom but was 
squeezed between the advancing Venetians (by sea) and Hungarians (by land) at the 
beginning of the tenth century. It accepted the suzerainty of the Hungarians and 
remained, for the most part, under Hungarian rule until 1918.5 It did, however, 
maintain some degree of autonomy even under foreign rule, although Lederer states 
that it gradually lost its national identity.6 The Serbs, meanwhile, had expanded into 
a large medieval state by the middle of the fourteenth century when the Ottoman 
Turks invaded and conquered them. Five hundred years of vassalage ensued 
wherein the Serbs were reduced to an isolated peasant populace. Their religion, 
Serbian Orthodox, helped to preserve their identity and a literary revival took place 
in the eighteenth century led by Obradovic and Karadzic, the latter of whom adopted 
the Hercegovinian "sto" dialect and standardized it into the literary language. The 
same dialect was adopted by Gaj, a Croat, so that the two ethnic groups came to speak 
the same language, even though the Croats used the Latin alphabet while the Serbs 
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utilized the Cyrillic. 
In 1804 the Serbs staged an unsuccessful armed resistance against their 
Turkish overlords. The Turkish administration took such harsh repressive measures 
against the Serbs that by 1815 there was another revolution. Backed this time by 
Russia, the Serbs were successful in obtaining their autonomy and Milos Obrenovic 
was formally recognized as the prince of the pashalik of Belgrade.? 
Serb chauvinism was manifest in the dreams of Prince Michael Obrenovic, who 
came to power in Serbia in 1860, aroused by the unification of Italy. He wanted all the 
South Slavs liberated from the Austrian and Ottoman Empires and united into one 
state, with Serbia in the role of "the Piedmont of the Balkans" ,8 Since Serbia was too 
weak to accomplish the task of unification itself, support had to be generated among 
the other South Slavs. 
The Turks never succeeded in conquering the mountainous region of 
Montenegro where Prince Ivan established his capital and ruled independently as a 
theocrat.~ Although the theocracy was abolished in the mid-nineteenth century, 
Montenegro remained independent until it joined with its South Slav brethren in 1918. 
The Croats, meanwhile, were not as successful in throwing off the yoke of 
foreign oppression. Croatian nationalism was aroused indirectly thanks to the efforts 
of Emperor Joseph IT of Austria to Germanize the peoples of the Habsburg Empire. 
Croats looked upon the achievement of their Serbian counterparts with a mixture of 
admiration and envy, staging their own armed rebellion in 1871. Unfortunately, it 
railed and the Croats were demoralized and more rigorously repressed by the 
Habsburgs,lO 
One of the main points of competing interest between Serb and Croat 
nationalists was control over Bosnia-Hercegovina, the territory separating the two 
ethnic groups, whose ethnic composition was mostly Serbs, Croats and Slavic Muslims. 
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Each group realized that control over this zone, which was still held by the 
splintering Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century, could very well determine 
which one would predominate politically in any Yugoslav union. Since the indepen-
dent Serbs were already acquiring more and more territory (between 1817 and 1905, 
Serbia.'sterritory doubled) while the Croats were still subject to foreign rule, Croa-
tian nationalists tended to fear that Yugoslavism was merely a euphemism for Serb 
domination. Nevertheless, many Croatians were in favour of the unification of 
southern Slavs into one independent state.ll 
In Slovenia during the sixteenth century German nobles attempted to gain 
autonomy by staging a Protestant Reformation. Slovene culture flowered for a time 
as religious materials began to be printed but repression by the Habsburgs resulted 
in publishing being moved to Germany. A counterreformation took place and 
Slovenian students were sent to Austrian universities as another measure to solidify 
relations with the monarchy. The Slovenian language remained alive among the 
peasants while the higher classes spoke German or Italian. Economic ties with 
Germany and Italy strengthened, resulting in an indigenous Slovenian middle class 
which eventually became self-conscious enough to begin to view the Slovenes as a 
nation. Napoleon conquered these lands and annexed them to his empire as the 
Illyrian Provinces. He laid down an infrastructure and fostered the growing 
Slovenian self-awareness. The concept of a common link among the various South 
Slavs of the Illyrian Provinces was also bestowed upon these people by Napoleon. 
Despite the return of the Austrians in 1813, the Slovenian culture continued to 
flourish such that, by 1843, the peasant dialect had been transformed into a literary 
language and was being disseminated to the masses. For a time throughout the 1860s 
the Slovenes rallied for more autonomy, enlisting the support of their South Slav 
compatriots, the Croats and Serbs, but by 1871 they had substantially abandoned 
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these aspirations. The notion of a union of the South Slavs remained alive among 
many, in spite of the repression by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, giving birth to a 
debate among Slovenes as to the implications of such a union for their own culture.!2 
During the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries a group of Bosnian 
nobles attempted to assert autonomy in the region, throwing off the Catholic and 
Orthodox religions in favour of a Christian offshoot known as Bogomilism. The 
Hungarians persecuted the Bogomils in order to re-establish their own dominance 
over them and their territory. Under Stefan Tvrtko I, Bosnia was joined to the 
principality of Hum, another area populated by South Slavs, in the fourteenth 
century. Tvrtko was later crowned king of Bosnia and Rasko, proceeding to conquer 
parts of Croatia and Dalmatia, and his troops fought with the Serbs against the Turks 
at Kosovo. After his death, a Hum nobleman rose to power, obtaining the title 
"Herzeg", which is German for" duke", from which the name "Hercegovina" derived. 
As has already been mentioned, the Bogomil nobles converted to Islam to save their 
feudal status, eventually rebelling against their Turkish overlords. This rebellion 
caused the Turks to take all power away from the Slavic Muslim nobles and to impose 
a highly centralized system of government. The Austrians began to invest in the 
region, helping to create a Christian middle class. However, because the Christian 
serfs were still suffering from extreme oppression, they led an all-out uprising in 
1875 in Hercegovina which eventually resulted in a European war. The Turks were 
defeated in this war and were forced to surrender Bosnia and Hercegovina to the 
occupation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In an effort to solidify their position, 
the Austrians instituted a policy of relocation wherein northern Bosnia was colonized 
by Catholic Slavs and Germans. Baron Kallay, the administrator, established an 
infrastructure in the region but, at the same time, played up the differences among 
the Muslim Slavs, Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs.!S 
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Macedonia's early history was comprised of a series of foreign dominations by 
the Bulgars, Byzantines, Serbs and, eventually, the Turks. The Turks were 
responsible for retarding Macedonia's cultural progress by destroying the 
indigenous aristocracy, turning the Christian peasants into serfs and plaCing the 
Macedonian Church under the control of the Greek patriarch. Bulgarians became 
active in the region during the nineteenth century, upsetting both the Serbs and the 
Greeks. For a time Bulgars ruled Macedonia when it became part of the newly-formed 
Bulgarian state created by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. However, the Treaty 
of Berlin in the same year returned Macedonia to the Turks. Secret nationalist 
societies were spawned in the late nineteenth century as a result of the rivalry over 
Macedonia among the Bulgars, Serbs and Greeks. Eventually all three rivals signed 
agreements settling their respective claims over the Macedonian people and their 
territory.14 
Thus, there was some sense that the South Slavs were brethren by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. The desire for collective security against the 
great powers also drew them toward each other, since they seemed to share a common 
desire for autonomy from imperial rule. From the preceding overview of their varied 
histories, it is possible to see that foreign oppression was common to all of them, as 
was the struggle for self-determination. Each of them experienced external threats 
to their cultures and the eventual awakening of self-consciousness. A lone they faced 
formidable odds in the achievement of their nationalistic aims; hence, they realized 
that they needed one another in order to break free. They appeared to arrive at the 
conclusion that it was better to live with other South Slavs than to live under non-
Slavic domination. 
Another pertinent matter raised by this overview of the early history of the 
peoples of former Yugoslavia is how opposition contributed to their burgeoning self-
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consciousness. As Spicer stated, their identity systems persisted, despite many, 
many years of foreign domination. In various ways, each group organized and 
mobilized against its opposition. At the same time, their historical experiences left 
indelible marks on these peoples: the Slovenes and Croats were Westernized due to 
their incorporation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire; the Slovenes were Germanized 
to some extent due to their economic ties and rule by German nobles; the Serbs were 
the first to break free of their oppressors and establish their own autonomy, giving 
them the sense that they were "natural'" leaders for their fellow South Slavs and 
making the Croats suspicious of them; the Bosnians were split into oppressed 
Christians on the one hand and, on the other hand, Slavic converts to Islam whose 
conversion was made on the basis of securing their socioeconomic status, thereby 
establishing themselves as anomalies in both the Slavic and Muslim worlds; and, 
finally, the Macedonians were virtual pawnsin the power plays among Serbs, Bulgars 
and Greeks, making them suspicious of all these groups. Nevertheless, these diverse 
peoples overcame their differences sufficiently to turn to each other for assistance 
in breaking away from their non-Slavic oppressors. 
During World War I, ignited by the assassination of the heir to the Habsburg 
Empire by an extreme Serb nationalist, the South Slavs hurried to join forces before 
the victors divided up their lands as wartime spoils. They had been weakened by the 
war, having lost great portions of their populations, and feared, no doubt, that they 
would not be able to resist whatever measures their former allies might wish to take 
at peace talks. iS As a result, "the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" 
(renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929) was proclaimed on December 1, 1918 in 
Beograd, six weeks before the Paris Peace Conference was scheduled to take place; 
thus, this unified southern Slav state was not a creation of Versailles. A leksandar 
Karadjordjevic, the Prince Regent of Serbia, was to rule the new kingdom. The name 
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"Yugoslavia"" was not given to the state at that time because Pasic, the pre-war prime 
minister of Serbia and leader of the Serbian Radical Party, was afraid that Serbia 
might be completely submerged in a state so named. It is significant to note, 
however, that the fact that Serbia and Montenegro voluntarily gave up their sover-
eignty to becnme parts of a large state -- made up of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro -- is something of a concession by 
Serb and Montenegrin nationalistsY 
The unification did not, however, constitute a happy ending for the Serbs and 
Croats or the other groups that had joined them. There were many unresolved issues 
among them, not the least of which was how Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Muslim 
peoples with different histories and cultures would be able to find a common path to 
follow. Having a Serb king as their ruler no doubt instilled fear of Serb hegemony 
in the hearts of the others who must have felt that, having paid such a high price for 
their autonomy from foreign empires, they were not going to surrender it now within 
their own state. Another great problem was whether the state should be unitary or 
federal, the Serbs being in favour of the former while the Croats favoured the latter" 
The Slovenes preferred autonomy but ultimately went along with unitarismY 
The seed of nationalities problems was already planted from the time of 
unification due to the fact that the new kingdom was not acknowledged as a 
multinational one; rather, it was based on the notion of a union of major South Slavic 
peep les. This "'las a fallacy, since Germans, Magyars, Albanians, Macedonians and 
Muslims were also enclosed within its boundaries. Instead of exchanging reciprocal 
neighbouring populations as other Balkan states had done, the new state kept them 
within its territory in the belief that these peoples could be assimilated. This was a 
grave error of judgment, since, as Djordjevic states, "[d]eprived of their national 
rights, the dissatisfied minorities turned into destabilizing factors, feeding both the 
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extreme political right and left, encouraged and supported by revisionist European 
powers. "It 
Political struggles, chiefly between the Serbs and Croats, dominated the 
interwar years, effectively rendering all parliamentary and party matters questions 
of nationalism. Acrimony came to a head when a Montenegrin shot and killed Radio, 
leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, and several other Croats during a debate in the 
Skupstina in 1928. The Croats boycotted the Beograd government, establishing a 
separate parliament in Zagreb. They called for a federal state to replace the unitary. 
Serb-dominated one. King Alexander took harsh,arbitrary measures to deal with the 
dissent. One of the major consequences of these actions was to arouse an extreme 
right-wing ultranationalist group called the "Ustashf' amongst the Croats. 
The Ustashi were not the only ultranationalists in Yugoslavia. The Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) was another such group, having split 
into two factions after the First World War. One faction demanded that Macedonia be 
annexed to Bulgaria and carried out terrorist activities in Yugoslavia throughout the 
1920s. The other favoured communism and a Balkan Federation with an independent 
Macedonia included.1t Communism was favoured by IMRO since the Yugoslav Com-
munist Party and the Comintern had debated the issue of Macedonia (as well as the 
other national questions) and, by 1923, had agreed that a federal solution was optimal 
for solving the matter; they had also come to the conclusion that each nation had a 
right to form a separate state." At times, IMRO and the Ustashi cooperated with one 
another since their goals were similar: the overthrow of Serb domination.u 
Croats achieved some measure of their much-desired autonomy on the eve of 
the Nazi invasion. Hitler attacked Yugoslavia; the king and his government fled the 
country, leaving it to the Germans, who promptly dismembered it.u Eventually a 
civil war broke out between the royalist forces and the Partisans (or communists) led 
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by Josip Broz Tito. Yugoslavia's problems were further compounded by the rise to 
power of the ultranationalist Ustashi in Croatia. Led by Ante Pavelic and supported 
by the fascists, the Ustashi delivered a severe blow to the future of Serb-Croat 
relations with their genocidal policy against the Serbs (and others) which resulted 
in Serbian retaliation. The brutality of the Ustashi even appalled the Nazis. "Of 
Yugoslavia's 1,700,000 war deaths (11 per cent of the population) about a million were 
due to interethnic strife. "23 This was possibly the most significant result of this 
period in Yugoslavian history -- something which would haunt the country from that 
time forward. The atrocities committed against the Serb population within the 
territory controlled by the Croats would never be forgotten by the Serbs. They were 
willing to sacrifice their personal suffering if it meant a better, stronger Yugoslavia 
for everyone -- but not if it contributed to Croat improvement alone. 
Previous history detrimentally influenced the early years of the South Slav 
union, as we have seen. Even when they realized they must cleave together to escape 
their foreign domination they could not overcome their mutual differences and 
suspicions, largely the result of the histories they sought so desperately to flee. 
External opposition became secondary to internal opposition as Croats especially 
struggled against possible submersion in a Serb-dominated unitary state. The seeds 
of nationalities problems had been sown from the inception of the country. The new 
state failed to deal adequately with the non-Slavic minorities within its boundaries, 
chauvinistically believing that assimilation was the best course to follow. Issues that 
had been left unresolved at the time of unification among the major South Slavic 
ethnic groups proved to be highly contentious since they were based on different 
world views. There was an obvious failure to forge a strong unified national 
ideology, so many ideologies competed for power. Intransigence, particularly 
between the Serbs and Croats, caused more problems. Groups mobilized in order to 
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deal with their own concerns, often in the form of political parties established along 
nationalist lines, sometimes in more virulent guises. Ultranationalist extremists were 
born out or this failure to compromise and mutual suspicion. Against this backdrop, 
along with the Second World War, the civil war in Yugoslavia was waged from which 
Josip Broz Tito and his Partisans emerged triumphant. It was incumbent upon the 
victors to forge a new Yugoslavia. 
The nationalistic excesses of the Second World War horrified so many people, 
including Serbs and Croats, that, for a time, ethnic conflict was regulated internally 
by most members of the groups. The extent of devastation, both material and social, 
resulting from the war was also significant in terms of contributing to relative 
harmony among the nationalities: post-war reparation allowed the nationalities 
question to recede into the background for a time. Development and modernization 
were the foremost concerns of the new regime under the leadership of Tito and the 
Partisans. Nevertheless, the future of the problem was foreshadowed by the fact that 
development was pursued in terms of economic equalization, placing new industries 
in back ward af'eas, such as Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro.24 From 
the time of Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union in 1948, centralism was gradually 
abandoned, giving over much of the economic and administrative powers and party 
organization to the republics. Because the six republics were based loosely on 
historic national territories, albeit not necessarily homogeneous areas, each 
government became the spokesperson for its respective majority nationality. "When 
disputes arose over economic or political questions, lo-~lleaders tended to dust off 
all the old flags and symbols and return with enthusiasm to the battles of the 
t "25 pas. 
When the communists assumed power, declaring on November 29, 1945 that the 
monarchy had been abolished and creating the Federative People's Republic of 
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Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavs felt that a new era was being ushered ;n. 26 The new 
constitution of January 1946 was modelled on the Soviet one of 1936. Serbia, Croatia, 
Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia were to be six sovereign 
nation-states free to exercise their right to self-determination "by coming together 
in a federation. "27 To allay the fears of the other groups concerning the prewar 
hegemony of the Serbs, the Serbian republic was weakened by creating within its 
boundaries the Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, in addition to 
declaring Montenegro and Macedonia to be republics in their own right.2S Such 
actions came to be reduced to the equation "Weak Serbia = Strong Yugoslavia", 
something which became athorn in the side of Serbs. The federal government retai-
ned the power over defence and foreign policy, economic planning, the currency and 
banking system, communications, law and maintaining the social system. This 
effectively meant the only powers retained by the republics were those pertaining 
to cultural and linguistic matters. The Federal Assembly was comprised of two 
houses, one being elected, the other formed from representatives of the republican 
assemblies; however, the latter met rarely and had no real power. The real power was 
vested in the Communist party itself which was centralized and hierarchical, 
consisting mostly of Tito's wartime cronies. 29 Of course, Tito himself dominated the 
whole system. If all else fa'iled during this period, pure repression was usually the 
answer. In fact, anyone who voiced opposition of any kind was likely to be branded 
a wartime collaborator and imprisoned, or worse. so 
The structure of the Yugoslav state after the war, formally giving concessions 
to the various nationalities while paring down the potential power of Serbia, seemed 
to have reassured many non-Serbs, especially considering that Tito was half-Slovene, 
half-Croat. The break with Stalin in 1948 also drew the various peoples of Yugoslavia 
together, giving them a sense of pride in defying the Soviets and surviving without 
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them. Because Stalin had attempted to incite insurrection among the Yugoslavs, 
calling for them to overthrow Tito, anyone who was suspected of 5upporting Stalin 
after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform was imprisoned. At first, the 
country was isolated from both East and West, the latter alienation due to its "bitter 
dispute with Italy over Trieste, the regime's refusal to compensate foreigners for 
nationalized property, continued Yugoslav support for the communists in Greece, and 
other issues. "31 The Soviet Union put economic and political pressure on Yugoslavia, 
hoping, no doubt, to bring it to its knees for its defiance. Tito changed his tactics 
as a result, taking steps to ingratiate himself and his country to the West, and 
succeeded in gaining economic aid from Western nations, importing weapons from the 
United States and securing military support, an arrangement which stopped short of 
Yugoslavia becoming a member of NATO.S2 
Along with the break from Stalin came a break with Stalinism. The tool utilized 
to accomplish this break was socialist self-management wherein workers formed 
councils to assume control over management and production. This device was largely 
a paper tiger, however, since government-appointed directors had veto power over 
council decisions. Foreign trade was still controlled by the federal government but 
some market mechanisms were instituted, giving rise to the system known as "market 
socialism". It was a period of political and economic decentralization which resulted 
in interregional (and, hence, interethnic) conflict and competition. Since the federal 
government still controlled the purse strings to a large degree, the fact that 
economic initiatives were handed over to the republics meant that, in effect, a zero 
sum game had emerged: whatever one region got meant less for another. Such a 
system was especially galling to the Croats and Slovenes, whose republics were more 
developed and, hence, more economically prosperous than those to the south. These 
people resented the diversion of economic resources to less profitable enterprises in 
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the less developed republics, since the system was based on political expediency, not 
rational economics. Republican leaders became national leaders and regional rivalry 
took on the character of ethnic conflict. A conservative faction of Serbs and 
Montenegrins called for a cessation of economic liberalization and recentralization. 
Since Serbs and Montenegrins were overrepresented in the state and party 
apparatuses, the other ethnic groups became alarmed, fearing the spectre of Serb 
hegemony once again, and opposed such a trend. Hence, we can see how the prewar 
experiences of the unitary state influenced the postwar federation: any call for 
recentralization of federal power away from the republics, usually on the part of 
Serbs and Montenegrins whose numbers were greatest within the federal ranks, 
threatened the other groups who feared that such a move would constitute the loss 
of their autonomy and domination by Belgrade. Once the conservatives were 
defeated, the party was reformed to devolve power away from the central organiz-
ation to the republican ones, resulting in the loss of loyalty to the centre. 33 
Accompanying economic liberalization was liberalization of a more general 
nature, a kind of early Yugoslav version of Gorbachev's glasnost. The effect of such 
an atmosphere was more personal freedom for Yugoslav citizens, cultural and 
religious freedom for the various ethnic groups, and a rise in the standard of living. 
Self-management was extended into the social sphere, allowing for local councils to 
be established to deal with most facets of daily life. Thus, the Yugoslavia of the 1960s 
enjoyed a form of Western-style "Enlightenment", a phenomenon which had far-
reaching effects on its culture and the consciousness of its peoples. These reforms 
also effectively opened up spaces in the Yugoslav society for activities and ideologies 
to fill as they could not when centralization and repression were present. By giving 
freedom, the state essentially opened the doors for the people to demand more. 
Although a detente was reached with the Soviet Union and links were forged with the 
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West, Yugoslavia retained a non-aligned stance, looking to Third World countries for 
peers and support and gaining prestige in that area.34 Poised between East and 
West, a trendsetter of sorts in the Third World, Yugoslavia was something of an 
anomaly, a patchwork rather than a synthesis of the capitalist and communist 
systems, as it attempted to negotiate through the treacherous shoals of its own 
multinational internal affairs. Tito enjoyed a fair amount of success at exploiting 
Yugoslavia's international position and further cultivating his country's appealing 
facade. 
The ethnic landscape in Yugoslavia was violently disturbed in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s by the Albanians of Kosovo and western Macedonia and the Croats 
respectively. Although both uprisings were quelled and liberal reform came to a 
temporary halt, constitutional concessions were made transforming Yugoslavia into 
a loose federation, giving the republics and provinces more control over what had 
heretofore been federal responsibilities and a veto over federal decisions. All of this 
was accomplished despite Tito's call for renewed democratic centralism and his 
insistence that the central party organization, the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia (LCY), was to regain control over political and economic life, The rise of 
nationalism, however, had alarmed federal authorities to the extent that the new 
Constitution, which was enacted in 1974, entrenched the reforms of the 1950s and 
1960s, including de facto republican powers for Vojvodina and Kosovo and the 
recognition of Bosnia's Muslim Slavs as a "nation", Republican and ethnic "keys" 
(i.e., that equal numbers of representatives be chosen from each republic, regardless 
of population or size) were introduced toensure widespread representation of ethnic 
groups in appointments to federal administrative elected bodies, even in the party. 
All this, coupled with the fact that Tito stated in 1964 at the Eighth Congress 
of the League of Communists that he did not believe that unity in Yugoslavia required 
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the elimination of nationalities and the creation of an artificial identity, fuelled the 
smouldering fires of various nationalisms, despite Tito's apparent commitment to 
damping down these very flames. 35 At this point, there was no longer any assump-
tion in Yugoslavia that nationalities were disintegrating. 
As a consequence, the republics at last came into their own as fully 
legitimate agents of popular sovereignty .... This congress thus laid the 
basis for subsequent political decentralization. A change in nationalities 
policy provided the preliminary thrust toward the transformation of 
Yugoslavia into a system in which the republics could advance their 
distinct interests in an autonomous way -- a balance-of-power sys-
tem. l6 
Thus, it can be seen that nationalities policy in Yugoslavia during the Tito 
years, although officially characterized by the slogan "brotherhood and unity", was, 
in reality, an odd juxtaposition of pro-nationalist decentralization and antinationalist, 
pro-centralist rhetoric. Tito d'iscouraged any overt display of republican nationalism 
(amply demonstrated by his actions towards the Albanian and Croatian nationalists) 
even while he augmented their power and, hence, the power of their respective elites. 
Because he himself dominated the political scene as the undisputed head of state, with 
all the power and legitimacy accruing thereto, he had been able to ensure the 
continued equilibrium and cooperation of the republics. This approach was not 
entirely without sense when it is recalled that Yugoslavia, from its inception, was a 
collection of weak nations seeking strength in unification, mutually suspicious and 
sensitive about collective rights. Self-management and the supremacy of the 
Communist Party were meant to ensure unity among the peoples of Yugoslavia, as 
they worked towards common goals and espoused the same ideology. Growth in the 
economy and prosperity, along with a relatively secure international position, during 
most of Tito's years in office were important factors contributing to tolerance and 
cooperation; as long as the economic pie was big enough to provide ample shares to 
everyone, it was easier to turn a blind eye to the fact that some republics were 
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getting more than others. 31 In addition, the threat of the Soviet Union gave all 
Yugoslavs, regardless of nationality, a cammon enemy; while there was the possibility 
that an invasion like those in Hungary and Czechoslovakiacauld occur in Yugoslavia, 
it was in every nationality's interest to cooperate with the others and present a 
unified front to the outside world. In addition, with the West buttressing the country 
in its efforts to control the spread of communism to Italy and Greece, Yugoslavia 
enjoyed a sense of security probably greatly disproportionate to its real problems. 
It had managed to survive dismemberment by Hitler and the catastrophe of civil war; 
it had emerged like a Phoenix from the ashes, became modernized and prospered, all 
with relative harmony among its varied peoples. 
By the late 1970s two factors on the Yugoslav horizon were gaining signifi-
cance: Tito was growing old and sick to the point where it was becoming obvious that 
his days were numbered, and economic conditions were worsening. Tito himself 
worked towards a unified collective leadership in the hope of preventing the rise to 
power of any single individual or group. He had struggled to create a system of 
checks and balances in his country, envisaging that his strategic distribution of 
power to various groups and use of socialist ideology would equalize economic 
disparities, political rivalries and ethnic hostilities. Unfortunately, Tito did not 
pay enough attention to domestic economic conditions, something that would prove 
to be a catalyst to nationalist mobilizations over the next decade or so.3! 
Economic problems, in addition to the absence of a strong federal1eader to fill 
the void left by Tito's death in 1980 were to have fatal repercussions for the country 
because of the constitutional arrangements set out in the 1974 Constitution. "The 
institutions established to cope with the running of Yugoslavia after Tito's death 
could not cope with the situation because in essence they had been created to deal 
with a system which actually had a Tito-like figure at the top."H Despite his best 
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efforts, Tita had underestimated the deleterious effects of his liberalization and 
decentralization programmes on the Yugoslavia he had attempted to create; he 
believed that the ideology of "brotherhood and unity" would carry the day. Perhaps 
he had also underestimated how pivotal his own personal presence had really been 
for the continued success of the "Land of the South Slavs". Having so effectively 
blocked the possib"ilities for any single individualto gain substantial power, Tita had, 
in essence, sentenced the federation to death due to the fact that there was no .. heir 
apparent" waiting in the federal wings to step into his shoes. Without the unifying 
influence of Tito or another strong leader with power and national legitimacy, 
decision-making by consensus in a highly decentralized country where republics 
represented ethnic majorities, deeply suspicious of one another and plagued by a 
bloody past, became increasingly difficult. In addition, Tito's handling of the national 
question was ultimately unsuccessful because it exacerbated oppositional factors 
which aroused nationalist feelings among the various groups. His system of checks 
and balances was based on mutual jealousies and suspicions, not on true consensus. 
Centralization was a threat to those groups which had striven for autonomous status; 
decentralization was a threat to Serbs who believed their own status and that of the 
Serbs in other republics besides Serbia would be undermined. Decentralization also 
brought great interregional and, hence, interethnic conflict and competition. 
Yugoslav-style federalism itself seemed to fuel nationalist tendencies by giving 
excessive autonomy to the various republics while depriving the central government 
of any real power to mediate. Oppositional circumstances were germane to every 
"solution" pursued and ethnic conflict accompanied them. 
As has already been suggested, this condition was exacerbated by the 
escalating economic crisis, largely outside of Yugoslavia's control: the rise in oil 
prices in the mid and late 1970s which caused the terms of trade to deteriorate; the 
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world recessions of 1974-1975 and 1980-1983 that decreased the demand for 
Yugoslavian exports; an increase in real interest rates and tightening of lending 
conditions which accompanied the latter period;4o "the collapse of the COMECON 
economies, and European protectionism destroyed international support for the 
Yugoslaveconomy."41 Within Yugoslavia itself, national-republican rivalries began 
to surface, causing economic and political disputes that fuelled the deficit (which had 
risen from approximately US $6 billion in 1977 to around $20 billion in 1980) and 
stymied economic growth. During the second half of the 1980s, ''[deal incomes 
declined by at least 30 per cent and inflation, at its peak in late 1989, reached 2,000 
per cent. "42 Unemployment soared in the poorer republics. 
The unstable federation was dealt another lethal blow by the interethnic strife 
in Kosovo, one of Serbia's autonomous provinces. Albanians make up the ethnic 
majority due, in large part, to their very high birthrate and the voluntary "ethnic 
cleansing" of the Serb population which began to migrate outasa consequence of the 
greater power granted the Albanians under Tito's programmes and the 1974 
Constitution. In this region, which some have called the "cradle of the Serb nation" 
because of its historic importance to Serbians,43 serious ethnic conflict began as 
Albanians clamoured for a continuation of liberal nationalities policies begun under 
Tito; they demanded that Kosovo be elevated to de jure republican status, among 
other things. 44 Demonstrations began to take place among the Albanian population 
which were condemned by Serbia's republican leaders (and some hardline Albanian 
leaders) as counterrevolutionary and irredentist. 
While it is true that the Albanians suffered repression under the domination 
of the Serbs, who did not recognize them as a legitimate nation in Yugoslavia, after 
1968 Albanians were permitted far greater freedom of cultural expression and, after" 
the 1974 Constitution, far more political autonomy. It is somewhat ironic that they 
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were granted so much by the Yugoslavs since their cultural expressions tend to bind 
them more closely to Albania than Yugoslavia (the Hoxha dictatorship in Albania did 
not a11m..! as much freedom) and politically they are most likely to be irredentist. 
Furthermore, Albanian mass culture harkens back to earlier times: they still live in 
lar-geextended families reminiscent of historical tribes where women are secluded in 
the home under strict male authority and deprived of education; they practise blood 
vengeance, the arranging of marriages and some polygamy; they have the highest 
rate of illiteracy in Yugoslavia and their standard of living is low due to high 
unemployment and an underdeveloped economy.45 In other words, in Serbian eyes, 
the Albanians represent a somewhat atavistic group in Yugoslavia; they are 
throwbacks to a feudal history modern-day Yugoslavia has striven ror years to 
escape. Many Serbs no doubt view the Albanians or Kosovo as a painful reminder of 
Ottoman rule, especially when they live on the very site where the Serbs suffered the 
military defeat that cost them so much as a nation. It;s not surprising, in light of 
these circumstances, that Albanians would feelthat Serbs treat them as second-class 
citizens, particularly those Albanians who have managed to attend university and 
have thus acquired some social mobility. For all these reasons, the bitterness of 
ethnic strife between the Serbs and Albanians is understandable. 
Serbian opposition forces began to emerge in response to the problems in 
Kosovo. Militant Albanians were jailed, the press in Belgrade began to blame the 
central government for, in effect, encouraging the ambitions of the provinces. The 
Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (SKS) claimed that "Serbia 
was the only republic not constituted as a state due to the disruptive role of the 
autonomous provinces. "46 Put another way, it appeared that every other territorial 
ethnic majority was given its own autonomous republic and permitted to administer 
its 0\-1I1 affairs to suit itself and its needs, except the Serbs. .. Weak Serbia = Strong 
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Yugoslavia" was increasingly galling to many Serbs, especially when the reality 
appeared to be mOre "Weak Serbia = Strong Everybody Else". In 1986 the Serbian 
elite published the" Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences" wherein it was 
alleged that Serbia had been the victim of discrimination in economic and political 
terms. It called ror self-determination for the Serb nation. When Slobodan Milosevic 
became a political force after 1986, Serb nationalism gained a definitive leader and 
spokesman. Milosevic was, in effect, a catalyst of sorts, providing the articulation 
required for the convergence of "private troubles" with "public issues". At least in 
the short term, he was able to furnish a "voice" for those Serbs who were experienc-
1ng disaffectation, in addition to a focal point for others whose feelings were already 
leading them in the direction of nationalism. 
The emergence of Milosevic on the political scene in Yugoslavia has served as 
a threat to the existing nationalities policy and, indeed, the 1974 Constitution. Only 
in light of this man's political career can the ensuing virulence of the various 
nationalisms in Yugoslavia be fully understood. It is suggested that the turning 
point in t>1ilosev;c's career and simultaneously for Yugoslav nationalisms was April 
24th-25th, 1987 at the Field of Kosovo when Albanian police attacked Serbian and 
Montenegrin protesters and Milosevic took the side of the protestersY 
In his speech to the assembled Slavs, he spoke of the injustice and 
humiliation they were suffering; of their ancestral land; of the proud 
warrior spirit of their forefathers; of their duty to their descendants. 
The speech was aimed at the people's emotions ... Milosevic endorsed the 
view that the Serb nation was at war, and offered the nationalists the 
support of the party. Hethereby, in effect, removed Kosovo Serbs (and 
Montenegrins) from the jurisdiction of the provincial authorities, 
tearing up in the process the existing constitution. The head of the 
League of Communists of Serbia was speaking noton behalf of the party 
(which, of course, includes also Albanians and other non-Serbs), not on 
behalf of the republic's (ethnically heterogeneous) working class, but 
on behalf of the Serb nation -- anywhere in Yugoslavia. In a direct 
challenge to the fundamental principle of the Yugoslav federation, he 
was thus endorsing the bourgeois nationalism recently re--formulated by 
the Memorandum.48 
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The weak and ineffectual federal government, paralyzed by its own internal 
strife and lack of power, failed to respond adequately to this monumental challenge 
by Milosevic and the Serb nationalists in part because the leadership was split as to 
how to deal with the challenge and also because of the ruling party's continued 
adherence to the principles of democratic centralism and Stalinist party unity. The 
federal party in Belgrade sat by in a state of paralysis and watched what was 
happening. In Slovenia and, to a lesser extent, in Croatia, there was some anticipa-
tion of the coming events, but Serbian party hardliners protected the nationalists by 
insisting that liberals and enemies of the system were to be found among the highest 
office-holders in the country, thus turning every criticism of the Serb nationalists 
into an attack on party unity and a threat to the party's control. Milosevic exploited 
this situation to the utmost, using it to shield his forging of a nationalist-conserva-
tive coalition. 49 
In many ways, 1987 marked the turning point in Yugoslavia as leadership 
throughout the land began to change, moving away from the traditional Tito-style 
Communist type to a kind that resembled prewar Yugoslavia. The League of 
Com mu nists of Ser bia came un del'" the control of Milosevic who successfully ousted his 
mentor, Stambolic, and purged the highest stratum of the party of liberals. He 
proceeded to reverse most of the gains accruing to Vojvodina and Kosovo under the 
1974 Constitution, depriving minorities (especially in Kosovo) of their rights. Thanks 
to his strategic use of the party's own ideological apparatus, Milosevic was able to 
paralyze the federal party and the leadership of the other republics, at least for a 
time, while he built his own power base from a coalition of conservative and 
nationalist forces. 5o His opposition was mainly from Vuk Draskovic, leader of the 
Serbian Renewal Movement, a nationalist party with designs on Macedonia as a Serb 
territory as well as anti-Albanian sentiments, and Vojislav Seselj, head of the Serbian 
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Chetnik movement, an extreme Serb nationalist.51 
In 1988, due to mass demonstrations in Serbia and rallies elsewhere, the 
pressure resulted in the replacement of the Montenegrin leadership to one that was 
sympathetic to Serbia's aspirations. Vojvodina and Kosovo experienced the same 
changes in their 1eaderships as well.52 
TheCroatian League of Communists, which included a disproportionately high 
number of Serbs, lost its grip on the leadership of that republic in the late 1980s as 
oppositional parties began to form and clamour for multiparty elections. The agendas 
of many of these parties involved nationalist issues. The Communist party had little 
choice but to give in. Hence, elections were held in 1990. Franjo Tudjman and his 
nationalistic Croatian Democratic Community party won the elections, despite the fact 
that he had only received a 42% share of the votes cast. The Croatian Democratic 
Community was also the party of choice among most of the Croats of Bosnia-
Hercegovina and succeeded in winning 44 of the 49 seats won by Croats in the 
Bosnian elections.53 
The Serbs of Croatia reacted to the loosening of Communist Party authority and 
the upsurge of alternative parties with Croatian nationalist overtones by organizing 
themselves. It is very probable that they were unwilling to wait around to see 
whether this new breed of Croatian nationalism contained any Ustasha elements for 
fear of another encounter with virulent anti-Serbism.54 The Serbian Democratic 
Party was founded in Knin with Dr. Jovan Raskovic as its leader. When newly-elected 
President Tudjman did not visit Serb majority areas and the republic adopted a new 
flag and other symbols which harkened back to Ustasha times, the Serbs of the 
Krajina began to mobilize for autonomy, holding a referendum on August 3rd, 1990 
which had been banned by Croatian authorities. In light of Tudjman's openly 
nationalist electoral campaign, the banning of the Serb referendum added insult to 
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injury. Despite measures taken by Croatian authorities, in January of 1991 the Serbs 
virtually established their own government in the Krajina region.55 
Tensions in Slovenia, the most developed and liberal of the republics, escalated 
throughout the late 1980s, especially once Milosevic had established his power in 
Serbia. By September of 1989, the Slovene Assembly had passed amendments to the 
constitution of the republic paving the way for secession. Slovene nationalism found 
voices in the Communist Party and the opposition party, DEMOS. In the 1990 
elections, DEMOS won the majority of seats but Milan Kucan, leader of the newly-
renamed League of Communists of Slovenia-Party of Democratic Renewal, won the 
presidency. In July 1990, Slovenia had, for all intents and purposes, declared its 
independence from Yugoslavia, although the word "secession" was still not being 
used. This, however, was a mere formality as Slovenia began to negotiate with 
Western nations for closer economic and political ties. 56 
Alija Izetbegovic, who had been jailed in the 1980s as one of the "Sarajevo 
Muslims", having written a treatise promoting the establishment of an ethnically pure 
Muslim state, became the leader of the Party of Democratic Action in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. This party carried the elections of December 1990, winning 86 of the 240 
possible seats, forming a coalition government with the other big winners, the Serbs 
and Croats.57 
Among the Serbs of Bosnia-Hercegovina there was political organization under 
the leadership of Radovan Karadzic, who formed the Serbian Democratic Party of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, an offshoot of the party which had been formed in Croatia by the 
Serbs. Due in part to the atrocities committed in the region during the Second World 
War and also to the postwar partitioning of the Serb nation within Yugoslavia, the 
Serbs of Bosnia experienced political revitalization. The new party formed a Serbian 
National Council in Banja Luka and later won 72 of the tota185 seats won by Serbs in 
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the republican elections of December 1990.5$ 
Macedonian leadership underwent similar changes as Communist Party control 
gave way under pressure and oppositional parties emerged. In m9C) two nationalist 
groups were created: the Movement for All-Macedonian Action (made up mostly of 
intellectuals and led by Ante Popovski) which criticized Bulgarian and Greek 
oppression of Macedonians within their borders; and an even more radical one known 
as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of 
Macedonian National Unity, led by Ljupco Georgijevski, whose platform called for 
improved relations with Slovenia and Croatia, along with the return of some 
territories under the control of Serbia. Aroused by fears of Serbian hegemony (a 
common sentiment apparently) and the nationalist claims of Draskovic, the two parties 
formed an a11iancecal1ed the Front of Macedonian National Unity to face the upcoming 
elections of November 1990. There was much controversy surrounding the elections 
but it appeared that ultimately Georgijevski's party emerged victorious with 37 seats 
out of a possible 120 in the assembly, This party, however, split into two factions in 
January of 1991 when Vladimir Golubovski challenged Georgijevski for the leader-
ship.59 
From this brief overview of the changes in leadership throughout Yugoslavia, 
two things become very clear: (1) Milosevic was not the undisputed leader of the 
Serbs in Yugoslavia or even the voice of Serb nationalism; and (2) many varieties of 
nationalisms, both inter- and intragroup, were on the rise, turning the political 
landscape into a virtual free-for-all as factions arose to challenge the existing power 
structure. The fall of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc had severely under-
mined Communist authority to the point where Yugoslav Communists came to realize 
that they could no longer unilaterally hold onto their power. Their only hope for 
survival lay in allowing the existence of oppositional parties and opening elections 
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toa multiparty system. They were gambling that their opposition would be weak and 
fragmented and that the masses would continue to support them as the incumbents. 
Unfortunately for the Communists, they had underestimated their opposition and 
overestimated their own support. Communism could not unify the country in the face 
of nationalism which was causing the various peoples of Yugoslavia to forsake one 
another and pursue their own sectional interests. 
Slovenia and Croatia were the first republics to secede in the summer of 1991. 
Federal tanks moved out of their barracks within twenty-four hours of the 
declaration. Slovenian defence forces and police fought back with barricades and 
antitank weapons. The European Community sent in negotiators to attempt to work 
out a truce between the Slovenians and the federal government. The United States 
and European Community refused to acknowledge Slovenia's independence at first, 
although this was a temporary situation with recognition forthcoming in the long 
run.'9 More vicious fighting broke out in Croatia after its announcement of 
secession, largely due to the size and territorial concentration of the Serbian 
minority within that former republic. Yugoslav Army troops moved from Slovenia to 
Croatia and United Nations peacekeeping troops were sent in. Croatia has been 
formally recognized as independent by Canada, the United States and the European 
Community. A ceasefire was eventually achieved, after Serbs seized one-third of the 
territory, consisting mainly of their enclave. 
Bosnia declared its independence in October of 1991, evoking great resistance 
from the Serb population. Under the leadership of Karadzic, they have fought with 
the Muslims for over a year, taking over approximately 70% of the former republic's 
territory. Since the Muslims were largely urban, while the Serb population tended 
to be agrarian, there is some validity to the Serbs' claim that they are simply 
securing their own land. Thus far, there has been no success in the negotiation of 
154 
a e~asefif'e and peace for Bosnia, despite the concerted efforts of Lord Owen and 
Cyrus Vance. Croats and Muslims, formerly allies, have recently engaged in fighting, 
while Serbs and iviuslims continue their combat in other regions of Bosnia. 
f.1acedonia declared its independence in "1991 but has failed to gain recognition 
by the majority of the international community due to pressure from Greece which 
fears that an independent Macedonia would have designs on Greek territory occupied 
by its own Macedonian minority. Kosovo Albanians have also declared their 
independene~ but only Albania appears enthusiastic about such a declaration. This 
is likely due to the fact that international recognition of the independence of a region 
within a Yugoslav republic (and Serbia and Montenegro continue to call themselves 
Yugoslavia) would have serious repercussions for the territorial integrity of both 
Croatiaand Bosnia. Serb-controlled regions in both republics have proclaimed their 
own independence but this has not so far been recognized because these regions 
ostensibly belong to the "independent" states of Bosnia and Croatia: international 
recognition of Kosovo would logically have to lead to the same recognition for the 
Serb-contro l1ed territories. 
Oppositionalfactors within the former country of Yugoslavia have had a major 
influence on the current events unfolding before the eyes of the world. The extreme 
devolution of power to the republics under the Yugoslav federal system which 
deprived the federal government of most of its power, coupled with the rotating, 
ethnically-represented presidium, rendered the centre virtually redundant. 
NatioiHOilisms arose in response to other nationalisms which then created a backlash 
in the former, arousing an endless spiral which ripped apart the country. However, 
external factors also played significant roles in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The 
fall of the Soviet Union and the liberation of the Eastern bloc from its former 
subjugation have already been mentioned as important influences on the situation in 
155 
for'mer Yugoslavia. The secessions of the former Baltic republics from the Soviet 
Union probably played a large part in the decisions of Slovenia and Croatia, as well 
as the willingness of Western nations, such as Austria, to negotiate closer economic 
and political ties with republican governments. The former Yugoslav republics had 
both a precedent an d support for their secessions. Economic conditions underscored 
matters in the country, making people more sensitive to political issues. Historical 
factors were also involved because they offered possible precedents for future 
circumstances and otherwise helped people to interpret what was happening within 
Yugoslavia. 
Germany's influence on the European Community probably dealt the final blow 
to Yugoslavia. By being the first country to recognize Croatia and Slovenia as 
independent states and taking the stance that any use of force in that area was 
unacceptable, it set the tone for the policies of the other members of the Community. 
Such policies included economic sanctions being imposed on Serbia, because it was 
perceived that Milosevic was the master puppeteer pulling all the Serb strings, and 
an arms embargo. The United States joined in, employing the same policy measures. 
The Vatican recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in January of 1992, 
conveniently ignoring similar declarations among non-Catholic peoples in the former 
Yugoslavia. When the European Community and the United States recognized the 
independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina in April of 1992, they inadvertently set the stage 
for the destruction of t.he former republic, since it had so much to lose with 
independence due to the historical claims made on its lands and peoples by Croats 
and Serbs. The United Nations approved the sanctions against Serbia and 
Montenegro and NATO, the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe and 
Western Europe imposed a naval blockade on them as well 61 In addition, the strict 
adherence by the West to the principles of the Helsinki Accord (for example, that no 
156 
boundaries would be changed by force) and internal disagreements and ambivalence 
among Western governments about intervention helped to create greater upheaval. 
All of these Western policy measures were designed to apply pressure on 
Milosevic to make him put an end to the civil war and curb the nationalism of the 
Serbs. However, the Western powers did not seem to realize that the various leaders 
of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia were not simply Milosevic's minions, that they, 
indeed, had minds of their own and personal causes for which to fight. Western 
governments also failed to foresee the kind of backlash their measures would 
precipitate among the Serbs; they underestimated the level of paranoia such actions 
could generate as the Ser'bs watched their former allies turn against them to lend 
their support to previous enemies. The West seems to find it difficult to understand 
the spirit of the Serbs which makes them increasingly defiant in the face of 
adversity. It has seriously miscalculated the depth of the grievances Serbs nurtured 
over the postwar years in Yugoslavia. Of course, the role of Western media cannot 
be ignored as they presented obviously biased reports of events in Yugoslavia, 
denying any and all validity to Serb claims, portraying them as barbarous monsters 
who turned on their former countrymen for no credible reason. An example of such 
misleading reports is that of the "breadline massacre": Western media immediately 
denounced Serbs for firing on Muslim civilians waiting to purchase bread in Sarajevo; 
shortly thereafter, the UN verified that it had actually been Muslims who had shelled 
their own people, information which the media rather quietly conveyed to the public. 
In short, the often misguided and misdirected efforts of the West have helped to 
escalate the civil war rather than alleviate it. 
Our discussion in this chapter has attempted to highlight the insights to be 
gained from the macro approaches to nationalism by using the former Yugoslavia as 
a case study. We have looked at the factors which led to the emergence of social 
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movements, such as the inadequacy of institutional guides, the rise of le..e.ders to 
articulate the grievances of certain groups, social and political factors which 
provided fertile ground for discontented individuals to mobilize collectively for 
change, and the presence of ideologies. The generation of ideologies was significant 
because it helped to bridge the gap between private matters and public issues, using 
thepowerfultoolof nationality or membership in an ethnic group. Thereafter, people 
could point to a specific reason for the troubles they were experiencing and find 
scapegoats for them. Most importantly, we looked at oppositional factors, both within 
the country and outside, which contributed not only to the events leading up to its 
disintegration, but also to the evolution of the civil war itself. Opposition forced 
some peoples apart while it drove others together. Ethnic identities became even 
more salient as individuals and groups experienced opposition while ideologies gave 
them a framework for interpretation and an agenda for action. Viewing events using 
these macro approaches assists us in understanding how the soil was fertilized to 
spawn such violent nationalisms in former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, we are left to 
ponder why these conditions did not produce identical results; that is, why did so 
many factions arise within groups and why was not every member of each group 
aroused to the same extent? For answers to these questions, we must turn from the 
observation of aggregates to the "verstehen" of individuals. In the following 
chapter, we will meet individuals through the device of interviewing to discover how 
social self-identity played a role in the nationalisms of former Yugoslavia. 
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CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS 
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This chapter will present the findings gathered primarily from face-to-face 
interviews conducted with six subjects, descriptions of whom have been provided in 
Chapter m. These findings will be augmented by those garnered from numerous 
informal conversations, both in person and over the telephone, as well as those 
extrapolated from various media reports and interviews. The goal behind the 
gathering and analysis of these findings is to determine from the individuals 
themselves how they feel about nationalism vis-a-vis the current conflict in 
Yugoslavia. We were most interested in ascertaining whether these people could 
provide empirical grounds for the revised model of nationalism proposed in Chapter 
IT. 
As has already been stated in Chapter m, to discover how people feel about 
particular issues must be achieved through discussions with them. The study of 
aggregates does not provide the human face for which we are searching. Our search 
must take us to the subjects themselves. Only an individual1ike the young Serbian 
warrior from Knin can offer the insight that the fighting between the Serbs and the 
Croats in the Krajina region, in his opinion, does not represent nationalism. "It is not 
nationalism," he stated firmly. "It is just people fighting for their homes. Nobody 
can take away your home. It's yours and that's all. People will fight for their 
homes. "1 What this young man, who led a unit of ten men in the combat zone, 
describes as "just fighting for your home" could easily be taken as -- and, for the 
most part, is taken to be just that -- nationalism by an outside viewer. A man named 
"Zjelko" (probably a misprint or misspelling of "Zeljko") was quoted in an interview 
in Harper's Magazine as saying, n'I don't fight for nationalism -- I sleep with girls 
of all nations. I don't fight for religion -- God is no place. I fight because I want to 
be back down there [Sarajevo] with my books and my CD player and my Gitane 
cigarettes.'n 2 Such illustrations bring out the pertinent question of whether we can 
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justifiably attach a label to a particular phenomenon because to us, as outside 
observers, it resembles oomething we know, or whether we must listen to the voices 
of those intimately involved in the phenomenon and accept their view as a viable 
reality. 
On the topic of nationalism as apsychosocia7 manifestation, we know that myths 
regarding the" golden age" of the past are promulgated, that cultural and territorial 
integrity are involved with the way people feel about their "nation" or ethnic group, 
and that self-esteem and social self-identity are part and parcel of the collective 
"identity. This becomes ever more clear when we read that "a furniture designer in 
his forties" told a journalist: "'We, the Serbs, are the oldest and the most courageous 
people in the Balkans, but Communism oppressed us. Now we do not want Islam to 
make us backward. fv1uslims are primitive; they want our women to wear a veil. 
Unlike the Islamic mujahideen, the Serbs do not want to impose themselves or the 
Orthodox religion upon anyone.'''s Such statements, for the most part, could have 
been uttered hundreds of years ago, when the Serbs were threatened by the 
encroaching Ottoman Turks and gallantly struggled to keep their lands and way of 
life. Yet, for him, they are just as true for today as the Serbs and Muslims wage 
armed combat against one another, killing the very people with whom they have, in 
essence, each lived for decades. Another man, harkening back to previous wars and 
referring to the "myth" of the Serb warrior, told the same journalist: "We are 
heavenly people because more of us are in heaven than on earth."4 The implication 
that Serbs are martyrs and have always been so is unmistakable. It seems evident 
that this man is invoking a justification for why he and his Serb compatriots are, yet 
again, taking part in a bloody war. Perhaps it is to save his own sense of self-esteem 
as an individual and as a member of a particular group. Another similar justification 
comes from the aforementioned Zjelko: "'Serbs, we are just like Jews, We are God's 
1R!i 
people, chosen to suffer. Hungarians, Turks, Germans, Germans again. Now it is 
Croats and Muslims. So you see, always we are victims,'''5 Equating Serbs with Jews 
gives them the same long-suffering, martyr-like image; we are led to understand that 
Serbs have been oppressed for many, many years and that it is time to stop being 
victims. Such an interpretation of Serbian activity is in direct contrast to what most 
of the Western world believes, but, if this is the interpretation of this man as an 
individual and as a member of the Serb ethnic group, it is difficult to deny it. Who 
can properly arbitrate claims of oppression? 
General Ratko Mladic, com man der-in-chief of the Bosnian Serb army, in a Globe 
and Mail interview, talked about the "1.4 million Serbs [who] gave their lives for the 
second Yugoslavia" (i.e., post-World War n) and that "one out of every three Serbs 
gave his life" during the First World War to create the first Yugoslavia. According 
to the article, Mladicadmitted that it was this history that provided a "driving force" 
for the Bosnian Serbs. It seems that Mladic considers himself to be continuing that 
heroic legacy and is proud of that fact. He appeared angered by Western accusa-
tions, responding, "'Who has the right to call me a war criminal when I was born 
here? These lands have belonged to us for centuries,''' His deep attachment for the 
land, or the territory occupied by Serbs, something which crops up time and again 
among the Serbs, is his vindication in his own eyes. Presumably it is excusable to be 
fighting for such a noble cause as the land of your ancestors rather than mere self-
interest. In the article, Mladic also recounted the painful story of a lifelong friend, 
a woman whose hand had been cut off when she was only two months old by unnamed 
mutilators during the Second World War, demonstrating how the personal attachment 
to a significant other can arouse our own feelings of who we are and what kind of 
people we are, causing a particular social self-identity to come to the forefront and 
become the most salient one. It is possible that the emotional tie created in him a 
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ground for nationalist sentiment to grow.' 
However, although it would seem that nationalism has caused ethnic groups to 
completely forsake one another and turn entirely inward, and that hatred and 
intolerance for one another are the order of the day, we read about people like Marica 
Josipovic, a Serb from a predominantly Croat town in Bosnia, who had to leave her 
homeand husband behind when she fled for safety, telling a journalist for Time that 
"neither she nor her husband has any interest in killing neighbours with whom they 
have lived harmoniously for years." This same woman left her goats in the care of 
her Croat neighbours and recounted that conscripts of both militias (of whom her 
husband is one) "sneak home at night to guard their own property, often standing 
shoulder to shoulder; when the sun rises, they report for duty in opposing camps. "7 
In the same article, we read about a Muslim businessman from Sarajevo who states, 
"'I grew up with Serbs. We chased women together when we were young,''' He goes 
on to accuse Serb leaders of promoting the ideology that any Serb who does not join 
in the battle in Bosnia is a traitor.s The ubiquitous Zjelko adds his own dimension to 
this version of reality. He is fighting in the hills above Sarajevo at the time of 
writing, ostensibly killing Muslims whenever possible, yet he is quoted as saying that 
he does not "bear his former neighbours any personal grudge. 'We still talk all the 
time,' he said. 'On the radio.' The two sides shared frequencies; when not trading 
gunfire, they swapped insults. ,,' Such sentiments seem anachronistic in an 
internecine war which has been repeatedly described as a "bloodbath". We expect 
to hear people saying things like "'Killing Serbs is hard work. When we fight, it is 
an eye for an eye. No compromise,''' uttered by a Croat paramilitary fighter in 
Mostar, Bosnia. Or the Croat peasant who told a European Community monitor, "'Dead 
Serbs are good for my cropS.'''10 These are the dimensions of nationalism with which 
we are more familiar and which we have come to expect. After all, does it not make 
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s.ene..e that peep Ie who are k il1in 9 one another sim p ly because they be lon 9 to different 
ethnic groups should hate one another? Apparently this is not necessarily the 
reality. Hencoe, we must admit that there is a more sophisticated psychosocial 
mechanism at \.Jork in ~.ome cases under the rubric of behaviour we have called 
" nationalism" . 
Perhaps we must consider that nationalism may, indeed, require forsaking all 
others but not hating them; perhaps nationalism has more to do with historical 
circu mstances and oppositional an d/ or structural factors than with sim p le hatred an d 
intolerance. There is the possibility that social self-identity, both at the individual 
and collective levels, demands that certain actions must be taken for its preservation 
which may, fortunately or unfortunately, require that others not of the group be 
sacrific..ed. Perhaps when the threat to self-identity is perceived as being so great, 
individuals believe they must form clear ties with similar others in an effort to 
preserve it collectively, no matter who else's identity must suffer in the process. 
Maybe other aspects of the individual's identity must also suffer fora time to protect 
the one that has become salient. In the case of one Serbian woman from Mostar who 
fled to a refugee camp, identity was sacrificed almost completely: "'I've lost my 
identity. I'm no one now.'''ll Others who feel that the ethnic identity is not worth 
sacrificing other self-identities, like the conscientious objector cited in an article in 
The Globe and tv1ail, may go to extremes to protect their personal integrity -- like 
committing suicide. 12 Some, like the liberal, antiwar members of the Belgrade Circle, 
a gr'oup of intellectuals and professionals, meet and stage protests against Milosevic 
and his government. They revile the actions of their Serb counterparts in Bosnia, 
calling the actions taken by Serbs there "genocide". One member stated, "'Th"is is a 
struggle between modern Serbia and primitive Serbia, and primitive Serbia has 
modern Serbia on her knees.'''1S Evidently the Serb identity of such people is 
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moderated by the strong presence of other self-identities in their psychosocial 
makeup, something which causes them to behave in ways we would not call 
"nationalist". Their ethnic identity is not threatened to the point where they would 
be willing to participate in the actions of the other Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia; it 
may be argued that it is the level and diffuseness of their self-esteem that playa role 
in the choices such people have made. 
We have already observed the influence of leaders and ideology in some of the 
above-noted comments, specifically those referring to the characterization of Serbs 
unwilling to fight as being "traitors" and to the struggle between "modern" and 
"primitive" forces in Serbia. A stronger sense of this influence is demonstrated by 
the Serb peasant family from Croatia seeking a new home in Serbia when the husband 
states, "'Until a few years ago, we never thought about who was Serb and who was 
Croat. Now we are told it makes all the difference if you light a white candle in 
church instead of a yellow candle, or cross yourself with three fingers instead of two. 
A whole life in my town, thrown away. For what?'" Yet, his teenaged son, evidently 
feeling the effects of ideology in a somewhat different manner from his father, 
declared, "'Yugoslavia was just a bad dream. Serbs will never live together with 
those animals again. Never forever.'''14 A Muslim from Tuzla, Bosnia, told a Time 
journalist, "'I don't understand anything anymore, and neither does anyone else. It's 
the politicians who have made this mess.'''15 Evidently there are those who perceive 
that, whatever people mayor may not have felt, or whatever their ethnic identity 
might have been prior to the disintegration of YugoslaVia, leadership and ideology 
were significant factors in the evolution of the civil war. Leaders and the ideologies 
they disseminated helped to divide individuals into opposing camps and provided 
interpretations of the situation and the character of the opposition, in addition to 
showing them the way to remedy the problem. 
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Structura7 factors are brought into focus by the half-Serb, half-Slovene man 
from Sarajevo, whose wife is Muslim, when he describes the role played by the 
demand for multiparty elections in Bosnia and the resulting election of November 
1990. The implication is that such freedom to vote for the party of one's choice 
rather than just the Communist Party, and the appearance on the political landscape 
of many different parties with various agendas, led to political and social splintering. 
He states that his acquaintances voted for eth nic parties: "'At that moment, it seemed 
likea political game. It was like a marriage quarrel: you sayan ugly word to me, I'll 
find an uglier one to throw back at you. No one imagined it would end like this, and 
everyone I talk to says he'll never again give his vote to an ethnic party.''' The 
influence of history was felt by the same man who argued with his Serbian mother 
over which group deserved the blame for the interethnic warfare. The mother, who 
had witnessed the slaughter of members of her family at the hands of the Ustashi 
during World War TI, became incensed enough to call her own son an "Ustasha" .16 
Once again, we see how history plays an important role in the way people perceive 
their present reality and the current events of their lives. Structural factors, 
including history, the "opening up" of the political system as Communism in 
Yugoslavia lost its hold over individuals, and the struggle for "democracy", already 
being waged by their Eastern European neighbours, compounded the other 
phenomena at work in the lives of the Yugoslavs and assisted in precipitating the 
conflict among them. 
General Mladic indicated the importance of both external and internal 
structural factors when he was interviewed for The Globe and Mail. External factors 
included what he called the "betraya'" of former compatriots who were willing to 
enter into combat to secede from Yugoslavia and the" ig nor ant an d misguided" efforts 
of Western powers which have denounced only the Serbs for their part in the civil 
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war. Mladic also believes that Germans and Muslims are conspiring to divide Europe 
between them and that, while the rest of the world naively stands by, only the Serbs 
are fighting to save themselves -- as they have been doing for five hundred years. 
He railed against the myopia of the Serbs which did not permit them to see the sad 
state of the Yugoslav federation or to prepare adequately for their own defence; 
declaring, "'Yugoslavia would never have been lost if Serbs were not blind to Croat 
and Muslim deceit.''' This was one of the internal structural factors cited by Mladic, 
along with the fact that Serb army officers had been repeatedly passed over for 
promotions in favour of Croats and Muslims during Tito's rule.!7 These structural 
components, at least for General Mladic, were significant in terms of the creation of 
thecurrentcivil war because of their effect on the people who were touched by them. 
Perceptions and interpretations were shaped by the structural factors present; such 
factors, in effect, set the stage for the way in which people would perceive and 
interpret their context. Structural factors, both external and internal, provided the 
oppositional element in the equation which served to solidify intragroup relations and 
intergroup rivalries. 
Having undertaken this preliminary discussion, we shall now turn to the 
interviews and observe what the interviewees perceived to be the factors that 
contributed to the civil war in former Yugoslavia and the rise of various nationalisms. 
Psychosocial Factors/Self-Identity 
As wesaw from Chapter IT and the review of literature on social self-identity, 
human beings are usually a collection of various identities, stemming largely from the 
roles they play in society and the way these roles are integrated into their personal 
conceptions of themselves. Self-esteem may be high or low, specific or diffuse, based 
171 
on how much gratification we receive and from how many sources. Emotions are 
profoundly significant in terms of identifications we make with others and how we 
interpret any given situation. The culture in which we live provides us with symbols 
that take on salience and help us to form our sense of self, as well as to express it. 
Hence, social self-identities are contextual: they become active when the setting or 
time is right for them while others recede into the background. When the integrity 
of self-identity is threatened, we will go to great lengths to protect it, for this 
integrity is deeply felt and just as deeply desired. Because we become unique 
individuals by identifying ourselves with groups, collectivities are intrinsic to 
individual psychosocial well-being. In other words, our personal well-being is 
intimately interwoven with the well-being of the groups with which we identify. If 
we come to believe that one of the groups in which we claim membership is being 
threatened, such a threat becomes very personal; it is a threat to our own integrity. 
Dr. George Vid Tomashevich, an anthropologist, eloquently summed up 
nationalism as follows: "It is the inflammation of a group's collective spirit which 
comes and goes but tends to persist as long as foreign bodies, i.e., irritants, are 
present." He believes that nationalism is inevitable, regardless of whether Western 
nations approve of it, because "group identity has not been transcended yet to a 
panhuman identity. Since we are all still divided along cultural factors, it is 
unrealistic for some nations to ask others to forego this." Another reason for the 
perpetuation of nationalist sentiment, according to Dr. Tomashevich, is that, when 
"your own group is under attack, [this particular identity] will transcend all other 
identities -- especially when threatened with extermination. "18 Such a comment 
illuminates how social self-identity is a collection of identities and provides an 
example of why, under certain conditions, one identity would take precedence over 
the others. Furthermore, the element of opposition and how it works to promote 
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identity and collective solidarity are highlighted by these statements. 
Most of the interviewees believed nationalism to be a. feeling embedded in the 
hearts and minds of individuals that required the right moment or oontext in 
combination with leadership to be stimulated. Marijan simply stated that nationalism 
was a concept associated with one's nationality and how much importance one gives 
to it, nothing more. Paul stated that nationalism was like a family feeling -- tha.t the 
nation was like a large family and nationalism was the same kind of feeling one had 
for one's family. Nationalistic feelings stem from the need to belong and the ethnic 
group provides us with a focal point for that need; that is, we seem to be able to 
relate better to members of our own ethnic group. Nationalism is also a survival 
mechanism for Paul. We can ensure our survival personally and as a species through 
this mechanism because it gives us a reason to band together and fight off threats. 
He illustrated his point by providing an analogy of a family at a Serbian dance where 
everyone, including the family, is Serbian. A member of the family may have 
criticisms of the others, but there is still a sense of pride and belonging to that 
family. If that member hears someone outside the family criticizing it, he/she will 
defend them, rightor wrong, because that is his/her own group and his/her identity 
is wrapped up with that group. Thus, even though the outsider is a member of the 
same ethnic group, he/she is not a member of the family and poses some sort of threat 
to the family identity and, in this way, to the individual family member's identity as 
well. This is nationalism on the micro level, according to Paul. The same sort of 
dynamics operate on the larger scale when the family is an ethnic group within 
society. 
Jovan states that nationalism is stronger than any other desire; it is virtually 
uncontrollable, but is capable of controlling people. Itisa powerfulfeeling stemming 
from culture and a particular way of life. Nationalism can develop in multicultural 
173 
societies like Canada where there are no deep, longstanding traditions or in countries 
like Yugoslavia where ethnic roots are profound. Nationalism can be a good thing if 
it means keeping ethnic culture and religion alive or when it is more like patriotism; 
but, when it becomes aggressive and chauvinistic, it is a highly destructive force. 
According to Jovan, nationalism is not an ideology. people do not have to be conscious 
of it to feel it; it does not take root in the hearts and minds of people through 
propaganda but through symbols and striking deeply-felt chords in people. Also, for 
Jovan, nationalism requires a specific moment in order to flower. An organized 
movement cannot be successful if the feeling is not already inside people and if the 
time is not right for it. Jovan also stressed the fact that groups are divided amongst 
themselVes as well, that not all members of an ethnic group or nationality will have 
the same vision of what is right for the group to fulfil its nationalistic goals. 
For Milan, nationalism stems from the fact that individuals fall into categories 
of people or groups with certain religious and ethnic characteristics. Nationalism 
depends on how strongly people want to protect their own, how deeply they feel for 
their own group, how deeply they understand it. He stated that he was raised with 
an ethnic identity and believes it is very important (even though he actually believes 
being a nationalist is not a good thing), especially for Serbs because throughout 
history they were always being chased, persecuted, attacked by outsiders. The 
implication is that he feels it is necessary to stand up for his people because he is 
part of that historical current, it is part of his legacy as a member of the group. 
For Tony, nationalism is the way a group of people "says who they are". It 
cannot simply be a feeling, because some people will feel one way while others will 
feel another. Croatian nationalism started a long time ago because peop le were tr yin g 
to say who they were. According to him, nationalism is not political, politics ;s 
something else. He is a Croat, but not from Croatia proper, and his family moved to 
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Serbia when he was quite young. He recounted how the children had teased him and 
made fun of him, calling him an Ustasha. Upset, he had had to go home and ask his 
mother what that was. "A real Croat will not go along with fascism," he stated firmly 
on that subject, evidently distancing himself from the whole matter. Tony had also 
had difficulties finding a job when he had finished school, saying that he thought it 
was because of his nationality. Furthermore, his father had been passed over for 
promotions in favour of Serbs even though his father had been in the Party. In 
these ways, Tony had ah.tays perceived latent conflict between Serbs and Croats. 
Peter stated that nationalism can only exist among "nations", those peoples who 
have their own language, history and culture. His useof "history" implies that they 
have at one time or another existed independently, presumably in their own state of 
some kind, Yet, a l'1ation does not have to havea state, according to him. In addition, 
nations are much greater than mere ethnic groups because the latter are just small 
groups of peep Ie within a larger state. Using this definition as a point of departure, 
Peter stated that Muslims in Yugoslavia cannot have nationalism because they do not 
have their own language or culture. Further, he believes nationalism to be a feeling, 
a kind of pride; if nationalism is nothing more than an ideology, then it can become 
fascism. Nationalism has to be created or socialized, it is not simply an innate quality. 
Serbs are not nationalists, according to Peter, because they would not be in their 
present situation if they were. Serb nationalism arose spontaneously because of fear 
of the other groups. Only Serbs were ever "Yugoslavs" in the former country; they 
respected their government because they have always had their own state, with the 
exception of the years spent under Ottoman rule. Peter thinks weare all nationalists 
to some extent because we are raised in certain contexts; however, when nationalism 
becomes chauvinistic, that is "something else". He said that some groups of people 
cannot be nationalists without chauvinism because they have nothing else to 
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distinguish them but their hatred of certain others. According to him, Serb 
nationalism is the kind that "the harder you press, the more it jumps". For instance, 
if the world is going to accuse them of ethnic cleansing, then they are going to do it. 
They are just defending themselves, but presumably they will become aggressors if 
they are pushed into it. Peter believes that nationalists undergo a change in identity 
because they look into the past and hope they will be glorified like the heroes of old. 
Another acknowledgement made by the interviewees was that there had always 
been some nationalistic sentiment expressed in Yugoslavia. Milan recalled when he 
was a youth a Serbian goalie on a Croatian soccer team that he followed had left the 
team and gone to Belgrade; immediately thereafter Milan had heard that Croatians 
were swearing at Serbs and hurt them and he was shocked by this kind of action. 
He said, "Croatian people start all the time," and explained that there had always been 
vandalism in Croatia whenever a Serb had displayed an ethnic symbol or if anyone 
had said he/she was a Serb. Croatians were always "boiling", according to Milan. 
Tony, a Croat, stated: 
Serbs are allowed to wear the red star, they put the Chetnik symbol on 
it -- no problem -- [even] if they are Communist. With Serbs, every-
thing goes. When the Communists ruled in Yugoslavia, Serbs, they know 
who they are, but everybody else was different story. I give them 
credit there -- to Serbs. They fooled everybody for fifty years. They 
did and they're doing it now. I give them credit there. They did it 
right -- getting army, get organized, get so much money from Croatia 
and everybody else -- pile up over there and build everything up. 
He seemed to believe that only the Serbs had been allowed to be openly nationalistic, 
although there had always been nationalism in Yugoslavia among various groups and 
this could especially be observed in the army, when men would band together with 
other members of their ethnic groups and keep to themselves. Tony said that 
"probably everyone feels some nationalism and you want to be free to express 
yourself and represent a large group of people." 
Peter believes that every other group in Yugoslavia was allowed to be 
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nationalistic, except the Serbs. Indeed, it was very fashionable to be a Croat or a 
Slovene, but a Serb c{'}uld only be a Communist or a Yugoslav, otherwise members of 
theothet' groups in the country screamed hegemony. In fact, according to him, Serb 
nationalists -- and only Serb nationalists -- were jailed in Yugoslavia. When asked 
why Serbs would tolerate such discriminatory practices, Peter responded that it was 
because the West had abandoned the Chetniks during World War IIand the Serbs had 
felt compelled to embrace Communism. He is referring to the fact that the Allies 
swung their support over to Tito and his Partisans near the end of the war, leaving 
the Royalist forces and their supporters without assistance. The Partisans won the 
civil war; it was they who were left to rebuild Yugoslavia after World War IT. 
Jovan also stated that he had experienced nationalistic sentiments while he had 
lived in Yugoslavia. He had always felt uncomfortable about that sort of thing 
because he had considered himself to be Yugoslav. But every group felt oppressed 
from time to time, especially when times were tough. Serbs blamed Muslims and 
Muslims blamed Serbs if an y of them could not get a job. He had know n of some sma 11 
secret societies but had never thought they amounted to much. He explained that 
nationalistic sentiments could be felt in simple ways on the streets and sometimes in 
"unhealthy" situations; for example, if people were sitting around discussing 
nationalism, they could be intelligent and inteilectualabout it, but, once they started 
drinking and the group was even slightly nationalistic, pure emotion took over. 
Paul had visited Yugoslavia in 1989 before nationalism had really burst on the 
scene. In Sarajevo he had been hanging around with Muslims and could not believe 
that they hated fviilosevic. In Vojvodina people had loved Milosevic, but in Sarajevo 
they hated him because he was Serbian. He had immediately thought about the fact 
that he, too, was Serbian. In Sarajevo Paul had experienced nationalistic sentiments 
among the Muslims. 
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When asked whether they had been nationalists in Yugoslavia or were 
nationalists now, Jovan and Marijan said they had not been before and did not 
consider themselves to be now. Jovan said that he had, from time to time, gotten 
"excited" over nationalistic things but that he had not liked it. He did acknowledge 
that it was not really fair to say that everyone had suffered the same during the 
Second World War because that was not true: Serbs and gypsies had suffered the 
most. Previously he had believed that if that was the price a nation had to pay to 
achieve something greater (i.e., Yugoslavia) then it was all right to say that everyone 
had paid the same price. However, now that nobody seemed to be for unity in 
Yugoslavia anymore, he feels a strong desire to say that it was Serbs who died 
during the Second World War and the First World War. But that is not being a 
nationalist, according to him -- that is just being fair. He denies that he is a 
nationalist because he does not feel any ethnic hatred. He does admit that, perhaps 
if he were still over there and he saw a soldier on the street in a different uniform 
(other than the Yugoslav Army uniform), he might feel differently. 
Tony always called himself a Yugoslav because he had married a Serb and so 
had his brother, but now he calls himself a Croat because Yugoslavia no longer exists; 
now he represents his nation. He never considered himself a nationalist in 
Yugoslavia. It appears that here he has very little choice since people have begun 
to call him an Ustasha. "If you're a Croat, you're right away Ustasha," he com-
plained. Tony's comments draw attention to the fact that social construction plays 
an important role in the creation of identity. 
Peter stated that he is a nationalist and that he derives an identity, a sense 
of belonging and a sense of continuity from being such. He said, "I don't want to be 
a pumpkin without roots." He wants to help his people because he feels he must. He 
believes that socialization has a great deal to do with his sense of nationalism and 
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considers that, if someone claims to be a Yugoslav, it is because he gets something 
from being that. He is willing to go very far to see his goals as a nationalist fulfilled; 
however, if he were still in Yugoslavia, he would not fight because he has a family, 
even though he would find other ways to help his people, probably in a more 
humanitarian fashion. 
Jovan thinks that everyone in the former country of Yugoslavia has to fight 
now, whether they are nationalists or not. "If you want to stay alive, you cannot be 
neutral, you must go one way or the other." He would go to the Serb side, but he 
would not dress up like a Chetnik. He would be fighting as an individual because he 
would not feel ethnic hatred, only hatred towards the soldiers who were fighting 
against him. At this point, Jovan said that nationalism is passed dow n from one 
generation to another but it depends on the individual how much he/she will adopt 
of this legacy. It also depends on the moment and the surroundings in which one is 
raised. If one lives in a situation for a long time under certain pressure, then surely 
one will give in to that pressure. 
For Jovan, nationalists are people who have not been able to "find themselves" 
in other ways; nationalism gives them something to be because it is a formula to 
follow. In Yugoslavia, he believes, successful people are not likely to turn to 
nationalism unless their economic success is somehow tied to nationalistic concerns. 
It all boils down to economic matters. Nationalists will die for what they believe in 
but there are other reasons for that besides money. Economic matters drive one to 
think about nationalism and can drive one to war, but people do not just die for 
money_ He cited the example of Yugoslavians going off to fight in the Spanish Civil 
War: people are ready to die for an idea, if it means enough to them. Tough economic 
times make people very nervous, according to Jovan. They start fighting with their 
spouses, families, friends, coworkers and then anyone they encounter in the street. 
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The situation is ripe for blaming other ethnic groups, especially if their political 
leaders happen to be in power. Jovan is, in essence, making reference to our model 
when he dioous5es people who, he thinks, would be most likely to embrace national-
i§ffl, Hii ii18a fitTerS to ideology when he mentions the "formula" these people are able 
to follow. 
Marijan said he was not a nationalist because he had not been raised that way. 
He has not personally suffered any effects of war and perhaps that is why he has no 
nationa.listic feelings. He becomes very upset when he hears people of his generation 
spitting on Tito when they were the beneficiaries of his system. He stated that much 
of the literature on nationalism and Yugoslavia in the West is written by emigres who 
left Yugoslavia either voluntarily or under duress, so theirs is not a "pure" view, 
they are biased because of their personal experiences. He said that, if he were in 
Yugoslavia now, he would defend his own backyard, not for nationalism, but because 
it is his. He believes 80 to 90% of the people fighting over there now are doing the 
same thing: defending their homes and nothing else. He said that nothing could 
induce him to go fight for somebody else, but that he would die to defend his home 
and his family. 
Paul considers himself to be a nationalist, but not a "true" nationalist, the 
distinction between the two being that a "true" nationalist would not be here in 
Canada but over in Yugoslavia fighting. If he were in Yugoslavia, he would probably 
be fighting first for his family, then his town, his region/province and finally for his 
country as a whole in that order. If he could not justify fighting for his entire 
ethnic group, then he would not fight at all. But Paul admitted that all these reasons 
for fighting stem from personal motives; it all started from the self. It is all the same 
thing: nationalism is protecting your own home on a larger scale. "By protecting my 
home, if your home gets protected as well, that's a secondary gain," stated Paul. 
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Yet, for Paul, nationalism is anything from moral support to dying for your 
ethnic group. "It all depends on how much you love your- people," he said. He thinks 
that Maslow's hierarchy of needs is a good parallel for nationalism; first you fight 
for your own survival, then you fight for other things. He thinks that nationalism 
and self-esteem are tied but that nationalism has more to do with a sense of belonging 
and the need to survive. Paul said it is easy to get ignorant people to take up arms 
but that more sophisticated people will do so as well if they believe they have the 
right reason. He does not hate others because of an ideology, but he would kill them 
for survival. "We can't all survive, someone's got to perish. If that's true, then it's 
not going to be me," he stated firmly. 
Milan, of course, is a dyed-in-the-wool, romantic nationalist and is the first to 
admit it. He stated that he had not been a nationalist while he had lived in 
Yugoslavia. However, since coming to Canada and seeing how freely people expressed 
nationalistic sentiments, he has become one. Milan declared: 
I would fight. I would die. I'm different because I was raised there, I 
know from my grandfather, my relatives -- I know what happened in the 
World Wars and I see what's going on. When you live there ... it's just 
inside of me. I bet people like I am in Yugoslavia are 80% .... It has to do 
with me. I feel these are my people, my nationality, my pride. I 
WOUldn't let anybody step on them. The reason is simple: Serb people 
have been dying for years, so why not me? Who am I? If my grandfa-
ther died for these people, why shouldn't I? I don't want my 
grandchildren to belong to somebody else, they belong to me, they be-
long to the Serbian people. I already asked to go and fight, but they 
said no. If they called me right now, tomorrow I would go, no question, 
and I would go on the first line -- because my heart is there. And I 
wouldn't step back one inch. If I go over there and fight, if they catch 
me, they would never catch me a1ive. I would never go into their hands. 
I would be the toughest I could until I died. I'll go all the way and do 
whatever has to be done for my people. 
Tony made a rather astute observation about the character of the Southern 
Slavs of the Balkans, one that may offer insight intothe current conflict: "You know 
our people -- could be friends today, drinking together -- tomorrow we gonna kill 
each other -- like that! [snaps fingers] I don't know why." What is most interesting 
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is that, after all the disparaging refer'ences to Serbs, he still referred to the South 
Slavs collectively as "our people"; the second part of his statement illustrates vividly 
the kind of love/hate relationship these people have maintained for generations. 
It is worthwhile to summarize the major contributions of this section at this 
point. One issue that has come through time and again is that nationalism is 
intimately connected with social self-identity, or how we view ourselves, including 
the level and diffuseness of our self-esteem. From Dr. Tomashevich's belief that 
group identity is still as viable as it ever was, regardless of whether some Western 
nations vindicate it in some instances or not, to Tony's persistent, irresistible 
reference to "our people", bringing Serbs and Croats together again, we see how 
important identity is in any discussion of nationalism. 
Emotions are also intrinsic to nationalism, as was demonstrated by the fact that 
nearly all of the interviewees believed nationalism to be a kind of feeling. Paul 
likened the emotions involved to be similar to those experienced within the context 
of the family. In essence, we feel close to those who belong to our gt'OUp because we 
are alike and because we are all members of the same group; by the same token, 
people not belonging to our group or "family" arouse defensive sentiments in us if 
they appear to threaten the group. Jovan posited that the feeling of nationalism 
comes from culture and way of life, an insight reinforced by Milan's belief that the 
intensity of nationalism depends on how strongly an individual feels about his/her 
own group and hm.t much he/she wishes to protect that group. Despite the fact that 
Tony said nationalism is not a feeling, his conceptualization of it being a way for a 
group of people to "say \4ho they are" suggests that emotional attachment to a 
particular culture or collective identity is present; otherwise, there seems to be little 
r'eason for' the desire to demonstrate such identity. According to Peter, without the 
sentimental attachment to nationalism, it becomes nothing more than an ideology, 
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which can then become a dangerous thing. Yet, Peter also believed the feeling of 
nationalism to be something socialized into people (i.e., it is socially constructed) 
rather than being inherent in human nature. Another insight offered by Peter is the 
notion that nationalists undergo a change in identity; that is, nationalism can bestow 
a hitherto lacking social self-identity or "awaken" one that has been latent. 
Most of our interviewees thought that nationalisms had always been present 
in some form in former Yugoslavia. Peter suggested that only Serb nationalism had 
ever been de facto outlawed while the others had been "fashionable" and Tony 
augmented this observation by his own: that it had been apparent in the army 
especially because men had tended to hang around with others from their own ethnic 
group. Jovan believed that nationalism had only appealed to those whose identity 
had been lacking in diversity; in other words, nationalism gave certain people 
something to raise their self-esteem which was suffering generally in the rest of 
their lives. 
Some of the interviewees called themselves nationalists while the others did 
not. Those that eschewed nationalism seemed to be those w hose identities derived 
from a sense of being "Yugoslav". This Yugoslav identity may stem from the fact that 
some of them were from Sarajevo, which was a cosmopolitan, mixed city before the war 
where Croats, Muslims and Serbs cohabited in relative harmony and intermingled, 
along with the fact that being from Sarajevo itself bestowed a specific identity on 
many of its inhabitants, who called themselves "Sarajlije". Another possibility is that 
some of these men are married to women of other ethnic groups, making it rather 
more difficult to lay claim to being a nationalist. The ones who called themselves 
nationalists tended to indicate that such an identity gave them a sense of belonging, 
being part of a historical entity. 
In short, we have all the aspects of social self-identity apparent in the 
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responses of the interviewees. They demonstrated that emotion, level of self-esteem 
and desire to protect a possibly threatened identity were at the root of nationalism. 
Their responses were couched in terms of a need to ensure the integrity of their 
identities: those who consider themselves nationalists indicated their commitment to 
their specific ethnic identity and the desire to protect it; those who do not consider 
themselves nationalists were also protecting their identity which is not connected to 
their particular ethnic group but to other sources. One of the tools which we use to 
frame our interpretations and which also provides the content for our interpretations 
of ourselves and our specific context is ideology. 
Ideology 
Two phenomena are intimately connected with ideology: power and praxis. 
Ideologies are created to deal with power, its acquisition an d maintenance. Ideologies 
are also inherently action-oriented since they are a combination of diagnosis (formu-
lating "the problem") and prescription (delineating the action required to remedy 
"the problem"). All ideologies are interest-bound because they arise from actual 
circumstances. There are multiple ideologies in society, but some have the power to 
become hegemonic and become a type of overarching, all-pervasive value-system; yet, 
even a hegemonic ideology must always compete against alternatives that attempt to 
replace its power. Ideologies can become utopian when they seek to destroy the 
existing order in an effort to achieve their goals. Their greatest power at the 
individual level derives from their ability to "speak" to us, or to give voice to our 
idiosyncratic needs, desires, goals, or even shortcomings. In other words, we are 
more likely to wholeheartedly embrace an ideology when it serves to articulate the 
184 
otherwise vague thoughts and feelings we experience. 
Another manner in which ideologies gain power is through their moral aspect. 
When we conclude that what we believe in has a higher moral purpose than mere self-
interest, we can be driven to greater extremes in our attempts to realize our 
ideologies. Nationalism may be a quintessential illustration of ideology because it 
derives from the material circumstances of a group of people; it vies for power with 
other ideologies as it presents its platform of diagnosis and prescription, assisting 
the group in its interpretation of its circumstances; it is often utopian when it 
aspires to nation-building or, at least, nation-destroying; and it purports to present 
its agenda based on some moral code, emphasizing the benefits of its programme for 
future generations. Often the greatest power of ideology ;s its subtlety; that is, 
ideology is frequently promulgated in various guises such that people may only 
subliminally experience its effects. 
Despite the fact that most of the interviewees did not deal directly with the 
matter of nationalism as an ideology, Peter eloquently observed that nationalism is 
a feeling, a kind of pride. If it were only an ideology, then it could easily become 
fascism. In this statement he demonstrates the emotional connection involved in 
nationalism: if it is devoid of emotional content and is restricted to the intellectual, 
purely cerebral sphere, nationalism can become a form of extremism that is highly 
dangerous to those whom it excludes. In short, it becomes "heartless". 
None of the interviewees thought nationalism was a particularly good thing in 
and of itself. If nationalism were justa cultural phenomenon to keep ethnic cultures 
from dying out then, according to Jovan, nationalism might be a positive thing. But 
for Yugoslavia, nationalism is deadly. Marijan voiced almost the same opinion. Milan 
stated that he thought nationalism was responsible for all the wars. It is inevitable, 
according to him. Nationalism will always come back. It takes only one country in the 
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world to espouse nationalism for the whole world to explode into nationalisms. 
Nationalism is the most sensitive thing in human beings, Milan said. "I could tell you 
something hurtfulthat was personal that would make you mad, but if I say something 
about you using Serbian, you'd kill me. Because [when that happens], you've 
brought my nationality into it. You've insulted my entire nation, not just me. You 
hate my whole nation, not just me," heexplained. Nationalism is about drawing a line 
between people and saying "you're not like us". Paul believes that nationalism is 
good for survival, but on another level it is bad because of the suffering and 
persecution associated with it. It is not really a question of good or bad, but "we 
need to breathe," he stated. Nationalism provides a common denominator to give 
peop le a reason to band together for survival; if they do not do that, they will perish. 
We can see from the above discussion that, in spite of the fact that few of the 
interviewees directly addressed the matter of ideology as it pertains to nationalism, 
there have been numerous indirect references to it, both in this section and in the 
one preceding. Jovan raised the matter of the subtlety of ideology, stating that it 
is transmitted to people through symbols and by striking deeply-felt chords. It 
would appear that the matter of the subtlety of ideology ;s highly significant from the 
point of view that few people realize when they are speaking from an ideological 
position; therefore, ideology is not just a coterie of ideas, it is most importantly a way 
of viewing the world. With regard to the point that even a hegemonic ideology must 
struggle against its potential rivals, Tony suggested that nationalist ideologies had 
always been competing with Communist ideology in Yugoslavia and that the former 
had prevailed over the latter, presumably because they arose from people's material 
conditions and "spoke" to them at a deeper level than Communist ideology. Milan 
provided the insight that nationalist ideology helps to draw the line between groups 
of people, creating the "us/them" mentality and Paul added that nationalist ideology 
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bestows a reason for peopleto band together in groups to ensure their own survival 
as a collectivity. These statements would appear to support the view that ideology 
acts as a diagnostic tool as well as a prescription for the curing of perceived ills. 
Moreover, ideology also assists in integrating the structural factors that influence 
the evolution of nationalism by setting the stage for it and placing it within a context. 
Structural Factors 
structural factors play an important role in any individual's life. Often we are 
not even conscious of all the influences in our lives or even how much "the big 
picture" affects our day-to-day existence. The interviewees all seemed to be very 
much aware of how "context" or structural factors shaped the rise of nationalisms in 
former Yugoslavia, as we will see below. The greatest significance of these factors 
is their "oppositional"" character; that is, the way in which these factors work to 
create opposition for certain groups that, by their very response, may create 
opPOSition for others. Once the spiral of opposition starts, it can escalate to vast 
proportions, leading to untold destruction. We shall see from the following responses 
that opposition can be real or perceived and that perception is the most significant 
variable in the equation. The structural factors have been grouped into those 
external to Yugoslavia and those that were internal. 
Internal Structural Factors: 
When asked about how the political system of Yugoslavia might have 
contributed to the rise of nationalism, Marijan and Jovan, both recent immigrants, 
said that they thought the political system had been comp letely oriented to containing 
nationalism among the ethnic groups of Yugoslavia. According to Marijan, "brother-
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hood and unity" (bratstvo ; jedinstvo) among all the peoples was the main goal. 
There was no sense that anyone group was being oppressed or that any republic had 
greater power than the others. Overt displays of nationalism, like the Croatian 
uprising of the early 1970s, were immediately and decisively crushed to preserve 
brotherhood and unity. Marijan believes that his generation (those born in the 
1960s) is not predisposed to nationalism because they were raised under that system, 
but those responsible for the Croatian uprising were of an older generation with 
different ideas stemming from the system under which they had been raised. He 
stated at this point that feelings about nationalism probably stem from family 
upbringing because the children of those involved in the Croatian uprising might 
very well have nationalistic feelings instilled in them by their parents and they might 
hate the political system. After Tito'sdeath, when the presidium became based on the 
ethnic key and presidents came from the various republics, the system of brother-
hood and unity began to disintegrate; nationalism started to grow as political leaders 
started vying for power and special considerations for their own republics/ethnic 
groups. 
While t.1arijan and Jovan believed that Tito's political system was geared to 
preventing nationalism, the others appeared to believe that it was largely responsible 
for helping nationalisms to develop. Paul cited the Communist regime itself as being 
a structural factor that contributed to the disintegration of Yugoslavia before the 
rise of nationalisms. Marijan proposed that family history also played an important 
role since those whose families had suffered at the hands of other ethnic groups 
would likely still bear animosity towards those groups. 
Jovan thinks the Yugoslavian political system was unique and full of beneficial 
elements for everyone, but that the economic situation in the country brought about 
the wave of nationalisms. While there was a shared sense of patriotism for 
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Yugoslavia, everything was fine; the moment people became freer, when they started 
to create capitalistic enterprises, they began to break away and look to their own 
interests. Once the economic situation deteriorated, outside interests could move into 
Yugoslavia and start destroying the system and awakening nationalisms. It is not 
that economics awakened nationalism per se, but that a space was created so that 
people could use nationalism for their own ends. Jovan also believes that the whole 
political system was oriented to keeping overt nationalism at bay, that people were 
free to express themselves culturally and even religiously, if they wished, but that 
all ethnic groups were treated equally. There may have been inequalities among 
people of various ethnic groups, but the system was not responsible for that. The 
implication here is that inequalities were due to individuals with particular interests 
and presumably some sort of power or access thereto. 
Jovan stated that many people believed that Tito gave power and freedom to 
the republics and that this led to nationalisms among the various groups, but that in 
his view this is incorrect. First, the republics were not pure nations, they were all 
ethnically mixed, and the great mobility allowed in Yugoslavia contributed to people 
mixing even more in the various republics and even intermarrying. He defended 
Tito's devolution of power away from the central government on the basis that 
culturally and geographically the republics were so different that it could not be 
expected that one set of rules/laws would obtain universally. Greater flexibility was 
needed to ensure the integrity of every republic. Nevertheless, republican 
rules/laws still had to adhere to the framework set out by the federal rules/laws. 
This was functional, not disintegrative. 
Milan, on the other hand, who was born in 1940, found the Yugoslavian political 
system to be repressive. He said he had lived fairly well materially, but that there 
was no freedom, people could not speak their minds or criticize anything done by 
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political leaders. Anyone who dared do such a thing or declared any bias towards an 
ethnic group disappeared overnight. There was a great deal of fear and suspicion 
of one's neighbours. That situation was good in a way because it kept everyone in 
Yugoslavia "tight"; that is, they had to cleave together as Yugoslavians and toe the 
line, so it benefitted the nation as a whole. 
The 1974 Constitution was an attempt to destroy the Serbs, according to Milan, 
because the Serbs were split up and Kosovo was given too much. (Milosevic, stated 
Milan, is only trying to recoup for the Serbs what Tito took away from them with this 
Constitution.) Tito was trying to destroy the Serbian people because he knew they 
were too strong and powerful. That was why he created a nationality out of the 
Muslims -- to protect himself. He removed all Serbs from high-ranking political 
office, like Alexander Rankovic (head of the police) and Milovan Djilas, or had them 
killed, like the then-president of Serbia. As for Serb hegemony, Milan said it was a 
lie because Serbs have not had any real power since the Second World War except for 
Rankovic, who killed more Serbs than Tito. The big three of the state at the time 
were Tito, Kardelj and Bakaric -- two Croats and a Slovene. Tito only allowed 
"stupid" Serbs to hold any power, people like Stambolic who "didn't know what one 
plus one was." These three were responsible for building up Croatia and Slovenia, 
especially Slovenia, because of Kardelj, ensuring that the most and the best went to 
those republics while very little was left for Serbia and virtually nothing for Bosnia. 
The whole notion of Serb hegemony is just "Croatian politics", said Milan. People are 
afraid of Serbs because they are the largest ethnic group and because "almost 80% 
of Yugoslavia was Serb country" from the thirteenth century empire of Czar Dusan. 
The political system definitely contributed to the rise of nationalisms, said 
Milan. Tito should have kept a tight rein on nationalism for about ten years, then 
slowly started to give people back their freedom. He should have allowed people to 
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do whatever they \.Janted to do in terms of their ethnic groups, as long as they did 
not attempt to infringe on any other ethnic groups. He gave the Croatians greater 
freedom because of the Vatican, but he did not give such freedom to the Serbs. 
Hm.Jever, because such a tight rein was held on ethnic expression for so long, once 
people became freer, they began to hate others of different ethnic groups. "[TitoJ 
should have started in the 1970s to give freedom and I don't think this would be 
happenin g now," t,tjilan stated. 
Paul stated that the Yugoslavian political system was rotten because it was 
Communist; that is, just another form of dictatorship. Even though Tito might have 
had the right idea in bringing everyone together and trying to establish brotherhood 
and unity, the fact that it \'lias Communist made it wrong. Tito was just continuing 
whata Serb king had doneanyway (i.e., establishing Yugoslavia). The federal system 
was bad because it cut up Serbia which was stronger than and superior to the other 
republics. That was Tito's \.Jay of creating a balance so he could better control the 
country. The Communist system indirectly contributed to nationalisms because of the 
power vacuum created by Tito's death. It was madeout to bea fair system but it was 
not because the people in power were able to do things for their own ethnic groups 
and by manipulating the national or public trust. According to Paul, political leaders 
in Yugoslavia were running a "scam" because they held that being against them and 
their actions was the same as being against the whole country. "You're against me, 
you're against the whole country and you should go to jail," said Paul But this only 
worked for a while untiHhecountry was completely broke and unbalanced in the end. 
There was a lot of wealth in certain areas and not in others; people revolt against 
that, there ;s a lot of um'est, and the whole system ends up paying in the long run. 
The masses revert to nationalism: "That's our family. We're all Serbian. Let's do 
something that's right for us and our family in order to survive." 
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Paul believes that Milosevic is manipulating nationalism for his own ends, but 
it is good to have him because Communists are good for making war; they do anything 
they want and do not have to answer to anybody for anything. They are also very 
disciplined. That is what Serbs need. Milosevic was trying to push a war: "Go 
ahead, make my day, give me a reason:' Once Russia collapsed and the Eastern bloc 
was cut loose, the situation became a free-for-all; Milosevic realized the time was ripe 
for doing something and that it was in the interests of the Serbian people to do 
something. He wants to protect the Serbs. 
Marijan thought that another factor which might be responsible for the 
emergence of nationalisms in former Yugoslavia was the suffering some families had 
experienced at the hands of the Chetniks or Ustashi during World War II. He believes 
that the descen dants of these families would probably bear hatred towar ds the entire 
ethnic group to this day. 
Regarding the political element, Peter pointed out that decentralization played 
a significant part in the rise of nationalisms. For instance, the 1974 Constitution 
crowned the events already taking place in Yugoslavia throughout the 1960s, 
granting the republics the authority to change their own laws with the exception of 
Serbia, which was unable to do so because of the de facto republican status given to 
Vojvodinaand Kosovo. Hence, only Serbia could not administer itself. The republican 
borders which were established were purely administrative, with very little 
coincidence with ethnic boundaries. Thus, they were not "natural" in any sense of 
the word. The republics did not represent "nations" becausethe Serbs were divided 
into other republics besides Serbia. The authorities did not allow the Serbs to all be 
together in one republic because then they would have been the largest nation and, 
hence, a threat to the others. Furthermore, having agrarian Serbs in the more urban 
or industrial republics meant that the Serbs could supply food for the other groups 
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which tended to be more urban. 
Because of the fear of Serb hegemony, Milosevic's proposal of a "one man/one 
vote" system was rejected. The Serbs were numerically gl'eater than any other 
individual group in former Yugoslavia, so a democratic system would have given them 
the political edge, st.ated Peter. 
Passing references were also made by Peter to, first, the fact that the Serbs 
constitute a nation which is another reason they will not tolerate minority status in 
an independent Croatia or Bosnia; and, second, that Western intervention in the 
affairs of the former Yugoslavia has played a more significant role in the conflict than 
economic mat.ters. Nevertheless, he feels that the current situation was inevitable, 
regardless of whether Tito had been living or not. 
Marko, a Serb from Serbia proper who was present for one of the interviews, 
made the observation that it is one thing to know where historically people have 
lived, it is quite another to claim that territory as belonging to you. Serbs have 
traditionally inhabited the lands where they live now and, regardless of whether the 
seceding republics of the former Yugoslavia were granted these lands under any 
constitutional arrangement, or whether Croatsor Muslims moved into them, the lands 
are still Serb lands. Marko provides yet another vivid illustration of how profoundly 
attached to the land Serbs appear to be, suggesting that ancestral territory plays 
a very large role in Serb culture and, hence, nationalism. 
An observation made by Tony was that Serbs -- presumably in the guise of the 
Communist authorities -- "always encouraged outs-ide workers"; that is, they 
encouraged Yugoslav cit.izens (presumably disproportionately Croats) to become 
guestworkers in other countries. The goal of such a promotion was to destroy the 
nume!~ical equality between Serbs and Croats so that the Serbs could come to 
dominate in Yugoslavia. This was resented deeply by Cr'oats. 
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The transition from emotion to action requires the proper context, according 
to Peter. "It's one thing to say something when your feet are on dry land and 
another when your feet are in mud," he said. "Those Serbs in Bosnia know from past 
experience what awaits them just because they are Serbs." 
Peter believes that nationalism is a good thing because it makes people fight 
for themselves and their family and keeps their identity going. "Croatian is good --
everyone's is good -- as long as they don't bother others and try to force others to 
do things their way," he stated. However, there is a negative aspect to nationalism: 
"Nationalism;s like a Pandora's box -- when you open it up, you never know what you 
will find." 
In Tony's view, the Serbs came into the Balkan region later than the Croats; 
thus, presumably, they have less claim to the lands than do the Croats. The 
republics are due to the Communist system; that is, the borders are the creation of 
that system. The Second World War confused and disoriented so many people that, 
after the war, when they were moved from one area to another in an attempt by the 
Communists to mix them up, people almost lost their identity -- but not quite, Tony 
hastened to add. The Communists had intentionally tried to equalize the numbers of 
Serbs and Croats in certain areas through their programme of resettling people. 
Communism promised the land of milk and honey to people, so they were willing to 
turn away from the Church. Serbs especially embraced Communism in order t9 reap 
benefits from it; they took over jobs for which they were not qualified and kicked 
others out, according to Tony. The Communists had sent Serbs to Croatia to run 
companies in the name of brotherhood and unity but this strategy never really 
worked except in theory. "Their ideology [of brotherhood and unity] backfired," said 
Tony with conviction. Once the Berlin Wall had come down and the Soviet Union had 
disintegrated, the ideology was there. The ideology he is referring to appears to be 
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that of the nationalist variety. 
Further'more, according to Tony, the Communists had been planning for the 
current conflict in Yugoslavia since World \>Jar IT because "Serbs benefitted most from 
Croatia's riches, \..jhich they then divided amongst everyone, but made sure their 
army get the most." Since the Serbs had used the old system to support "their" 
army, they were unwilling to tolerate a change to a confederation. 
Tony believes that a confrontation was inevitable between the Serbs and Croats 
becoause, although they speak the same language, they are politically very different. 
These differences have caused conflict between them far many years. A lthaugh he 
did not elaborate on what these differences were, it might be assumed from earlier 
references to Sel"'bs that he considers them to be somewhat right-wing in contrast to 
the more liberal Croats. In Tony's opinion, Yugoslavia had been artificially 
constructed by the Europecirl powers in 1918 and, after all this time, people had 
simply had enough. He also mentioned the fact that the economic crisis of the 1980s 
had contributed to the current confrontation. 
Having looked at some of the structural factors present within the former 
country of Yugoslavia to examine their effect on the rise of nationalisms, we will now 
proceed to those that occurred outside the country, External factors are those that 
are located in the international forum. Even though their effects are specific to 
former Yugoslavia, their character does not derive from within the country. These 
factors would include such th'jngs as influences from other countries, international 
politics and economics. 
External Structural Factors: 
Several interviewees mentioned the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse 
of Communism in Eastern Europe as a factor in the development of nationalisms in 
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Yugoslavia. Without a common enemy to fear, the various ethnic groups could look 
inward and turn suspicious eyes on one another. 
In Peter's opinion, some of the structural components involved in the rise of 
nationalisms in Yugoslavia were related to religion and politics. Insofar as religion 
is concerned, he stated that the Catholics and Muslims were able to organize 
themselves better than the Serbs since both of those creeds allowed fOf' the 
discussion of nationalist politics within their organizations while the Orthodox Church 
did not. He suggested that the nationalism promulgated by the Catholic and Muslim 
religions was one of intolerance of Serbs. Peter does not believe that Croatian and 
Slovenian nationalisms are economically motivated but he did comment on the economic 
factor of market socialism, stating that market mechanisms were only applied to 
industrial goods, not agricultural, thus disadvantaging the largely agrarian Serbs. 
As such, the economic factor has distinctively political overtones. Jovan and Paul 
also mentioned economics as being an extremely significant component of the current 
situation, although their references appeared to pertain more to the former 
Yugoslavian economic system within the international context. 
The fall of the Soviet Union and the liberation of Eastern Europe, the 
misdirected interference of Western nations in the emerging conflict (i.e., the 
recognition of the seceding republics as independent states, the involvement of the 
UN, European Community and United States in negotiations, peacekeeping, 
humanitarian aid, etc.), religious and economic factors were all discussed by the 
interviewees as issues that affected the burgeoning nationalisms in former 
Yugoslavia. All of these matters provided opposition in someway to some group; as 
one group took action to remedy its situation. it created opposition for another group 
or groups. The spiral was established and caused the situation to escalate to the 
point where nationalist mobilizations precipitated the collapse of Yugoslavia. 
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Mobilization for action to deal with perceived problems is something which usually 
requires some kind of organization; organization generally calls for leaders; the way 
leaders present the situation and propose to deal with it (in addition to their own 
personal agendas) has great significance for the kind of action which will be taken, 
as we shall see below. 
Organization and Leadership 
The conceptualizations of organization and leadership emerge from the 
literature on social movements. Some form of organization is intrinsic to mobilization. 
Mobilization evolves from dissatisfaction with the status quo and the decision to 
effect a certain kind of change -- whether that be to prevent or precipitate it. Social 
movements are inherently political due to the fact that they aim to challenge the 
power structure and redistribute power to other groups, preferably their own. 
Leadership plays a vital role in mobilization because leaders create a focal point for 
the masses and help to disseminate information. Movements open up spaces in SOCiety 
to allow for new identities and frames of reference. They can change institutional 
guides and frequently reflect the realities in society. They are also a product of 
their historical times and their contexts. Most importantly, social movements 
establish the "Other", i.e., by delineating those of the outgroup and the ingroup, and 
indicating against whom action must be directed. In addition, social movements are 
forms of interaction on the collective level. Ideology and personal commitment are 
both significant elements of social movements. Nationalism is a form of social 
movement for it involves demands and action; thus, organization and leadership are 
part of nationalism. 
Jovan stated that nationalism had to be organized. Marijan also believes it has 
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to be organized and not just feelings because the Yugoslavian political system had 
not allowed for nationalism, therefore somebody had to instill it. In order to instill 
such feelings, nationalists had to be organized because there was no other way of 
transmitting such information in Yugoslavian society; it was not something readily 
available. 
Milan, however, was adamant that nationalism did not need to be organized --
"if you feel it, you go for it," according to him. He said that he personally has such 
strong feelings of nationalism, he would do anything, including die, for those 
feelings. He would die for his fellow Serbians and he believes that "99.9% of Serbs" 
in former Yugoslavia feel the same way. 
Peter also believed that nationalism does not need to be organized -- it is a 
feeling of belonging -- but it does require leadership for mobilization to occur. The 
Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia were terrified but for them to take action required that 
they have a leader. Milosevic only awakened something that was already there. 
Someone has to come along to awaken the feelings that people already have before 
they will take action in any collective manner. Long-term leaders are necessary to 
those nationalists whose nationalism is artificial (i.e., ideological) only. In addition, 
propaganda is required only by those without history, culture or language. It would 
appear that the rationale behind Peter's statement is that any nationalism without an 
emotional foundation and/or material distinctiveness (i.e., those that are not 
"natura''') demands that leaders be present at all times to guide it and ideologues to 
create and promote it. 
Nationalist or ganizations are interest groups based on national criteria, Peter 
stated. Nationalists do not have to belong to nationalist organizations to be true 
nationalists. He is the only one of the interviewees who is actually a member of such 
an organization and advised that the reason he joined was because the organization 
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had an agenda which suited his personal views. By being a member of a nationalist 
organization, Peter feels that he is "doing something for his nation". He does not 
believe that his organization is a political one because its members are not fighting 
to establish a state, their goal is greater than that. His organization is a humanita-
rian one. 
According to Peter, leaders and members have the same agenda. In his 
organization. leaders are only so on paper. The only benefit they derive is that they 
enjoy seeing their names somewhere. A hierarchy exists within his organization 
simply because it has a programme of action; "every organization must have a 
hierarchy to get things done because every stratum must have its own role". His 
particular organization also allows everyone to contribute although he admitted that 
those with more money and experience with Croats and Muslims command more 
attention because they possess greater resources which the organization can utilize. 
All the interviewees thought that leaders were very important for nationalist 
groups. Milan believes that a good leader is essential for the Serbs right now to rally 
them as a nation because they are fighting for their lives. He despises dissension 
among the Serbs because that just weakens the nation; the Serbs can argue amongst 
themselves after the war is won. He loves Milosevic and, the more the world hates 
him, the more Milan loves him -- because he cares about the Serbs and no one else. 
Milan believes Milosevic is the most astute politician in former Yugoslavia at the 
moment because Milosevic waited for the right moment and took advantage of it. 
Izetbegovic is "history"; the war is over for him and he destroyed his own people 
because he could have remained a part of Yugoslavia, kept his presidency and 
nobody would have touched his people. But he let the Croatians, who were supported 
by the Germans, Austrians and Hungarians (a reference to externalfactors), push him 
into a very foolish secession. Izetbegovic still thinks somebody from the outside is 
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going to step in and help him by attacking the Serbs but he is wrong, according to 
Milan. The Serbs are too strong because they have a powerful and astute leader. 
Paul thinks that leaders provide a focal point for nationalism. The goals of 
leaders may differ from those of the rank-and-file members but that is what 
separates good leaders from bad leaders: bad leaders have their own agendas while 
good leaders are moral leaders of their people, not just self-interested individuals. 
Good leaders put the interests of their people before their own. He thinks Milosevic 
is smart, although he reserves judgment at this moment as to whether Milosevic is a 
moral leader or not; he may simply be self-interested. Only time will tell. Paul stated 
that Milosevic set up the Croatians to pull out of Yugoslavia and that the Croatians 
just played into the hands of the Serbs. If they had not seceded, the Communist 
system would have deteriorated to such an extent that everything would have 
collapsed; the military would have collapsed and been divided equally among the 
republics. The Croatians were stupid for seceding because Milosevic pulled the 
Yugoslav Army out of the republic back to Belgrade and then waged war on the 
Croatians with all the military equipment at his disposal. Paul said, "Serbians should 
build a temple to Tudjman. Look what he did. What he did was the stupidest thing 
in the world -- not for us, but for Croatians. To secede. He gave us an excuse to pull 
all the military that's been building for forty years and attack them. The guy ought 
to be shot -- if I was a Croatian. He didn't use his head." According to Paul, the 
Muslims were even stupider: they saw what happened to the Croatians and they 
seceded anyway. The Muslim leaders took a gamble at a million to one odds; they 
ruined Sarajevo. For the next hundred years, Sarajevo will be nothing but "a bunch 
of rubble". The Bosnian secession was good for the Serbs because now the Serbs will 
take what they want and make a new Serbia. 
According to Jovan, leaders are always necessary_ They do not have to be 
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intelligent or competent, they simply have to "sing the right song". Leaders exploit 
the tendency in human beings to want to blame anyone other than themselves for 
their own situation. "Even if we know we are to blame, if a leader comes along to 
blame someone else, people immediately follow that," Jovan stated. A leader must come 
from the group itself, but he must be an extremist. He must have a strong feeling of 
nationalism, otherwise he would not know how to present it to the masses. It is not 
easy for an outsider to come along and use the masses because he would not 
understand them. All1eaders want position. Most people just want a better life and 
if nationalism presents a better life to them, they will go for it. Cultural traits are 
used to raise the morale of a group and strengthen their nationalistic feelings in 
order to better reach their goals. The context is there, but so is the feeling; they are 
tied together and cannot exist without one another. 
Marijan believes that leaders are necessary for nationalism because it cannot 
develop spontaneously. At the moment when a leader emerges, he can easily influence 
others if they have lost everything and have nothing further to lose. A good speech 
can sway these people, especially Balkans, thanks to their nature. There is no 
nationalistic feeling in people's hearts, there must be some influence from another to 
turn people around or someone has to really pound nationalism into another's head. 
Everybody knows who they are, but nationalism comes from the outside: "You're 
something less because you're whatever and that's no good. Things will be better for 
you if you follow me and you will have what you want." Promises are made to people 
by leaders. "Our people are easily led because socialism made them lazy and they 
lived too well. Someone comes along and promises better [and you follow him], 
especially if you don't have to work for it," Marijan explained. Leaders always have 
different goals than rank-and-file members because if their party succeeds, then 
they get position and power. They becomes the bosses. They are definitely 
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motivated by self-interest. 
Tony stated with conviction that "only crazy people like Milosevic become 
nationalists". He believes that ordinary people are not interested in nationalism 
because they just want to live and be left alone. Only the "big guys", or leaders, 
want nationalism because they have their own agenda: they want to achieve their 
own goals and they want power. He noted that all the current nationalist leaders in 
former Yugoslavia were trained by the Communist system so they all adhered to the 
same ideology. 
Context and national feelings are both necessary, according to Marijan. The 
side that won in Croatia on ly won because Tudjman had "the best lines" to gain votes 
from the people. He was the best talker, but he cannot really do anything for them. 
Milosevic would not have won in Serbia if there had been better opposition or 
someone with a better line. It was not nationalism that brought these leaders to 
power because every leader was preaching nationalism; it was social and economic 
factors. Tudjman put these things together best. If Tito were still alive, there would 
be no possibility of this current situation coming about because Tito was the only 
legitimate leader. 
Only Peter among the interviewees was actually a member of a nationalist 
organization; hence, his observations offered some particularly interesting insights 
into the role of organization. For example, there is an apparent paradox in the fact 
that he does not believe that nationalism requires organization, yet he himself joined 
an organization because its agenda suited his own since he wanted to help his people. 
We must assume that a mediating factor in this instance is that Peter is outside 
Yugoslavia; hence, he must join an organization (and, indeed, organizations per se 
must be formed) in order to lend assistance to the cause of ethnic nationalism. 
Presumably, if he were actually in Yugoslavia, he would not need to become a member 
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of an organization because he would not need such an entity to mediate his actiolis; 
he could take direct action. However, the question reme:insas to how effective could 
the actions of one individual be when nationalism is the cause. Adamantly Peter 
insisted that leaders and rank-and-file members have the same agenda, regardless 
of the fact that they do not occupy the same position within the hierarchy; 
stratification within his organization is only to accomplish tasks, he told us. 
Milan seemed to echo Peter's sentiments when he stated that all that was 
necessary for nationalist mobilization was the feeling, that organization and 
leadership were superfluous. Jovan and Marijan believed that only organization 
could have facilitated the growth of nationalisms in former Yugoslavia because the 
whole system had been established to deny nationalism. Leaders were considered to 
be absolutely necessary for nationalism for various reasons, including rallying the 
people, providing a focal point and assisting their followers in the achievement of 
goals for the good of the whole group. Paul stated that the last point distinguished 
between good and bad leaders since bad leaders are self-interested and only using 
the group to achieve their personal goals. Jovan and Marijan suggested that leaders 
are important because they articulate "the prob lem" for the masses, who then become 
ardent followers based on their own self-interest. Tony thinks that only leaders 
truly desire nationalism because they can aggrandize themselves while ordinary 
people simply want to live and be left alone. Such a conceptualization does not 
explain, however, why an ordinary person would follow a leader and embrace 
nationalism. 
Therefore, weare able to see that leadership is very important for mobilization 
and the achievement of nationalist goals for two reasons: an individual is not capable 
of effecting such far-reaching changes on his/her own and, in order to succeed in 
having demands met, some sort of organization, however loose, is required to 
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delineate those demands and present them in coherent fashion to the proper 
authority, People running amok, no matter how great their numbers, are rarely able 
to achieve specific goals. Institutional change is especially difficult without some 
form of organization because such change is not simply spontaneous and cannot be 
accomplished in "one-off'" fashion. In short, social movements, even in their loosest 
incarnation, are mandatory when massive change is desired -- or when there is an 
attempt to stop it. 
The frequent references to self-interest should be particularly noted. We get 
the general feeling that nationalism for the purpose of self-interest, whether it be 
that of leaders or followers, is not condoned by these interviewees. It smacks of 
exploitation when nationalism, presumably, is about freedom. yet, when discussing 
the definition of nationalism, the interviewees indicated repeatedly that they believed 
nationalism had everything to do with the self and identity. It is fascinating to 
observe this paradox in their conceptualizations. What it would appear to suggest 
is that nationalism is a social end (in spite of the fact that individuals benefit from 
it) while self-interest is purely selfish (only for the benefit of the individual). The 
former is acceptable; the latter is reviled. 
From all of the above, it is apparent that the major elements of our model of 
nationalism are present and intimately intertwined. Although the findings were 
broken down into thematic sections, these were somewhat artificial since there was 
a great deal of overlap in what the interviewees actually said. Psychosocial factors, 
or self-identity, were laced with numerous references to structural and ideological 
elements. The same is true for the discussion of structural factors: references to 
ideology, identity and organization were frequently intrinsic elements. As such, the 
interviews eloquently illustrate how deficient anyone single approach to the study 
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of nationalism is; they must be combined, as in the case of our model, to provide an 
adequate conceptualization of the emergence of nationalism. To that end; the 
following chapter will undertake a discussion of the model in light of the history of 
former Yugoslavia and the findings from the interviews and attempt to draw 
conclusions. 
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The case of the former Yugoslavia offers an excellent illustration for our model 
of nationalism for several reasons. The first is that there was a variety of ethnic 
nationalisms in the country, all of which influenced the evolution of others, and were 
reflexively affected by them in turn. The second is that there were numerous 
structural factors in evidence, both external and internal to the country, that 
provided opportunities for some groups and opposition to others. The third reason 
that former Yugoslavia served as such fertile ground for study is that the conflict 
generated some very strong opinions among those with ties to the area, affording a 
wealth of information and spirited opinions to emerge in the interviews that were 
conducted. Since we could not actually go into the fray, it seemed almost as 
beneficial to speak to former Yugoslav citizens in this country to gain a deeper 
understanding of how the rise of nationalisms might affect individuals. The 
magnitude of the conflict provided the fourth reason; such an explosion of virulent 
nationalisms in a country that enjoyed relative harmony for more than forty years 
deserves closer study. The fifth, and final, reason stems from the first two cited 
above: the multiplicity of nationalisms and structural/oppositional factors produced 
a fascinating reflexive effect that allowed us to look at the same phenomenon from 
various angles. In short, former Yugoslavia as a case study for a new model of 
nationalism granted us a richness of information akin to a research goldmine. 
Our model of nationalism attempts to integrate the major structural approaches 
to the study of nationalism, which address themselves primarily to macro-level 
factors involved in the phenomenon and the treatment of the human beings who take 
part in it as aggregates, and the less-popular psychological perspective, which 
concentrates on how the participants (still paradoxically viewed as aggregates) 
personally experience nationalism. Our desire was to provide a linkage between the 
two approaches; the conceptualization of social self-identity was employed as the 
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linchpin of our linkage because it was the best way to explain why some members of 
a particular group might embrace nationalism while others would not. 
The Social Movement Approach 
Certainly the macro perspectives have given students of nationalism important 
insights into the matter, a fact we have not omitted from our new model. The 
literature on social movements aids our understanding of how groups mobilize for 
action and how they organize themselves to do so. We learned that a social movement 
is characterized by collective, deliberate action designed to bring about change, that 
such action must have some degree of organization and that there must be a 
commitment to the aims and beliefs of the movement on the part of its participants. 
The word "change" is somewhat misleading in this context, for movements may also 
form to prevent change from proceeding. Social movements are rarely unidimen-
sional; that is, they encompass a variety of goals and often these goals have a moral 
ethos. The moral dimension affords a great deal of strength to the movement in 
general and can lead it down the path towards becoming an antisystemic movement. 
The moral content of movements is profoundly significant since any action arising 
from it will affect a great many people. Participants in the movement playa number 
of roles, including those of leadership and the formulation of ideology. 
Social movements are intimately involved in culture for two reasons: 
frequently they reflect changes already occurring within society and, in addition, 
they serve to encourage cultural shifts. In their latter guise, movements helps to 
create new spaces in society and bring hitherto undiscussed issues into the public 
forum. Because of their "mass" character and its accompanying anonymity for 
participants, social movements can achieve the heights of altruism or sink to the 
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depths of atrocity. They, therefore, require a certain amount of abandonment of 
individual social identity to effect the group consciousness. In other words, our 
sense of "we" comes to take precedence over "I". Yet, we contend that individual 
social identity is never wholly transcended in favour of that of the group. 
Individuals do not become mindless, faceless "human matter" over an extended period 
of time, even if there are brief instances when "mob mentality" may take over. The 
fact that human beings employ their own frames of reference while participating in 
movements, using their cognitive skills and individual consciousness to interpret 
events and situations, assists in ensuring the retention of individual social identity 
even while individuals take on collective social identity and play their part in 
generating group consciousness. Hence, we see a dialectical process occurring within 
movements. 
Social movements provide new social identities, both for their participants and 
society at large, as they create and disseminate knowledge that was not previously 
present. They themselves are a product of their historical and symbolic context and 
they, in turn, make contributions to history and culture. One of the most important 
aspects of this function is the formation of the "Other", or the opponent, be it the 
government, state, or other groups. It must be remembered that the "Other" is not 
simply an abstraction; it is a real social actor. The formulation of the "Other" 
requires that some aspects of reality be filtered out while some are emphasized. 
Thereafter, social movements are involved in an ongoing interactive process with the 
"Other" and with other political and social factors. 
The presence of social cleavages contributes to the emergence of social 
movements due to their very nature: people become divided; communication among 
groups is often virtually non-existent; and there is very little cooperation among 
them. Such cleavages render fertile soil for movements to spring up because of 
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various group norms, values and worldviews; social institutions often seem 
inconsistent with some of these, further exacerbating cleavages. When existing 
institutions come to be identified with one group, the others will become more 
estranged and direct their discontent or animosity against those institutions. Hence, 
organized opposition will entail homogeneous segments of people whose shared 
values, norms and world views will provide the necessary factors to ensure their own 
solidarity as well as their coherent attitudes towards the institutions in question. 
Discontent will beamplified if opposing segments have experienced a relative decline 
in their members' achievements or if members' expectations are rising more than their 
actual achievements, which may, in reality, be rising as well. 
Pursuant to the above, it becomes evident how important organization is for 
group mobilization. Organization can be based on the "community", wherein members 
are bound by personal ties, or "association", involving members bound by specific 
social roles such as occupation or religious affiliation. Intercommunication among 
members is paramount for effective organization, as is leadership. Organizations 
frequently rely on subgroups at the local level; such reliance carries its own 
inherent difficulties since there is potential for disagreements among local subgroups 
and between the subgroup and the central organization. This potential can result in 
factionalism which may ultimately determine the fate of the social movement; that is, 
whether it becomes institutionalized and/or routinized or dissipates. Such insights 
provide the basis for an understanding of social movements as collections of 
individuals and groups in an ongoing dialectical process of interaction and 
interpretation rather than as a seamlessly unified, monolithic entity always working 
in concert. Although the discussion of the organization of social movements seems 
to take leadership for granted, we must concede that the presence and character of 
leaders are crucial elements in any sort of mobilization. 
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To characterize nationalism as a social movement is a fair assessment based on 
our understanding of the former as a set of demands related to political change as 
opposed to simply a sentiment directed towards one's country, homeland or ethnic 
group. Nationalism only gains power and force when it is taken to the grand scale, 
entailing many followers. Hence, organization and leadership are crucial require-
ments for any sort of meaningful, far-reaching achievements. By its very nature, 
nationalism can be categorized as a social movement since it involves a homogeneous 
segment of society with shared values, norms and a particular worldview and often 
a coherent network of communications and community leadership. The communal basis 
for organization is present in nationalism and the moral component would find fertile 
ground among the members of an ethnic group and their culture. Since nationalism 
involves a set of demands for institutional, political change (or to defend the status 
quo), it also entails deliberate action oriented to attaining these goals. In addition, 
commitment of individuals is secured by nationalism because it is intimately connected 
with social self-identity; it gives a new sense of identity through its ideological 
component and requires some sacrifice of individual identity in favour of the 
collective one. Previously ignored or unresolved issues are brought into the public 
forum by nationalist movements which can become institutionalized and/or routinized 
through the creation of political parties or governing bodies. 
Therefore, we may conclude that nationalism does constitute a social movement 
to some degree when it is characterized as a set of political demands. The case of 
former Yugoslavia has demonstrated that such a representation was present among 
the va.rious ethnic groups as their historical grievances took shape in the form of 
political parties in opposition to the reigning League of Communists. These 
alternative political parties/movements began to demand multiparty elections, 
attaining this goal by 1990. However, we must apply a caveat tothe social movements 
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literature here by pointing out that the extant social cleavages among ethnic groups 
did not result in unified social movements wherein one organization represented all 
those in a particular sector. For examp le, in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia, 
there were several political parties organized around nationalist goals competing with 
each other. This is also true of Serbia. Although Milosevic emerged in the earliest 
stages as the leader of the Serbs and provided a focal point for Serb nationalism, we 
see from a review of the situation that other leaders appeared at the head of other 
groups with alternative visions of Serb nationalism. 
In order to do a comprehensive analysis, we will step back into Yugoslav 
history before dealing with the present. During the years between the two World 
Wars, there was much political strife between Serbs and Croats as the latter, repre-
sented in parliament by the Croatian Peasant Party, struggled against possible Serb 
domination. The solution sought by the Croat nationalists was the replacement of the 
unitary state by a federal one; when tensions mounted sufficiently, the Croats 
boycotted the Beograd government and established their own parliament in Zagreb. 
The ultranationalist Ustashi also emerged during this period. In Macedonia, IMRO 
split into two factions, one demanding that Macedonia be annexed to Bulgaria, the 
other favouring a Communist Balkan Federation. The Ustashi, in their quest for 
nationalist goals, took extremely harsh measures against the Serbs and others during 
the Second World War, while the Serbs split into the royalist Chetniks and the pro-
Communist Partisans. These two Serb-dominated groups often fought each other over 
their alternative visions. 
Tito's regime sought to quell the kind of nationalist sentiments that had led to 
the violent internecine strife which culminated during the war by instituting the 
policy of "brotherhood and unity" and repressing overt nationalism. Despite these 
measures there were, nonetheless, displays of nationalism throughout the post-war 
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period, as well as latent nationalist sentiment that ultimately dictated thetermsof the 
1974 Constitution. The "Croatian Spring" of the early 1970s was instigated and 
spearheaded mostly by intellectuals while the Albanian uprisings in Kosovo also 
involved leadership by the upwardly-mobile segment of that group. As has already 
been stated, such movements, or at least organized mobilization of ethnic groups, led 
to the constitutional reforms entrenched in 1974, which gave more power and 
autonomy to the republics and, hence, the ethnic groups. 
Serb nationalism was first led by a group of academics from Beograd with their 
published Memorandum, but it really only took off when the protests of Serbs and 
Montenegrins at the Field of Kosovo were legitimated by Slobodan Milosevic. The 
green light was effectively given to Serb nationalists when a "legitimate" government 
official endorsed their concerns and offered his support, not just to the people in 
situ but to all Serbs everywhere. The "voice" given was not so important for its 
articulation of concerns or ideology, but because it emanated from officialdom. Hence, 
Milosevic came to be regarded by many as the leader of Serb nationalists and 
continues to retain such title in the eyes of many -- especially those outside former 
Yugoslavia -- in spite of the fact that a number of other leaders at various levels 
from regional to local have arisen to challenge him and have a considerable number 
of followers who espouse a variety of visions of the "Serb nation", 
Some of the people interviewed openly blamed leaders for actively partitioning 
former Yugoslav citizens into ethnic groups and turning them against one another, 
Even families were torn apart by such ideological divisions, a phenomenon amply 
demonstrated by the "Sarajlija" of mixed descent and married toa Muslim whose Serb 
mother, in the heat of an argument over which group bore the responsibility for the 
civil war, called him an "Ustasha", What others perceived as a "political game" of 
various nationalist parties demanding open elections turned out to be a deadly war 
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game because, once these organized nationalists gained the avenues of legitimate 
power, they put their political agendas into effect. Several interviewees stated 
emphatically that leaders were crucial in whipping up nationalist sentiments among 
groups of people; a few of these believed that such actions were taken simply to 
realize leaders' personal agendas and to attain power for themselves, not because 
these leaders wanted to achieve something for "their people". All of the interviewees 
reflected the belief, in one form or another, that the present civil war would not have 
taken place, especially on such a grand scale, if there had not been leadership and 
organization to mobilize the people and givethem a focal point around which to rally. 
Certainly the secession of republics would not have taken place had nationalism not 
been organized. 
Thus, we have seen how important the elements of organization and leadership 
are for the nationalisms of former Yugoslavia. The aspect of nationalism that falls 
under the category of social movement is one that cannot be ignored in a case where 
a country with a substantial history has degenerated into the kind of chaos where 
republics have seceded and former neighbours are brutalizing one another. Our 
overview has highlighted some interesting and rather contradictory matters for 
consideration, however. The Serbs have demonstrated that their brand of nationalism 
is no more unified than that of any of the other groups. There is not one coherent 
movement of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims or Macedonians. Each ethnic group is 
subdivided into a multip licity of movements with distinct wor ldviews and aspirations, 
although those groups currently engaged in combat may have greater similarities 
among them. Leaders within ethnic groups are as much in conflict with one another 
as with those of other groups. It should also be recalled that not every individual 
ascriptively belonging to any single group is engaged in a nationalist movement of 
any kind. 
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The literature on social movements does not en gage such anomalous phenomena. 
It leads us to believe that those with certain sectoral interests will organize in 
unified fashion, although there may be factionalism within these social movements. 
What the case of former Yugoslavia suggests is that the competing organizations are 
not so much factions as distinctly separate groups. These groups have had 
alternative visions from the beginning and there seems to be little agreement among 
them, let alone solidarity. If "national" groups provide the most conducive breeding 
grounds for nationalist social movements because of their shared culture, values, 
normsand worldviews, then how can we account for all the subdivisions among them, 
evidently arising from highly differentiated ideologies? And how do we reconcile the 
fact that many people in former Yugoslavia have chosen to stay out of organized 
social movements and, as much as possible, out of the combat? Or that some choose 
solidarity with those who are touted as being their enemies? The literature on social 
movements, to some extent, preaches about the converted; that is, it tells us many 
insightful things about those who join social movements. It informs very little when 
it comes to those who remain outside them or why such people might choose to do so. 
The motivations of these people are unknown to us and remain unexplained if we 
attempt to understand nationalism purely from the point of view of organization and 
mobilization . 
The Ideological Approach 
The macro approach which conceptualizes nationalism as an ideology provides 
us with another way of looking at the phenomenon. At the outset, we should 
remember that ideology is an integral part of social movements, so we must bear in 
mind that the "nationalism-as-ideology" perspective still involves some sort of 
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organization and leadership. Howevef~, by approaching nationalism from the point of 
view that 'it 1S an ideology, \ole gain "Insights into the more philosophical, albeit still 
quite pragmatic, dimension of nationalism. This aspect allows us to address ourse'lves 
to some extent to the quest"J.::in of why people would join nationalist movements. 
Despite the difficulties with the definition of the term "ideology" itself, we may 
assume that ideology is a coherent set of ideas pertaining to a particular subject. 
However, it is mewe than that, for power is intimately connected with ideology. In 
short, the ":,:,..et of ideas", when related to a subject that pertains to social interests 
or social order, generates its own power and seeks to gain more. Ideo1ogy emerges 
out of particular interests and addresses itself to those interests; it relates to real 
conditions experienced by individuals in their daily lives. It can take many forms 
from antht'opological to exploitative; it can also be positive in that it provides an 
ameliorative guide. Ideology not only provides the content of people's values, needs 
and desires, it also helps to shape them. As it shapes the \.;ay people think, it also 
shapes their actions, which reciprocally influence the ideology, taking on the 
character of a spir'al effect. It can also distort rea"lity to legitimate the interests of 
a particular gr'oup, although this does not make it simply a tissue of lies. This facet 
of ideology seems to refer to what was called the formation of the "Other" in the 
social movements literature. Ideology gives people something to believe in, an anchor 
in the storm frc.im which to generate meaning; it can also be a kind of "desideratum", 
articulating futw'e goals. 
It is important to keep in mind that, even though there might be an ideology 
which dominates in a particular society, having attained hegemonic status, there are 
always competing ideologies. Just as societies, no matter how homogeneous in terms 
of ethnic composition, arecomposed of many strata and status groups, ideologies are 
similarly diversified. Most people are not involved in the actual production of these 
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ideologies; rather, they participate in perpetuating and disseminating them. 
Ideologies may be conservative or utopian. Conservative ideology generally 
subscribes to the belief that the current social order is worth maintaining, although 
it may allow for some tinkering. Utopian ideology, on the other hand, promotes the 
idea that change can be accomplished only by way of the destruction of the existing 
order. Thus, utopian ideology is a call to action. Ideology may move back and forth 
along this continuum, although it is likely that, once it has become utopian, it will not 
return to a more conservative type. 
Nationalism incorporates many of the foregoing aspects of ideology, a fact 
which makes it readily viewed by many as a prime example of this phenomenon. 
Minority nationalism is often utopian, while that of the State or dominant group (often 
referred to as "patriotism") is frequently conservative. Nationalist ideology springs 
from the material conditions experienced by a group of people and articulates their 
concerns, giving them both a diagnosis of current conditions and a prescription for 
a remedy. Thus, it, in turn, shapes the thinking of this particular group of people, 
who then may take action in accordance with the ideology they have embraced; such 
a.ction may cause a change in their material conditions which will bring about 
concomitant alterations of the ideology. 
Power ;s an important factor in nationalism. Nationalist ideology seeks to 
empower the ethnic group; it attempts to shift power from other groups to its own; 
it is concerned with fundamental questions pertaining to the social order. Reality is 
frequently distorted by nationalist ideology when constructing the national identity, 
including its history, the situation in which the ethnic group finds itself, and the 
characterization of the opposition. As an ideology, nationalism can be a positive 
factor in the lives of the members belonging to the ethnic group. While the dominant 
ideology may be exploitative, nationalist ideology will tend to give the ethnic group 
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a much more favourable impression of itself, building on ethnic culture, creating a 
mythical "golden age" in 'its history, emphasizing the best characteristics of its 
membership. By doing this, it raises the level of self-esteem of its members and, 
thereby, raises group self-esteem. It becomes the centre of people's lives and the 
ultimate answer to every question. Nationalism as an ideology in most cases must 
compete with the dominant, or hegemonic, one which can propel it along the 
continuum from conservative to utopian. Once it becomes utopian, totally committed 
to changing the existing social order as the only possible means for achieving its 
goals, there is little hope that it can be turned back. This assertion would certainly 
seem to be true in the case of former Yugoslavia. 
The country was originally built on the foundations of an ideology which 
emphasized the similarities among the South Slav peoples and insisted that the only 
way in which these peoples could throw off the yoke of foreign oppression, and keep 
it off, was to join together to form their own nation. One area in which the ideology 
failed was that it did not take into consideration the many non-Slavic minorities also 
dwelling on those same lands. From the start, these minorities were a source of 
discord because the authorities wrongly assumed that they would simply be absorbed 
into the Slavic mainstream. The ideology that had stressed the similarities of the 
South Slavs effectively enough to bring them together, was not as efficacious in the 
long term for it did not sufficiently ack now ledge the varied histories of groups which 
gave them very different orientations. The Serbs saw themselves as leaders for the 
others while the latter feared a return to subordinate status by a dominant group. 
The Croats especially perceived that their due under Serb domination would be 
oppression and a loss of autonomy, so they clamoured for their own administrative 
body in a federal state. In the interwar years, nationalist ideologies began to gain 
credence and to replace the ideology of South Slav union. The emergence of the 
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Ust .. ::;,.shi and n·1RO are evidence of this rise of nationalist ideologies competing against 
the dominant one. 
After the Seo;,:md World War, a new ideology came to dominate in Yugoslavia, 
that of Tito and his Partisans. Nationalist excesses had wf'eaked so much havoc 
throughout the country that the new Communist Party was able to impose a strict 
anti-nationalist "brotherhood and unity" doctrine. The Communist ideology also 
suppressed ror a time other' political ideologies with its one-party system, closed 
elections, and feder'al structure. However, the dominance of this ideology was 
somewhat short-lived, for once the country was able to rebuild and modernize, 
bringing some measure of prosperity, nationalisms began to gain ground once more. 
Throughout the 1960sand early 1970s, nationalist ideologies posed such a great 
challenge to the Communists that reforms were undertaken in attempts to appease 
these groups. There were uprisings, notably among the Croats and Albanians, 
wherein groups demanded more rights to exercise their cultural interests and 
administer their ow n destiny. Despite the fact that these movements were decisively 
quashed and the ringleaders harshly dealt with, their demands were effectively met 
through constitutional change. As has already been stated, the 1974 Constib.Jtion 
entrenched numerous concessions to nationalist ideologies, among them the ethnic 
.. key" to be used in fillin g positions of authority, greater rep u b lican autonom y, an d 
the de facto n;;publican status granted to Kosovo and Vojvodina. Concessions were 
made to the Serbs and Montenegrins as well to curb their' potential nationalism from 
attaining power by permitting them to hold high positions in the army and governing 
bodies. HOlrieVer, the net result of such attempts was the opening of social and 
political spaces to allmJ for the blossoming of nationalist ideologies to seek ever-
greater power. This, in concert with the declining role and power of the central 
gove!~nment, caused the dominant ideology to lose ground and create even more room 
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for the expansion of nationalist ;d&::.logies. 
Economic crises during the 19805 and the collapse of the Soviet Union and its 
constellation of Communist satellites contributed to the greater burgeoning of 
nationalisms within former Yugoslavia. It was becoming more and more evident to the 
varied citizens of that country that Communist ideology wa"", universally dyirlg a slow 
death; its legitimacy was at an all-time low. There was little to stop nationalist 
ideologies from replacing the once-dominant Communistone -- which is exactly Itihat 
took place by 1990 throughout most of the country. To some extent, Serbs continued 
to adhere, at least nominally, to Communist ideology since it retained some features 
that could be viewed as a kind of nationalist ideology for these people. Serbs and 
Montenegrins had experienced some benefits under the dominant ideology so they 
were not as susceptible to purely nationalist ideology. However, this was more true 
for those living in Serbia proper and Montenegro. For Serbs in other republics, the 
realities of other nationalisms wakened them to the need for a nationalist ideology of 
their own in order to act as a response and defence. 
Serbs in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia could not afford the luxury enjoyed by 
their counterparts in Serbia and Montenegro because they were minorities in these 
republics, lacking the strength to defend the dominant ideology in the face of 
Albanian, Croatian and Muslim nationalisms. Theirs had to be a nationalist ideology, 
so when Milosevic made his famous speech at the Field of Kosovo and took measures 
to ro·n back the gains Albanian nationalism had made, Serbs found their champion and 
proceeded to create their own nationalism. Other leaders emerged on the scene, 
contributing their own variations on the same theme, vying for the newly-created 
role of leader of Serb nationalism against Milosevic. 
The dominant Communist ideology was thoroughly discredited outside Serbia 
and Montenegro by the early 1990s and passionate rallying to various nationalist 
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ideologies led the former Yugoslavs right into civil war and keeps them battling one 
another in an epic power struggle. In spite of huge losses or human lire, immense 
social and physical dislocation, and untold suffering on all sides, ns.tionalist 
ideologies remain strong, regardless of whether they are articulated in the minds of 
the combatants. 
Hence, while few of our interviewees directly referred to the role of ideology 
in nationalism, there were implicit references in many of their responses. Even 
Zje lko, the man who said he does not fig ht for nationalism, he merely wants to retur n 
to Sarajevo to listen to his CDs and enjoy his Gitane cigarettes, implies nationalist 
ideology for there is reason to question why taking up arms is necessary for his 
return. VIe must ask why he did not choose to evacuate to Serbia until the fighting 
was over, rather than picking up a gun and shooting his former compatriots. The 
men who talked about Serbs being "heavenly" people and the oldest and most 
courageous p€-oples in the Balkans fighting to throw off yet another oppressor were 
articulating the myths of Serb nationalist ideology, even if they did not realize it. 
The Muslim businessman from Sarajevo who accused Serb leaders of promoting 
the notion among the members of their ethnic group that any Serb who did not fight 
in Bosnia was a traitor \~as all-too aware of the effects of ideology on nationalism. 
Peter stated that, if nationalism is based only on ideology, and not on sentiment as 
well, then it can easily become fascist. (The distinction between the kind of thing he 
is talking about and what is currently taking place in former Yugoslavia may be lost 
on some -- including the writer!) Milan described the effects of nationalist ideology 
when he gave the illustration of being insulted personally as opposed to being 
insulted as a member' of an ethnic group. "You've insulted my entire nation, not just 
me. You hate my whole nation, not just me," he stated. Disliking or discriminating 
against someone because of the group they happen to belong to is part and parcel of 
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the construction of the "other", the drawing of lines between people and separating 
them into "us" and "them". 
Tony's comments explained why nationalist ideology reaches peopleata deeper 
level than Communist ideology; it "spoke" to their material conditions with greater 
eloquence. Jovan commented on thesubt1etyof nationalist ideology, how it enters the 
consciousness through, and becomes identified with, symbols and profound emotions. 
Both these interviewees were referring to the power of ideology: its ability to become 
an interpretive toolin our lives and shape the way we view reality, often without our 
being aware of its presence. By shaping our thoughts, ideology also shapes our 
actions. This is the praxis of ideology, its translation toaction. Ideology effectively 
mirrors our daily experiences; the kind of mirror we use will determine how we "see" 
things. If the ideological mirror is a nationalist one, then we will view reality in that 
particular light and govern ourselves accordingly. 
Thus, it becomes clear to us how significant the literature on ideology is for 
understanding nationalism. We have come to comprehend how nationalist ideology can 
become part of our day-to-day lives, often without even being conscious that it has 
entered our world, and how we come to live out our ideological orientations. Diverse 
ideologies compete for our loyalties and their power lies in how well they can frame 
and describe our experiences and conditions. They have the power to change our 
world because they give us the power to do so. Yet, we still have to ask why there 
are people living under the same material conditions and having similar experiences, 
but manage to elude the grasp of nationalist ideology. We wonder why these people 
do not embrace it, why it does not become their way of interpreting reality, why it 
has no power to move them. Since the literature on ideology does not adequately 
engage these questions, we must search for answers in another place. For this 
reason, we must explore the psychological dimensions of nationalism. 
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The Psychological Approach 
Social scientists tell us that the self is a process, not a product. A lthoug h self 
and identity are not one and the same, neither can exist independently of the other. 
Identity is one of the most important aspects of self and it is formed through 
interactions with others. When we interact with another social actor (be that a human 
being, group or more abstract entity), we not only take our own role, we also take on 
the other's role; thus, the interaction occurs on two levels: the actual interaction and 
the one playing in our heads. Throughout the course of said interaction and 
afterwards, we interpret our selves within its context and how the other social actor 
reflected our selves back to us. This reflexive interpretation is part of Mead's 
conceptualization of the formation of the self, for only when we are capable of "taking 
the role of the other" are we then capable of creating the "me" of self. The "me" is 
the socialized self, the component that has been taught the rules, norms, values, 
moresand behaviours appropriate to the society into which we have been born. This 
component mediates between our context and our "r" which is the spontaneous, 
untamed self with which we are born. The"r" is roughly similar to Freud's "id" or 
what Douglas refers to above as the "subjective r" or the "inner self". Language is 
crucial to the conceptualization of self because we cannot interpret our selves or our 
interactions or take the role of the other without a coherent set of symbols to guide 
us. Hence, language is not only the means of communication with others, it is also the 
means of communication with our selves. 
Interactions with others require us to play roles. These roles become 
incorporated into our sense of self once they have been validated by others, as well 
as by our own volition. The collection of roles, in reality a collection of social 
identities, makes up our self-identity. The social context in which we live will 
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determine to a large extent what kind of roles may be available to us. Contrary to 
popular Opifl'ion; the self ;5 not fully farmed and immutable by the time we reach 
adulthood; we are always in the process of acquiring new identities. While the old 
ones c'Sn never be truly discarded, they may become latent or less salient during 
s0111e phases of our lives. 
Emotions are very much a part of our selves. They form the basis for' our 
rationality. In concert with our values, they act as guides whenever we take action 
and, 'in fact, determine to a lar'ge extent whether we will take action. When powerful 
emotions become aroused, they can take over the entire sense of self to the exclusion 
of other factors, according to Douglas. Whether this is merely a short-term, episodic 
occurrence or one of longer duration is not elaborated by Douglas, but is surely 
something that deserves greater future consider'ation. 
Because the self is encased in an anatomical structure of singularity, it may 
appear to be independent of others. This, however, is not the case, for we are all to 
be found in collectivities. In other words, regardless of the fact that our bodies 
cause us to be separate entities, we are nevertheless always members of groups, 
often by virtue of the very bodies which house us. For instance, if we happen to be 
born \.;ith anatomically female bodies, we are part of the social and biological group 
known as women. ~iJore importantly, social groups provide us with references. We 
constantly compare and contrast ourselves with others as we attempt to discover who 
weare and we describe ourselves by referring to groups. These groups are not only 
to be found in the present, but the past as well. Throughout our lives we are always 
engaged 'in the pn)cess or struggling against being subsumed by the collectivity, yet 
identifying with it. 
Another significant aspect of our identity is self-esteem. We derive our self-
esteem from pleasurable experiences; these experiences may be diverse or concen-
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tr'ated in one area. The more pleasurable experiences derived from various sources, 
the higher our level of self-esteem and the more diff"use it is. i"lost of us seek 
pleasurable "strokes", or the reaffirmation that weare good, worthwhile pf:'jple, while 
avoiding as much as possible negative experiences which end up makiiig us feel baal:l 
about ourselveso If our level of self-esteem is generally high, when caught in a 
negative situation, we may try to rationalize or attempt to find something in it which 
can be converted into something positive. This may be less true for those with 
generally low self-esteem, although it is possible that even these individuals, \'IIhen 
they have one source of pleasurable "strokes", may be able to apply the saving 
mechanism in a situation relating to that source. Again, more study must be done in 
the future to determine how "saving" mechanisms might operate. 
A further way that self-esteem may operate is that, whenever an individual 
finds him/herself in a negative situation, such as where failure has occurred, an 
external factor can be blamed 'in lieu of the individual's lack of skill, knowledge or 
otherwise. In other words, we can save our self-esteem to some degree if wecan find 
someone or something else to take the blame for a negative experience. We wiTI then 
avoid such a situation in the future, if at all possible, since a repetition of the 
negative experience may prove that external factors were not actually to blame, but 
that it was due to our per'sonal shortcomings. Those with high self-esteem who 
perceive dissonance in a situation between reality and self-perception will take steps 
to remedy the dissonance. 
Guarding our personal integrity, or the integrity of our self, is one of the most 
important experiences of our lives. Our self is our most meaningful possession and 
we will do virtually anything to protect ito After all, who we are is invested in our 
sense of self and losing our identity is perhaps the greatest trauma we can suffer. 
When a social identity has been incorporated into our self, we become attached to itj 
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therefore, when it is threatened, we will do whatever we believe it takes to defend 
it. This defence becomes complicated because we have a whole coterie of social 
identities, some of which may come into conflict while we are in the process of 
protecting our threatened identity. Hence, we may find ourselves in a situation 
where we personally, albeit epiphenomenally, threaten our own social identities. 
Under such circumstances, our course of action will then be influenced by which 
social identity is most salient. What may help to determine the salience of a given 
identity is how our self-esteem is affected: if self-esteem suffers more profoundly 
by the threat of one identity as opposed to another, we will probably move to defend 
that one and sacrifice the other. 
The link between the individual and the group is established by way of "social 
identification". This device consists of self-cognition and social-cognition; that is, 
an individual identifies a group, identifies him/herself as belonging to that group, 
then interacts with other members in accordance with that identification. Affectivity 
;s not necessary for individual identification with the group; cognition is the key. 
Cognition of self is crucial for the linkage between the individual and the group 
because the primary question involved with group membership is "Who am I?". Once 
identification has been made with a group, the individual will attribute positive 
characteristics to it because such an attribution is significant for self-esteem. If 
positive characteristics cannot be attached to the group, the individual will be 
motivated to exit in some man ner . 
Regrettably, the aforementioned elements of the self and self-identity are 
largely omitted from most of the existing theories of nationalism as a psychological 
phenomenon which tend to concentrate on only one or, at best, a few of them. Such 
theories tend to emphasize either the personal choice and/or the sentimental 
attachment to ethnic identity, one of the many possible social identities available to 
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us. Nationalism in this sense may be conceptualized as a rational choice based on 
value-maximizing behaviour and a cost/benefit analysis appraising self-interest and 
social reality. This process may apply to groups as well as individuals. Thus, 
nationalism may involve the calculation of personal skills in terms of possible future 
demand for them in the anticipated state. Such analyses and appraisals rest on the 
desire to maximize pleasurable experiences and enhance self-esteem. 
Spicer's theory rests on the persistence of identity systems in the face of 
opposition. In his interpretation, nationalism arises from the identification of ethnic 
groups with their culture. This theoretical representation also posits a close 
relationship to historical factors in that culture is cumUlative and members of the 
group have the sense that what they share has been shared by previous generations. 
Such a relationship helps people to continue the historical process and fulfil group 
destiny, Oppositional factors are highly salient in terms of the group and individual 
identity for they assist in the creation of the "us/them" orientation and because 
opposition strengthens group resolve to cleave together for resistance against 
assimilation. We would posit that ideological elements are implicit in Spicer's 
conceptualization since they would naturally be part of the identity system. He also 
delineates three spheres of participation (communication through shared language, 
common moral values and political organization) which readily remind us of the 
components of social movements. 
The theory proposed by Spicer posits that symbols utilized by the group 
generally arise from the land and language, Other theorists of nationalism who 
examine the psychological dimension also incorporate these concepts. In addition, 
shared history and communication play important roles in their theories. Therefore, 
we can see that frequently when we discuss psychological orientations, we are in 
reality speaking of psychosocial ones. If we conclude that the psychological 
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dimension involves attachment to land, history and acommon language, then we must 
conclude that personal affinities spring from social sources. 
Ethnic identity is not just one of many identities, or merely primordial 
sentiment, it is also a resource to be employed in accordance with a particular 
situation the individual may face. Power, perception and purpose comprise elements 
of ethnic identity, according to Royce, because they involve the group in jockeying 
for an improved sociopolitical position against the dominant group, the creation of a 
distinct culture and identity different from those of other groups, and the group's 
desire to enhance their own conditions. All these matters pertain to nationalism for 
such is usually the vehicle for their realization. The choice available to individuals 
of whether to employ their ethnic identity for a particular goal is also the choice 
between espousing nationalism or not. 
Another conceptualization of the psychological aspect of nationalism comes 
from Scott, who weds Spicer's notion of opposition with primordialism, and proposes 
that primordial sentiment is an intervening variable between opposition and ethnic 
solidarity. In other words, opposition does not lead directly to ethnic solidarity (and, 
hence, nationalism); primordial sentiment must intervene to strengthen ethnic 
identity and cause members of an ethnic group to experience more powerful ties 
among them. Causation is circular so that a spiral can easily develop, escalating 
nationalism rapidly and climactically. In summary, external factors lead to a rise in 
personal sentiments, which results in greater ethnic solidarity, and hence national-
ism, as the group undertakes the task of dealing with the opposition. Therefore, in 
Scott's version of nationalism as a psychological phenomenon, we see the importance 
of external factors. 
Psychological nationalism begins with patriotism for Doob. Patriotism is based 
on the personal feelings individuals have for their land, compatriots and culture. It 
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imp lies com mitment and reciprocity. However, such feelings are not in nate; they must 
be learned. Furthermore, external factors (called "stimulus patterns") influence the 
perception of individuals as much as their sentiments. Distinctiveness is the hallmark 
of Doob's psychological portrayal of patriotism. He contends that every living 
organism must distinguish itself from others by perceiving its own distinctiveness. 
Distinctiveness is also bestowed upon significant others, evoking a sense of 
psychological connection and lending them higher status than to others perceived as 
being outsiders. 
Nationalism arises from Doob's presentation of patriotism because he asserts 
that all groups must seek preservation and/or expansion. When a patriotic group 
experiences a threat from another group or groups, it will turn inward as a defensive 
measure; as discontent with its own way of life or perceived alterations thereto 
escalates, nationalism willensue, for the group members will make demands and start 
to take actions to have those demands met. For Doob, the behaviour of nationalist 
groups is that of nationalist individuals writ large. Any tensions within the group 
can be blamed on "the enemy" (those perceived to be posing the threat). 
The foregoing studies have all proposed insightful and meaningful dynamics 
of individual psychology with regard to nationalism. Unfortunately, they still treat 
individuals as aggregates and imply that all who qualify as part of the group, or who 
have an ethnic identity, or have a rationally-prescribed stake in the future of the 
group, will embrace nationalism. None of these theorists has really got to the heart 
of why a human being would direct his/her energies towards the group or why 
he/she would lend any salience to his/her ethnic identity. The factor of human 
motivation is virtually ignored in these theories. Furthermore, there is little attempt 
to establish how individuals actually become members of a group; that is, how does 
the group traverse that gap between something which is highly abstract to that 
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which has real, individual human beings acting in concert with one another. 
Bloom's version of psychological nationalism hinges on his elaboration of the 
notion of identification. This theorist augments, to some extent, the other approaches 
with his endeavour to describe how human beings come to identify with other social 
actors in both the abstract and in material terms. His version of the human psyche 
is distinctly psychosocial. A purely social phenomenon, identification takes place 
through interaction with significant others and continues throughout our lives. 
Identification is based on emotional attachment and rests on both the gratification of 
primary needs for survival as well as acceptance by the social environment. Ideology 
assumes an important role in this identification as that which guards identity; any 
threat to ideology is a threat to identity, collective and individual. The response of 
the group to such a threat will be affected by numerous factors, including both 
external and internal, but may result in mobilization. Nationalism for Bloom is the 
consequence of unsuccessful nation-building and, thus, represents nation-destroy-
ing as an ethnic group seeks to create its own, new nation. His contention is that 
individuals experiencing a threat to their identification with the "nation" will form 
a national identity and begin to act in concert with others in the same situation and 
with the same identification to form the national identity dynamic which is the 
potential for mobilization of the mass. Mobilization, or nationalism, will occur when 
national identity has successfully transcended all others, something which only 
happens when the individual experiences a direct benefit from the espousal of such 
an identity. Structural conditions are also part of Bloom's elaboration of nationalism 
as they may play the important role of "triggering" national identification and/or 
mobilization. 
In summarizing Bloom's contribution to the literature on the psychological 
dimension of nationalism, we may state that, although he has omitted a number of 
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significant aspects of self-identity, in contrast to the other theories he has given an 
insightful presentation of the more social aspects of individual psychology. His 
rendering of identification theory goes one step further than the other theories by 
suggesting how idiosyncratic motivation can occur with regard to nationalism. 
Unfortunately, Bloom, Hkethe others, falls into the trap of conceptualizing individual 
motivation in terms of collective psychology; that is, he still views it in aggregated 
form, as a kind of mass psychology, without adequately establishing the linkages 
between the individual and the collectivity. 
Utilizing the case study of Yugoslavia to highlight the insights offered by the 
literature on the psychological dimension of nationalism, we are struck by the 
divergenceof historical and religious identities among the South Slav peoples which 
inevitably formed very different ethnic group identities in the present. Even among 
the members of one particular ethnic group, the Serbs, we see a varied history; some 
moved into the Krajina region, under Habsburg domination, others lived under 
Ottoman rule until the liberation of Serbia, while still others were to be found in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina. Slovenian history was dominated by German occupation while 
the Croats lost their independence to Hungary at the beginning of the tenth century 
and did not regain real independence until the Second World War. The split between 
Muslim overlords and Christian serfs characterizes the history of Bosnia while that 
of Macedonia demonstrates that these people were buffeted about among various 
dominating groups. Considering these histories of foreign oppression, it is not 
difficult to understand why some ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia would have been 
extremely wary of any sociopolitical arrangement that so much as hinted at inferior 
status. It is also rather clear why the Serbs considered themselves the rightful 
leaders of the country, considering their early success at freeing themselves from 
Ottoman rule and becoming independent. 
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Furthermore, during World War IT, the creation of the fascist Croatian state, 
which enoompas~d Bosnia as well, helped to forge a new identity for the Croats and 
Muslims, as well as one for the Serbs. From that time forward, despite the fact that 
the puppet state had been administered by the ultranationalist Ustashi and that most 
definitely not all Croats are Ustashi, there was a suspicion among many that Croats 
and Muslims, when given power and independence, were likely to become fascist 
killers. In other words, the legacy of that era left the impression that such an 
identity might be lurking within the ethnic identity of Croats and Muslims. 
Concomitantly, another identity added to the repertoire of the Serbs was that of 
victim (although such identity might already have been present because of the 
Ottoman experience). 
The Tito era was characterized by the official attempt to create a Yugoslav 
identity. "Brotherhood and unity" was the catchphrase at that time. The Serbs, to 
a great extent, seemed to be willing to embrace that identity, possibly because for 
them it was interchangeable with their own: they were Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia was 
Serb. This is perhaps why the Croats especially appeared highly unwilling to adopt 
such an identity; with the already close linguistic and cultural similarities between 
Serbs and Croats, the last thing Croats would voluntarily accept would be a national 
identity so closely linked to the Serbs. Albanians were alienated by the notion of a 
Yugoslav identity because they are non-Slavic. After the reforms of the 1970s, they 
established an ethnic identity of their own that drew its inspiration from Albania 
proper and, in the late 1980s, Albanians in Kosovo demanded that they receive full 
recognition from the authorities as Albanians, not Yugoslavs. Muslims gained a new 
identity at roughly the same time when it was declared that they constituted a 
"nation" of their own. 
Due to their very special position during the Cold War, Yugoslavs were granted 
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a new identity. Seen as very "Western" by their Eastern European neighbours and 
as mavericks in the Soviet sphere of influence, they were the darlings of the Western 
world which sought to keep them from falling under Soviet domination and possibly 
dra\,jing Gi"!:~ece and Italy along with them. Yugoslavs became the leaders of the non-
aligned \,.Jorld and enjoyed a privileged status among Third World countries, notably 
Egypt, whose president, Nasser, attempted to build a socialist state modelled on 
Yugoslavia. Their identity during those years can be characterized by the phrase 
"Something in Between" which was the title of a film that effectively showed how 
truly confus"ing such a position can be. 
As \4e mentioned previously, when Slobodan Milosevic became the champion of 
the Serbs, he helped to forge a new identity for these people, drawing on the warrior 
myth of the past, pointing out the degradations they were suffering and their efrects 
on the future generation as well. He capitalized on the "victim" identity and 
galvanized the Serbs: but not all of them, however, for we have seen that other 
leaders and followers emerged with differing orientations from Milosevic. Thus, it is 
apparent that the Serbian identity splintered to some extent. This is also true of the 
Croats, Slovenes, Muslims and !vlacedonians; in no case did only one person arise to 
fashion an identity for and lead the entire ethnic group. For the Serbs, their 
location \,jithin the country assisted in the splintering of their identity, for those who 
lived in Croatia Or~ Bosnia experienced d-ifferent contexts from those living in Serbia. 
proper or Hontenegro and, hence, they possessed varied identities. 
Once the republics seceded from Yugoslavia, identities underwent enormous 
changes. Some considered themselves citizens of a new, independent st.ate; some 
realized they were nm"! in the minority and rejected such an identity; others believed 
they could hold onto their Yugos'lav identity; still others became passionate 
nationalists. There were those who lost their identities completely, especially after 
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the fighting began and their worlds were turned upside-down. There were others 
who, although their actions would indicate that they were nationalists, rejected that 
identity, insisting they were on ly fighting for their homes. We heard this from Zje lko 
and from the young Serb warrior from Knin. Perhaps nationalism had acquired such 
a bad reputation under Tito's regime that these people could not embrace that 
identity, opting for giving their actions another rationale, another name. 
We learned from some of the secondary interviews that "Serbs are the oldest 
and most courageous people in the Balkans" and that they are "heavenly people" 
because so many of them have laid down their lives fighting for various causes. Such 
statements allow us to see the identities these people have carved out for themselves. 
General Mladic is outraged at being labelled a war criminal, rejecting this identity 
based on his belief that his actions are justified because he was born in that place 
and because the lands have belonged to his ethnic group for centuries. His 
friendship with a woman who was mutilated as a baby during the Second World War 
contributed to his self-identity in a way that is unknown to us, although we might 
speculate that it aroused feelings of compassion, protectiveness, the desire for 
vengeance, and so on. Perhaps Mladic embraces the identity of "avenging angel", 
dedicated to righting old wrongs. It is possible that the Croat paramilitary fighter 
who stated that killing Serbs was hard work because it was "an eye for an eye" and 
there were no compromises espouses the same "avenging ange'" identity that we 
attributeto Mladic. Ethnic hatred may have little to do with the fighting between the 
Serbs and Croats, Serbs and Muslims, or Croats and Muslims; perhaps these people 
are all fighting for their social identities and it just so happens that the others pose 
a threat to those identities. 
The interviewees gave various interpretations of how nationalism related to 
self-identity. Dr. Tomashevich stated that, since we are all still divided along 
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cult:.ur"all'lne:':" it was Unreas.::mableto expect that \.Je could somehow transcend ethnic 
identities. He also maintained that when one's group was under attack, the identity 
associated ',;;lith that group \pjould feel tht~eat.ened as \vell and become the most salient. 
For Paul, nationalism was a kind of "family" feeling. It gave the sense of belonging 
and assisted in sunf'ival. Paul's idea that nationalism is an identification fulfils 
Blc'Om's criteria: it Satisfies primary needs for survival and ensures acceptance 
within the social environment. Jovan informed us that nationalism springs from 
culture and a particular way of life and that, as long as it remains patriotism, it is a 
good thing because it keeps the ethnic culture alive. In other words, nationalism as 
a facet of self-identity is valuable if it helps to maintain the ethnic group and 
culhH""'e; if those bow',daries are transgressed, it becomes an identity that is 
destructive and undesirable. He also pointed out that not everyone belonging to a 
certain ethnic group would have the same view of what was right for the group. Our 
model \.!ould suggest that this is due to the fact that every member of the group has 
his/her m·m unique configuration of social identities which will influence the way 
he/she schematizes nationalism. 
Being a Croat I.Jas an important identity for Tony, although he took pains to 
distance himself from the Ustasha identity. He indicated that, to some extent, the 
Croat identity had been forced on him by others and also that he preferred to think 
of himself as a Yugoslav but, now that the country no longer existed, he had no 
choice but to become a Croat. tvlarijan, on the other hand, acknowledged that he was 
a Croat, but demonstrated clearly that this identity was not in the least salient for 
him. He admitted that, if he were still in former Yugoslavia, he would fight for his 
home and family, but certainly not for his ethnic group. Clearly Marijan has no 
interest in identifying himself with nationalism, despite the fact that he revealed an 
identification with his home and family which might amount to the same thing in terms 
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of consequential actions. 
Peter' 5uggested that nationalism caused identity to undergo a change in that 
people hope to be exalted like the heroes of old, so they govern themselves in 
accordance with thi5 hope. Jovan believes that nationalism appeals mostly to those 
who are not able to derive identities from other sources; nationalism bestows an 
identity upon these people. Furthermore, economic deprivation brings suffering to 
individual identity and self-esteem, giving people a good reason to begin looking for 
a scapegoat. Nationalism is the perfect vehicle for such people. Jovan also admitted 
that, a lthoug h he does not consider himself to be a nationalist an d never was, he had, 
from time to time, felt nationalist sentiments -- something he had rejected because 
these sentiments had not given him a pleasurable experience. According to him, if he 
were still in former Yugoslavia, he would probably be fighting, but not out of ethnic 
hatred; it would be mainly out of self-preservation. Peter, on the other hand, stated 
that he i5 a nationalist bEY"....ause he derives a sense of identity. belonging and 
continuity from it. For this man, nationalism provides roots. It informs him of who 
heis. He acknowledged that anyone who calls him/herself a Yugoslav does so because 
he/she derives personal benefit from such an identity. Paul thought of himself as a 
nationalist, but not a "true" one, because he was not in Yugoslavia fighting. Yet, he 
also admitted that he would probably be fighting first and foremost for his own 
family, then everyone else. Nevertheless, all these scenarios begin with the self: 
nationalism is nothing more than fighting for your home on a grander scale. For 
Paul, simple people will readily fight for nationalism, but more sophisticated 
individuals will not do so until they believe they have the right reason. Milan is an 
ardent nationalist because he places himself into the historical flow of his ethnic 
group and believes it is incumbent upon him to continue this history. His identifica-
tion with his group may very well be the strongest of all those interviewed because 
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he conceptualized himself almost entirely in terms of his ethnic group and its 
fOi~tunes. 
A brief ovel'view of the statements regarding nationalism made by the 
interviewees reveals how closely they connect the phenomenon with identity -- their 
own and that of otherl:'L They demonstrate over and over how per'sonal national"ist 
sentiments are, how much they relate to how these individuals perceive themselves 
and how close is their identification with their ethnic group. They do not speak in 
terms of social movements or even, for the most part, of ideology (except in a 
disparaging manner evidently aimed at other groups); for them, nationalism is §!bol,Jt 
them -- their identities, their emotions, their self-esteem. Some of them embrace it 
in various degrees, others reject it; all of them do so because of what they personally 
derive from it. Those who embrace it shine a very positive light on it; those who 
reject it make it seem negative. These characterizations originate in their ow n 
perceptions regarding their selves. 
The only way we can tru1y understand the phenomenon of nationalism as 
described by these individuals isin light of the various facets of self and social self-
identity. Some have made strong identifications with their ethnic groups while others 
have identified with different social roles. For some, their identification with their 
ethnic group is more salient than for others. Emotions appear to motivate the rational 
choices these poop Ie have made, show n by their references to that sense of be longin g 
and the analogy to the family. Their socialization has taught them values which 
either mak.e them feel a special attachment to their ethnic group or no such 
attachment. These emotions and values form the basis for their actions and their 
decision whether to act. Se If-esteem is an integral part of their response to 
nationalism for, if they embrace it, they derive pleasurable "strokes" from it; if they 
do not, then they fail to experience these positive effects. Being a nationalist makes 
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90me of the interviewees feel good about themselves while it makes others feel 
unoomfortab1e. In short, nations 1i8m seems to be a very personal experience, one that 
is closely connected with feelings about self. If we fail to recognize the intimate 
nature of nationalism and how it relates to the way people perceive their own 
identities, then we fail to grasp the key to understanding the phenomenon. 
Nationalism will forever remain a mystery to us if we fail to connect it with personal 
social identity. 
At the same time, the interviewees discussed the various structural and 
oppOSitional factors which had operated both within former Yugoslavia and from 
outside the country to set the stage for these personal sentiments and identifications. 
Structural and OPPOSitional factors were as important as the psychosocial component 
for they provided the context within which social self-identity took place. These 
factors interacted, as it were, with social self-identity, as they influenced the roles 
peop 1e played an d the identifications they made. To some extent, social self-identity 
reflexively affected the internal structural factors. Further opposition was created 
as a result. The process is an ongoing one as structural factors provide a frame for 
social self-identity which, in turn, acts upon that frame, attempting to reshape it as 
much as possible. The flexibility of the frame will determine to a great degree how 
social self-identity will respond -- whether it will be altered and in what way. The 
same interaction applies to ideology and organization as to structural factors. 
Ideology and organization are part of the frame in which social self-identity operates. 
It is imperative to bear in mind when considering nationalism that there is always an 
ongoing process occurring between the psychosocial element and the frame within 
which it is located, otherwise we will be left with the unidimensional and deterministic 
approaches of the macro perspective or the "mass psychology" of the micro one. 
Therefore, we must come to the same conclusion with the existing, rather 
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skewed, psychological treatments of nationalism at which we arrived with the two 
macro perspectives: they fail to develop the full understanding of the psychosocial 
aspect, as \.4el1 as the integration of the individual with the group. Thus, without the 
psychosocial dimension, they continue to present a somewhat deterministic approach 
to the subjecL We are still left to wondet~ why some human beings embrace what 
appears to be a collective identity when others, who might belong to the same group 
and, indeed, identify with it, do not. 
Towards a Comprehensive !,-lodelof Nationalism 
Our thS'.:Jry, v.Jhich presents the multifaceted nature of the psychosocial 
dimension, attempts to treat individual motivations, not in terms of aggt~egates, but 
"in a more intimate manner, yet still demonstrates that individuals do form close 
connections \..!ith groups and are very much influenced by structural factors. Our 
theory does not attempt to reduce nationalism to a purely idiosyncratic phenomenon, 
""hich would be just as skewed and unidimensional as the existing theories we have 
c!~iticized. What we endeavour to do is to situate the individual squarely within the 
context of the g!~OUP, as well as the structural influences so inescapable in daily life. 
At the same t"ime, we take care not to forget that every group is comprised of 
individuals who bring their m4n frames of reference and agency along with them; that 
structural factors can influence and limit options, but that individuals still have some 
options in terms of their responses. 
When our integrated theory of the individual within his/her context is directed 
specifically to the study of nationalism, we demonsb~ate how idiosyncratic frames of 
reference, motivations and agency take their form and then become part of the social 
phenomenon of nationalism. We establish linkages at the psychosocial level between 
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the individual and the group, the individual and the external world, and, finally. 
between the group and that world. We show how nationalism involves a configuration 
of forces that causes people to turn inwards towards their own group and even 
towards their own personal interests and emotions. The phrase "forsaking all others" 
is most appropriate for the conceptualization of nationalism because it describes 
exactly the process which takes place and, in essence, facilitates the proliferation of 
nationalism. 
Nationalism is all about our selves -- as social actors. We can have no concept 
of our selves without reference to the social, even in the most intimate sphere of our 
emotions and our inner or core selves, because we have no terms for describing those 
things without the social construct known as language. We cannot think about them 
without that system of symbols, We cannot think about our selves in isolation --
there must be reference groups, whether we embrace or reject them. When things 
happen in our world, historically and currently, they affect our selves not just 
directly but also in terms of the social identities that comprise who we are, We 
consider these events in relation to our fate, that of our families, progeny, friends, 
neighbours, and so on. When we feel threatened, we try to surround ourselves with 
allies and form a support network with others who are like us. Anyone not willing to 
join that network isconceived not asan ally but as an enemy. Therefore, we forsake 
all others who do not join with us. Together with our social allies, we can formulate 
a defence against the enemy and its threat. We can act in concert to accomplish that 
which we could not alone. All of us may have different ideas about how we should 
attain our goal, but our goal is the same. If we perceive that our allies are doing 
something that contradicts what we believe, or if we come to realize that we will be 
forced to act in a fashion that is not acceptable because doing otherwise would cause 
us to be expelled by the group, we may reorient our beliefs or we may choose to 
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reject the group as no longer repf'esenting allies and similar others. Yet, at all times, 
we must weigh our own experiences against external factors because we are always 
present within a specific context. Thus, we are engaged in ongoing social interac-
tions which will affect our self-identities, and vice versa. Nationalism will bestow 
upon us a new identity or identities which we can accept or reject. HO\Ciever, it will 
also narrow our social world down to a dichotomous one "'inerein our most positive 
interactions will be only with those whom we believe are like us and allied If/ith us, 
while our most negative ones will be with those whom we have forsaken in order to 
save our selves. Ow~ self-esteem will derive from those pleasurable experiences and, 
in turn, make them more pleasurable. 
Still, this is not the last word on nationalism. We have constructed what we 
believe to be a potentially optimal model of nationalism, employing an integrated, 
holistic approach. Nevertheless, we have not fully fleshed out all aspects of this 
model More study should be done on the effects of powerful emotion, as 1.4as 
mentioned above, to discern whether to be entirely in its grip is a long-term 
phenomenon or one of shorter duration. We need to establish strong linkages 
beh-veen group membership in the abstract and material, or active, membership. It 
wOI..lld be fruitful to examine the sociological constitution of "the group" -- whether 
it is truly a group or, in fact, an aggregate, something qualitatively d'jfferent. HUCr-l 
more work needs to be done to integrate the finer aspects of psychosc-cial 'identlty. 
Gender is a vastly significant issue in terms of the entire model, a matter that could 
not be adequately explored at this juncture. Of course, fieldwork is absolutely 
crucial to further testing of this model. And, finally, cross-cultural comparisons 
would serve to demonstrate the applicability of the model 
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"A" 
QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEWS FOR M.A. THESIS 
1. While you were living in Yugoslavia, what was your impression of the political 
system an d how it operated? 
2. How would you describe nationalism? What does it mean to you? 
3. Do you think that the Yugoslavian political system contributed to the rise of 
nationalisms? 
4. While you were living there, were you aware of any nationalist feelings among 
various ethnic groups? Why or why not? 
5. Did you think anything was being done by the political powers to discourage 
nationalisms from developing? Why or why not? 
6. Were there any other factors in Yugoslavia that contributed to or discouraged 
nationalisms from developing? Was this true for all groups or just some? 
7. Did you feel the nationalistic sentiments, if any, were organized (i.e., like a 
movement) or just feelings among certain peoples? 
8. Did you consider yourself to be a nationalist? Why or why not? 
9. Do you consider yourself to be a nationalist now? Why or why not? 
10. If you were still in Yugoslavia, do you think you would have become a 
nationalist or at least would you be fighting? Why or why not? 
11. What kinds of people do you think become nationalists? Do you think all of 
these people would be willing to fight for their nationalist beliefs? 
12. Do you feelthat nationalism arises spontaneously among people or do they need 
leaders? 
13. Do you think that leaders of nationalist groups and rank-and-file members 
have the same goals? 
14. Do you think that nationalist groups are unified or that people get involved 
merely to suit their own personal goals? 
15. Do you think that nationalism arises out of a particular sociopolitical context 
or just spontaneously, based on ethnic/religious/cultural criteria? Why or why not? 
16. Do you think nationalism is a good thing? Why or why not? 
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"B" 
QUESTIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL INTERVIEWS 
1. How would you describe nationalism? What does it mean to you? 
2. What factors do you think contributed to the rise of nationalism(s) in the 
former country of Yugoslavia? Why? 
3. Do you believe that the nationalistic sentiments in the former country of 
Yugoslavia were organized (i.e., like a movement) or just feelings among certain 
peoples? Why or why not? 
4. Do you believe that nationalism must be organized? Why or why not? 
5. What is a nationalist? How would you describe one? 
6. What kinds of people do you think become nationalists? Why do you think they 
become nationalists? 
7. Do you consider yourself to be a nationalist? Why or why not? 
8. What, if anything, do you personally derive from nationalism? In other words, 
what motivates you, as an individual, to embrace this particular sentiment? 
9. What led you to espouse nationalism? 
10. How would you describe a nationalist organization? 
11. Are you a member of a nationalist organization? If yes, why? If not, why not? 
12. Do you consider yourself to be a leader of a nationalist organization? Why or 
why not? 
13. Do you think that your organization has a pecking order? That is, are there 
different levels in terms of your membership? Are there things that divide your 
membership? Why or why not? 
14. Are there any cleavages among the members of your organization? For 
example, are there divisions among your members due to age, gender, length of time 
in Canada/United States, social or economic status? If not, why not? 
15. What are your organizational goals in terms of nationalism? 
16. What are your personal goals in terms of nationalism? 
17. Do you think that leaders of nationalist organizations have the same goals as 
rank-and-file members? Why or why not? 
18. Do you think that your personal goals or beliefs differ from those of the rest 
of the organization? If so, in what way? If not, why not? 
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19. How far would you personally be willing to go in terms of actions for the 
attainment of your nationalistic goals? 
20. How far would your organization be willing to go in terms of actions for the 
attainment of nationalistic goals? 
21. If you were in the former country of Yugoslavia, would you be actively 
engaged in politics? Why or why not? 
22. If you were in the former country of Yugoslavia right now, would you be 
fighting? Why or why not? 
23. Do you think nationalism is a good thing? Why or why not? 
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